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ABSTRACT
LOVE’S LACK: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EROS AND POVERTY IN
PLATO’S SYMPOSIUM
Lorelle D. Lamascus
Marquette University, 2010
This dissertation responds to a long-standing debate among scholars regarding the
nature of Platonic Eros and its relation to lack. The more prominent account of Platonic
Eros presents the lack of Eros as a deficiency or need experienced by the lover with
respect to the object needed, lacked, or desired, so that the nature of Eros is construed as
self-interested or acquisitive, subsisting only so long as the lover lacks the beloved
object. This dissertation argues that such an interpretation neglects the different senses of
lack present in the Symposium and presents an alternative interpretation of Eros based on
the Symposium’s presentation of Eros as the child of Poverty and Resource.
Chapter one examines the origin and development of the position that Platonic
Eros is acquisitive or egocentric and the influence this has had on subsequent
interpretations of Plato’s thought. Chapter two argues that Diotima’s theogony of Eros
that presents him as a child of Poverty and Resource is central to understanding the
account of Eros propounded in her discourse. Chapter three examines the development
and refinement of the concepts of lack and poverty that are offered alongside those of
Eros throughout Socrates’ account of Eros in the Symposium. Chapters four and five
discuss the relationship of these concepts of lack to the depiction of Eros as an
intermediary and the ethical consequences of this relationship. Chapter six shows how
the disposition of poverty serves as the source of the erotic ascent toward the vision of the
beautiful itself. Chapter seven, drawing upon the analysis of previous chapters, argues
that the reexamination of the role of poverty in the Symposium reveals that the account of
Eros offered there describes a katharsis of the affective element in human beings, parallel
to the katharsis of the rational element described in Plato’s Phaedo. This katharsis
involves the embrace of poverty as a way of living, loving, and knowing. Thus, the
poverty of Eros does not indicate a lack that is egocentric or acquisitive, but describes a
kind of asceticism or spiritual discipline that is requisite for the philosophical and moral
life.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

Plato’s treatment of Eros in the Symposium presents Eros as the child of Poverty
(πενα) and Resource (προς), and this is central to understanding the nature of Eros. The
more prominent interpretation of the Symposium’s account of Eros presents this poverty
as a lack or need experienced by the lover with respect to the object needed, lacked, or
desired, so that the nature of Eros is construed as self-interested or acquisitive, subsisting
only so long as the lover lacks the beloved object.1 This assessment of Eros, however,
does not resonate with Plato’s presentation of Eros in the Symposium or his other works
in which Eros and reason are presented as properly in accord with one another The moral
life and the philosophical life alike depend on properly trained or directed Eros. Indeed,
in the context of the Symposium, the philosopher and a mythical personification of Eros
are portrayed as poor and homeless; what this poverty (πενα) expresses is an appropriate
detachment from transient goods and an appropriate directing of Eros towards eternal and
unchanging goods, participation in which is the end or goal of the moral and
philosophical lives. The poverty of Eros does not indicate a lack that is egocentric or
acquisitive, desiring to possess private goods for its own pleasure; rather the poverty of
Eros describes a kind of asceticism or spiritual discipline that is requisite for the
philosophical and moral life. As a way and not merely a lack, Eros becomes a certain
disposition in the lover that leads the lover to the Good.
1

Gregory Vlastos, “The Individual as Object of Love in Plato,” in Platonic Studies, vol. 1
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973) 3-42; Anders Nygren, Agape and Eros,
translated by Philip Watson (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1953).
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Chapter one discusses the major interpretations of Platonic Eros from the last
century, and traces the origin and development of the position that Platonic Eros is
acquisitive or egocentric and the influence this has had on subsequent interpretations of
Plato’s thought. Though there is a good amount of literature examining the nature of
Eros, the relationship between poverty and Eros is not sufficiently taken into account in
this literature. This is, in part, because little heed is paid to Diotima’s mythological
account of the parentage of Eros and the way this account affects the interpretation or
meaning of the ladder of love she subsequently describes. Egocentric accounts of Eros
fail to note that the attitude or disposition of properly directed Eros not only precludes a
grasping desire to possess or dominate the beloved, but necessitates an attitude of poverty
toward objects and persons that loves them in allowing them to be what they are. I argue
that the examination of the role that poverty plays in the understanding of Eros will show
that such an account is unsatisfactory. This chapter concludes by noting that the role of
poverty is essential to a proper and complete understanding of Eros and that the
understanding of the relationship between poverty and Eros provides the foundation for
understanding that Eros is not merely or even primarily acquisitive and egocentric.
Rather, this relationship shows that Eros is better understood as activity and disposition.
Chapter two examines the roles of theogony and myth in the Symposium as a
whole in order to show that the theogonic account of Eros given by Diotima is crucial to
understanding the account of Eros contained in her discourse. Based on the use of
theogony and myth in the speeches throughout the Symposium, I argue that the theogony
given by Diotima presents the nature of Eros in which she grounds her prescription for its
proper use and work.
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Chapter three examines the concepts of poverty and lack present in the
Symposium and Platonic dialogues from the same period. From the beginning of
Socrates’ examination of Agathon until the end of Socrates’ speech, the theme of lack
emerges in various forms, and is manifest in three different Greek terms: νδεια, πενα, and
φθονα. Socrates’ speech, in its discussion of Eros, moves from treating its relation to
νδεια, to its relation to πενα, and finally presents it as φιλοσοφα φθονος. I argue that
these are three distinct concepts of lack present in Socrates’ speech in the Symposium,
and that the sense of lack develops and changes alongside that of Eros as the speech
progresses. Of these three words that express the lack of Eros, πενα, or poverty, stands
out as holding special significance for understanding the lack of Eros because of its
presence in the myth of Eros’s origins and because of its thematic presence in the
dialogue as a whole. The evidence of the dialogue and evidence from the Greek tradition
prior to and contemporary with Plato, e.g., as present in Hesiod, Xenophon, and
Aristophanes, shows that the concept of πενα is associated with a disposition of
moderation. This disposition is, I argue, fundamental to Plato’s conception of Eros.
Chapter four examines the relationship between the lack of Eros and his
intermediate nature. Proceeding from the articulation of Eros as involving lack, this
chapter shows that the conception of Eros as deficient leads to the conceptions of Eros as
intermediary, and as daimon. The initial discussion of lack leads to the exposition of
Eros as necessarily relational, and further to Diotima’s description of Eros as existing
between various sets of opposites and thus as intermediate or µεταξ". It is this
intermediate status that identifies Eros as a daimon and the human being who understands
the daimonic as the daimonic man. There is a traceable development, then, of the
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concept of the intermediate in Diotima’s discourse, one that begins with the recognition
of Eros’s lack, and derives from this lack a structure of Eros that expresses its
metaphysical reality and the human psychological experience of this reality. This chapter
articulates this development and shows that the consequences of Eros’s intermediacy are
embodied in his portrayal as daimon, particularly in the manner in which he includes both
Προς and Πενα in his nature.
Given that Eros is an intermediate, the question arises as to the consequences of
this status for the relationship of Eros to virtue. Chapter five responds to this question by
examining Diotima’s remarks concerning the use (χρεα) and work (ργον) of Eros. I
argue that we should understand ‘use’ not as an instrumental means to acquiring some
object, but rather as the appropriate directing of an activity proper to an individual being
toward its proper end. Eros has a proper use and a proper work, according to the kind of
being to which he is joined. Eros, like the cosmos he inhabits, is subject to rational order,
and, though Eros animates the cosmos and causes all beings to strive toward participation
in immortality, he causes this striving in accordance with the proper end of each kind of
being. Consequently, his proper use for human beings is to lead them toward states of
ε$δαιµονα, and his proper work is manifest in the various kinds of procreation that afford
them participation in immortality.
Chapter six shows how the nature of Eros as an intermediate binding together
Προς and Πενα functions as the cause (α%τα) that moves individuals upward in the ascent
to the vision of the beautiful itself. The understanding of Eros as poor and as disposition
in the lover as he makes his ascent is depicted at each level of the ascent. Poverty, as it
appears in the discussions of immortality, procreation, and ascent, is revealed as
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dispositional, in relation to a resourcefulness and productivity, and is embedded in the
descriptions of Eros that occur at each level of soul; in the ascent passage itself it appears
in the ‘relaxing’2 of the soul’s passion toward objects it has found σµικρς in relation to
other objects; it is captured in the description of the penultimate stage of the ascent,
which presents the lover as procreating in φιλοσοφα φθονος, and is the precondition for
the vision of beauty itself.
The final chapter, drawing upon the analysis of previous chapters, argues that the
reexamination of the role of poverty in the Symposium reveals that the account of Eros
offered there describes a κθαρσις of the affective element in human beings, parallel to the
κθαρσις of the rational element described in Plato’s Phaedo. Consequently, the poverty
of Eros describes a disposition that is the necessary condition for the final vision of
Beauty as well as a habit or practice by which this disposition is maintained.
The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between poverty and Eros
as it exists in the Symposium. Some reference will be made to dialogues generally agreed
to be from the same period of Plato’s thought and writing.3 This study does not propose
to put forward a comprehensive theory of love, or to demonstrate the development of a
Platonic theory of love as emerging from the generally accepted chronological order of
the dialogues. Rather, it is intended to examine the nature of the lack or poverty that is

2
3

Symposium 210b5, 211b6, c1.

R. E. Allen suggests that the Symposium should be read with the Protagoras, given the
presence of most of the same characters in both dialogues. He cites Cornford and Robin
as suggesting that it is a “companion piece” to the Phaedo. The Dialogues of Plato, vol.
2: The Symposium, translated with comment by R. E. Allen (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1991) 8-12.
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presented as essential to the nature of Eros in the Symposium and to demonstrate the
development of this concept alongside the concept of Eros in that same dialogue.
In what follows, I will discuss the major schools of Platonic interpretation, and
then present the major interpretations of Platonic Eros from the twentieth century, with
special attention to the development and influence of the position that the lack of Eros
indicates that it is egoistic or egocentric. The first section discusses global issues of
interpretation, including schools adhering to esoteric hermeneutics, the chronology of the
Platonic dialogues, and the importance of the dialogue form. In the second section, I will
discuss authors writing in the early part of the twentieth century, prior to the rise of the
discussion of the putatively egocentric nature of Eros. My discussion here centers on
Cornford’s presentation, which is in general agreement with those given by Grube,
Robin, and Friedländer.4 In the third section, I will focus on the scholarly debate that
becomes popular in the second half of the twentieth century, and focuses on the
egocentric or egoistic nature of Eros that develops in response to Nygren’s Agape and
Eros and Vlastos’s landmark article, On the Individual as Object of Love.5 In the fourth
section, I will discuss some responses to the view that Platonic Eros is egoistic or

4

F. M. Cornford, “The Doctrine of Eros in Plato’s Symposium,” in The Unwritten
Philosophy and Other Essays, edited with an introductory memoir by W.K.C. Guthrie
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950; reprint Aylesbury: Hazell Watson &
Viney Ltd., 1967); G. M. A. Grube, Plato’s Thought (Boston: Beacon Press, 1958); Paul
Friedländer, Plato, 3 vols., translated by Hans Meyerhoff (New York: Pantheon Books
Inc., 1958); Léon Robin, La Théorie Platonicienne de l’Amour (Paris: Félix Alcan et
Guillaumin Réunies, 1908). Though his writings date from a later period, this view is
also in accord with that articulated by W. K. C. Guthrie in A History of Greek
Philosophy, vol. 4 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1978).
5

Nygren, op. cit.; Vlastos, op. cit.
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egocentric that attempt to show that this rendering of Platonic Eros is, at best, a partial
and incomplete account of Plato’s thought on the subject.

A Note on Interpretation

The scholarship regarding Plato and his Symposium is extensive; in addition to the
works commenting on Plato’s thought generally and on the Symposium in particular,
there are traditions and schools of interpretation that have influenced the long discussion
in Plato scholarship. These schools and traditions of interpretation pose a particularly
difficult problem for anyone attempting a history of the literature and debate on a
particular topic. This is, in part, due to the different ways in which such schools and
traditions may be divided. Where one author divides interpreters according to their
acceptance or rejection of esoteric doctrine,6 another divides them according to their
acceptance or rejection of the systematic nature of Plato’s work.7 In addition to these
global issues of interpretation, there is disagreement as to whether any accurate
chronology of Plato’s dialogues can be achieved and whether this should influence the

6

Francisco J. Gonzalez, The Third Way: New Directions in Platonic Studies (Lanham,
Md: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1995) 1-22.

7

E. N. Tigerstedt, Interpreting Plato (Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell International,
1977). Tigerstedt draws a distinction between those who see philosophy as system and
those who see system as anathema to philosophy, resulting in two approaches to
interpreting Plato—as a coherent and consistent system or as a continuing and developing
search for truth and understanding. He also draws attention to two other much-debated
issues in Platonic interpretation: Plato’s choice of the dialogue form and his use of irony.
These two aspects of Plato’s work create special difficulties for understanding Plato’s
thought because they make it difficult to make unequivocal claims about Plato’s
intentions in his writings.
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interpretation of the individual dialogues.8 The Tübingen school is a proponent not only
of esotericism but also of reconstructing Plato’s “system of philosophy” on the basis of
Plato’s esoteric doctrine.9 Students of Leo Strauss hold to a kind of esotericism distinct
from that of the Tübingen school, are in fact critical of the approach of this school, and
generally resist an approach to Platonic interpretation that attempts to reconstruct a
“system of philosophy”.10 I mention these very different kinds of esotericism to
emphasize the difficulty of giving a brief critique or assessment of esotericism in Platonic
interpretation. This is further difficult because, prior to the very explicit esotericism of
Straussians and the Tübingen school, scholars did consider many of the same issues taken
up by the esotericists as part of their interpretation of Plato.11 The esotericists of the
Tübingen sort are distinguished primarily by making the esoteric doctrine the primary or
superior instrument of interpretation, rather than taking the Platonic dialogues as the

8

John Cooper, introduction to Plato: Complete Works (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing
Company, 1997) vii-xviii.
9

C. J. de Vogel, Rethinking Plato and Platonism (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1986) 3-56; W. K.
C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, vol. V: The Later Plato and the Academy
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978) includes a good discussion of the
interpretive problems inherent in the approach of the Tübingen school. See in particular
pages 420-423.
10

Stanley Rosen, Plato’s Symposium, Second Edition (New Haven and London: Yale
University Press, 1987).

11

See for instance John Burnet, Greek Philosophy: Thales to Plato, Reprint Edition
(London: MacMillan and Company, Limited, 1932); W. K. C. Guthrie History, vols. IV
and V; F. M. Cornford, Principium Sapientiae: The Origins of Greek Philosophical
Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1952); Friedrich Solmsen, Plato’s
Theology, Cornell Studies in Classical Philology, vol. 28, edited by Harry Caplan, James
Hutton, and H. L. Jones (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1942; reprint New York:
Johnson Reprint Corporation, 1967).
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primary source.12 The Straussians are distinguished, similarly, by their emphasis on
irony and silence in the interpretation of Platonic dialogues. Thus, what they have in
common as esotericists is their use of an unknown as an instrument for understanding
Plato.
The students of Leo Strauss adopt varying interpretive positions, but in general
share the view expressed by Rosen, that irony is “the central problem in the interpretation
of Plato”.13 A consequence of this position is an emphasis on the meaning of what
remains unsaid within a given dialogue. This has the rather happy consequence of
encouraging readers to enter into the dialogue itself, submitting to what Rosen calls a
“medicinal rhetoric” that aims to turn the souls of men toward the good.14 There is, I
think, some value, especially pedagogically, in the position Stanley Rosen adopts: “The
first step in the study of Plato is easy to state, even trivially obvious, and yet seldom
honored: to see the dialogues in their own words, independently of presuppositions
derived from modern conceptions of historical development or sound argumentative
technique”, but he follows this statement with the claim that the result of this step is to
recognize irony as “the central problem in the interpretation of Plato” and consequently
fails to meet his own standards, since the appeal to this use of irony is based on a view of
12

It is notable that Stanley Rosen criticizes them on just this point, i.e., for making the
Platonic dialogues secondary in their interpretation of Plato.

13

Rosen, Symposium, xlii. Rosen also complains that modern readers have lost an
appropriate sense of irony (in part because of a lack of persecution of writers!) and so
have more trouble in understanding Plato. I can only think he has not read his Walker
Percy and so had his attention drawn to the deeply ironic nature of the American
Southerner. Perhaps, given the Southerner’s naturally ironic disposition, it is to this
quadrant that we should turn for better Platonic interpretations.
14

Rosen, xlviii.
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the historical political position of an author in Ancient Greece.15 In part because I
disagree with such undue emphasis on one feature of Plato’s dialogues, and in part
because I think it is difficult to make a convincing argument for the truth of what Plato
did not say, I have not devoted much space to interpretations that appeal primarily to
irony and silence as hermeneutic principles.16
Such are, in brief, some of the difficulties inherent in esotericism and in
conversing with its proponents. As I noted above, however, several issues taken up by
esotericists have long formed a part of the scholarly discussion of Plato and Platonism.
Among these are the influence on Plato of the Pre-Socratics, Pythagoreanism, Orphicism,
and Greek Mystery religions generally, and the use that Plato made of these traditions.
The Symposium, in particular, is noted for its allusions to Greek Mystery religions and
consequently some discussion of these aspects of the dialogue will form a part of the
interpretation I offer here. In discussing these aspects of Plato’s dialogues, I make no
claim to special knowledge, nor do I employ the interpretive methods of esotericism.
Rather, I turn to these dramatic features of Plato’s work in recognition of their
significance to the medium in which Plato chose to convey his thought.
It seems neither possible nor desirable to separate Plato’s philosophy from the
setting in which he placed it, and so also that the dialogue form, the dramatic structure of
the dialogue one is studying, its relationship to other dialogues, its language, and various
15

Rosen, xlii. His further remark that “What counts is the application of sound
techniques in a particular case and the “soundness” of the techniques can be finally
judged only by their results” (xxxix) is a bit dubious if not an explicit begging of the
question.

16

The interested reader can peruse the works of Seth Benardete, Allan Bloom, Leo
Strauss, and Stanley Rosen, among others.
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other dramatic elements bear significantly upon the interpretation of any given Platonic
dialogue. In short, whatever argument is being made can only be understood within the
context of the dialogue—in both its philosophical and dramatic elements. Consequently,
I will make use of such features in articulating my own interpretation of Plato.
A second prominent issue in Platonic interpretation is the chronology of the
dialogues and whether the relationship of the dialogues to one another must be
understood with respect to their chronology. Recently, John Cooper has argued against
the position that the dialogues should be understood as revealing the development of
Plato’s thought based on their chronological order.17 The primary issues are that there is
some dispute regarding both the method for dating the dialogues and the precise dating of
the dialogues. This has at times resulted in particular dialogues being understood as
belonging to the wrong period. The changeable nature of the dating of the dialogues
seems then to pose an obstacle to understanding Plato’s work. Nonetheless, it has been
common throughout the twentieth century for Plato scholars to refer to dialogues as
belonging to the early, middle, or late periods, and to consider the chronological place of
a dialogue when interpreting it. In particular, the chronological order of dialogues is used
as a guide as to which dialogues may be profitably read together and as a means to make
sense of apparent disparities in the positions affirmed in dialogues from different periods.
Such reference to the chronological order of the dialogues should be distinguished from a
strict adherence to chronology that uses chronology as the dominant or guiding

17

Cooper, xii-xviii.
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hermeneutic principle.18 A complete lack of attention to issues of chronology, however,
might lead to the conclusion that there is no consistency to Plato’s thought whatsoever
and also no development in his approach to philosophical problems. Either of these
extremes seems to pose problems for readers of Plato.

Platonic Eros in the Early Part of the Twentieth Century

In the early part of the twentieth century, writers such as Cornford and Grube
describe Eros as a “fund of energy”19 or “stream of desire”20 that can be trained or
directed toward different objects. This understanding of the Symposium’s account of
Eros draws on the teachings of other Platonic dialogues, especially those of the Republic,
Phaedrus, and the Phaedo. Understood with these other dialogues, as a part of Plato’s
moral philosophy and as related to the tripartite division of the soul, Eros is viewed as the
moving force of the soul, as neither good nor evil in itself, but as taking its goodness
from the object toward which it is directed. Cornford’s interpretive approach is
organized around four central points: the nature of Eros itself; the mythical
representation of Eros, especially as it portrays Eros as an intermediate or metaxy;21 the

18

Terence Irwin’s Plato’s Moral Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), for
example, studies Plato’s approach to ethics as it develops according to the chronological
order of the dialogues; the study is predicated on the idea that the chronological order of
the dialogues reveals a development of Plato’s thought.
19

F. M. Cornford, “The Doctrine of Eros in Plato’s Symposium,” 71.

20

Grube, 115.

21

The development of the concept of eros as metaxy is more developed in the writings of
Paul Friedländer, Plato, vol. 1, An Introduction, translated by Hans Meyerhoff (New
York: Pantheon Books Inc., 1958), 32-58.
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relation of the nature of Eros to the education of Eros described in the ascent passage; and
the final end of Eros, i.e., participation of the soul in immortality by virtue of its vision of
the forms. Cornford’s interpretation is characterized by approaching an understanding of
Eros in relation to the soul and to the end of man, not in isolation from these. The
following passage from Cornford explains Eros in this way, using as its starting point the
tripartite division of the soul articulated in the Republic:
Hence it appears that we are not to think of the soul as divided into reason,
a thinking part, on the one side, and irrational appetite on the other; or of
the internal conflict as between passionless reason, always in the right, and
passion and desire, usually in the wrong. That analysis would point to an
ascetic morality of the repression and mortification of the flesh, the
extinction of passion and desire, leaving only dispassionate
contemplation.[…]But the Republic is concerned with this life and the best
that can be made of our composite nature, in which all three forms of
desire claim their legitimate satisfaction. Hence the conception of virtue is
centred in the notion of a harmony of desires—a condition in which each
part pursues its appropriate pleasure and finds it truest satisfaction,
without thwarting or perverting the others. There is for each type of man
one best possible balance or harmony of various desires. The condition
may not be perfect; but it is more stable and happier than any other.
Beyond this lies an ideal solution, which would produce the perfect
individual. In the later books of the Republic that solution is stated on the
intellectual side. There is a higher education which might end in perfect
knowledge and fashion the only type of man who ought to take control of
human society—the philosopher-king. But the process is not purely
intellectual; it involves the education of desire. This aspect is developed
in the Symposium, in the theory of Eros, the name for the impulse of desire
in all its forms. We are now to learn that the three impulses which shape
three types of life are not ultimately distinct and irreducible [71] factors,
residing in three separate parts of a composite soul, or some in the soul,
some in the body. They are manifestations of a single force or fund of
energy, called Eros, directed through divergent channels towards various
ends. This conception makes possible a sublimation of desire; the energy
can be redirected from one channel to another. The flow can be diverted
upwards or downwards. The downward process is analysed in the eighth
and ninth books of the Republic. It leads to the hell of sensuality in the
tyrannical man. The upward process is indicated in the Symposium.22

22

Cornford, “The Doctrine of Eros in Plato’s Symposium,” 70-1.

14

In Cornford’s analysis, Eros is the general name given to the experience of desire,
regardless of the objects toward which it is directed.23 This emphasizes a fact of human
experience: that we feel ourselves moved by objects other than ourselves and that these
objects are the catalyst for our desires, our deliberations, and subsequent actions.
Cornford’s analysis focuses on the psychological fact of desire and on Plato’s description
of it; what are experienced as diverse desires for diverse objects are then explained in
terms of one desire which may be directed toward diverse objects. Just as the eye views
many objects that all belong to the visible with the power of sight, so Eros is directed
toward many objects that are, in one way or another, desirable. What distinguishes types
of Eros are their respective objects, the same objects that distinguish the three types of
lives in the Republic, as each is characterized by directing its desire toward the
pleasurable, honorable, or good itself.
It is in this last sense, in Cornford’s view, that Eros is intermediate, and this
intermediate status is depicted in (and at least in part the reason for) the myth of his
origins. As a ‘fund of energy’ it is intermediate because it can be directed upward or
downward; Cornford shows this in his interpretation of the Symposium’s discussion of
Eros as intermediate, and so also draws attention to the contribution of the mythical
depiction of Eros to Diotima’s discourse as a whole:
In mythical terms, Eros is neither god nor mortal, but a daimon
intermediate between the two—one of those spirits through whom
intercourse between the divine and mortal worlds is maintained. For the
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object of Eros is to be found in both worlds, the seen and the unseen; here
there is visible beauty, a likeness of the invisible beauty yonder; and Eros
lends to Psyche the wings that will carry her across the boundary. But the
point here is that desire, in itself, is neutral, neither good nor bad; it takes
its value from its object.24
The psychological experience of Eros is connected with its metaphysical explanation in
Cornford’s analysis. The experience of a ‘fund of energy’ that can be directed toward
different objects is also identified as the moving force of the soul; Eros is not merely
experiential, but has its being in the soul itself.25 Cornford writes that “in Plato the soul
which is detached from the body is the rational intelligence, moved by its own
characteristic desire to recover the antenatal vision of truth.”26 This ‘characteristic desire’
is Eros, and it is the means by which the soul moves toward the divine.
The final two aspects of Cornford’s analysis to which I would like to draw
attention are the final end of Eros and the ascent to this final end. Because Eros is joined
to the soul as its motive force, Eros and the soul share the same final end—the source of
goodness and beauty that is the goal of the ascents in both the Symposium and the
Republic. Similarly, the ascents of these two dialogues describe the progress of the
affective and rational elements of the soul, respectively. Based upon his understanding of
the nature of Eros and its relation to the soul, Cornford views the ascent passage in
relation to the theory of education and training of desire in the Republic.
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The Greater Mysteries of Eros begin where the musical education of the
Republic ends; namely in the passion for beauty and goodness as revealed
in an individual person. The purpose of that lower education is to produce
in the soul reasonableness, the rhythms of harmony and grace, and
simplicity of character. These qualities, it is hinted, are images, existing in
individual souls, of the eternal ideals of temperance, courage, and the
other virtues. Such an image, says Socrates, is ‘the loveliest object of
contemplation to him who is able to behold it’. It inspires the passion of
love in the ‘musical man’. The love of beauty in an individual person is
meant, though the physical side of this passion is expressly excluded.
‘Music’, Socrates concludes, ends where it should end, in the passion for
beauty.
Now in Diotima’s discourse the Greater Mysteries of Eros take this
for their point of departure. They describe the conversion of Eros from the
love of a single beautiful person to the love of Beauty itself. The upward
journey of emotion runs parallel to the upward journey of the intellect in
the mathematical and dialectical studies of the Republic. The intellect
soars from the world of sense to the source of truth and goodness; but the
wings on which it rises are the wings of desire for the source of beauty.
The true self, the divine soul, is not a mere faculty of thought and
dispassionate contemplation of truth; it has its own principle of energy in
the desire kindled by goodness in the guise of the beautiful. The
intimations of immortality already discernible in the lower forms of Eros
are now confirmed when its true nature is disclosed as a passion for
immortality in an eternal world.27
This analysis emphasizes not only the parallel motions of Eros and reason in their
respective ascents but also the nature of the soul in the ascent.28 Eros and reason alike
must undergo conversion in the process of education in order to attain the vision of the
good itself.
27
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The ascents discussed in the Republic, Phaedo, Symposium, and Phaedrus have been
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In view of the soul’s nature as divine, the Eros that moves the soul upward is an
Eros directed toward divinity and the immortality proper to divinity. The final end of
Eros is participation in immortality, but not merely the mortal immortality that is
described at the lower levels of Eros. Rather, because the soul is itself divine, it
participates in the kind of immortality proper to divinity, the immortality that consists in
being always the same.
At last [the final stage of Eros in the Symposium] by the strength gathered
in these regions of contemplation, the soul becomes capable of a
revelation that comes, if it comes at all, ‘suddenly’. Plato here borrows
from the Eleusinian mysteries the language of the Sacred Marriage and of
the final revelation, when the ancient symbols of divinity were disclosed
to the purified initiate in a sudden blaze of light. The soul is united with
the divine Beauty, and itself becomes immortal and divine. The offspring
of the marriage are not phantoms of goodness like those images of virtue
which first inspired love for the beautiful person. The child of Love and
Beauty is true virtue, dwelling in the soul that has become immortal as the
lover and the beloved of God.29
The attention to myth, the intermediate status of Eros, the depiction of Eros as a
daimon, and to the various formulations of the meaning of the term Eros are present in
other authors of the same period. Both Léon Robin and Paul Friedländer focus on the
portrayal of Eros as a daimon, as intermediate, and on the implications of the myth of
Eros in Diotima’s speech as important to understanding the nature of Eros depicted in
that dialogue.30 The salient feature of this interpretation is its characterization of Eros a
source or fund of energy; from this understanding of the nature of Eros, Platonic Eros is
joined to Platonic education understood as a channeling of this common source or fund of
29
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energy, the energy or power to move that belongs to the soul and may be directed by
reason. Thus, as Guthrie has written, the soul is described as “not simply reason, but eros
totally absorbed in the quest for truth”.31
The writers of this period focus on the issue of Eros’s lack only inasmuch as it is
part of the myth of his origins and as part of the dialectical movement to establish the
intermediate nature of Eros. The definition of Eros as lack of the desired object that is
the result of Socrates’ questioning Agathon is treated as a step away from a false
conception of Eros as beautiful and good himself and as necessarily inculcating virtue in
those who follow him; and as a step toward the conception of Eros as intermediate
between good and evil. The depiction of Eros as poor, deficient, or needy does not
feature largely in these discussions, though it is discussed in the context of the myth of
Eros’s origins. The authors are also alike in applying the nature of Eros as established
through a discussion of his intermediate nature to the ascent passage, which is to say that
the goodness of Eros is determined by its object. It is notable, however, that though
poverty and lack are not made thematic in the writers of this period, both Rohde and
Cornford connect the ascent passage of the Symposium with the κθαρσις of the Phaedo.32
None of the authors cited above, however, treat the theme of poverty or lack as it emerges
in the dialogue alongside the developing concept of Eros. As we shall see in the next
section, the issue of Eros’s lack becomes central to the scholarly discussion in the latter
part of the twentieth century.
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Platonic Eros in the Mid- to Late-Twentieth Century:
The Rise of the Egoistic Interpretation

The Platonic scholarship of the last half of the twentieth century has been
dominated by debate over the egoistic or egocentric nature of Eros.33 Noting the
characterization of Eros as a desire for what the lover lacks, scholarly discussion centers
on the question of whether Eros is solely acquisitive or egocentric in nature, leaving no
room for love for another person for her own sake.34 This is perhaps due to the influence
of Anders Nygren who is frequently noted for his indictment of Eros as acquisitive and
egocentric; indeed his work seems to set the stage for much subsequent discussion.35 The
philosophical discussion that develops in response to Nygren’s work focuses on two
33
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primary and related issues: the problem of egoism in ancient conceptions of love and the
question of what constitutes an adequate theory of love.36 In some authors, the two issues
are not clearly separated from one another; others seem to attempt a response to one
within the context of the other, and this seems only to obscure the issue at hand. What
seems to pervade the discussion, from Vlastos forward, is the idea that Eros, because it
involves lack or deficiency, is always seeking to acquire what it lacks, and so is, in some
sense at least, vulnerable to Nygren’s charges.37 This understanding of Eros is then
further examined within the context of a theory of love, implicitly or explicitly expressed,
that views the love between two individuals as paradigmatic or at the very least as an
indispensable component of a theory of love, and it must be included that this love has a
self-sacrificial character; altruism is its test.38
Gregory Vlastos, for instance, in his (1973) article The Individual as an Object of
Love in Plato, criticizes Nygren for neglecting “to reckon with the fact that philia is a
near-synonym of agape”39 and proceeds to search Plato’s treatments of both philia and
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Eros for the understanding “that to love a person we must wish for that person’s good for
that person’s sake, not for ours….”40 In his treatment of the Symposium, Vlastos
concludes that “…the individual cannot be as lovable as the Idea; the Idea, and it alone, is
to be loved for its own sake; the individual only so far as in him and by him ideal
perfection is copied fugitively in flux.”41 Vlastos acknowledges that Platonic Eros is not
“as “egocentric” and acquisitive” as Nygren has claimed: it is only too patently
Ideocentric and creative.”42 But in the end, he attributes to it “the spiritualized
egocentricism of Socratic philia.”43 Though Vlastos recognizes that Eros ends in creative
activity that produces beautiful things, he holds that this activity is still egoistic since “it
is not said or implied or so much as hinted at that “birth in beauty” should be motivated
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by love of persons—that the ultimate purpose of the creative act should be to enrich the
lives of persons who are themselves worthy of love for their own sake.”44 The
motivation for “birth in beauty” is limited to the lover’s desire for self-perfection and her
desire to fulfill the experienced deficiency that is characteristic of Eros. Thus, though
Vlastos begins his article by noting the deficiency of Nygren’s account, his final
conclusions regarding Platonic love are not far removed from Nygren’s own. As
Osborne notes:
His [Vlastos’s] article…reflects some of the same concerns as Nygren,
and although Vlastos disagrees with Nygren’s one-sided and inadequate
understanding of what the Greeks could regard as love, he does not
actually break loose from the dichotomy that he inherits from
Nygren…But for Vlastos some charges are still justified against Plato,
though not simply for taking love to be an egoistic tendency, as Nygren’s
challenge had stressed, but also for his failure to value the individual,
seeing in love only an admiration of the qualities that an individual
instantiates, and not the individual as a person in her own right.45
Osborne’s conclusions regarding Vlastos’s work are significant, for scholarship
on the concept of Eros subsequent to Vlastos’s article draw upon his thought and work.
Evidence of this is seen not only in the ubiquitous citing of his article, but also in the
continued presence of the issues of egoism and possibility of the individual as an object
of love in Plato’s thought. Two premises, implicitly or explicitly stated, appear in
subsequent authors: that the concept of self-perfection in Plato is egocentric; and that the
concept of Eros is egocentric.46 Indeed, authors such as Santas seem to begin from the
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assumption that Eros, at least in its structure, is egoistic. Consequently, any attempt to
defend Plato from accusations of egoism begins with its assumption, and generally
follows by appealing to some one aspect or other of Plato’s account that might provide
for the possibility of a love that is not egoistic.47
David Halperin (1985) and Gerasimos Santas (1988) both make use of a
distinction between aim and object borrowed from Freud in interpreting Platonic Eros.48
I have included both formulations of the distinction here because Halperin articulates
more clearly what the “aim” signifies; Santas’s discussion of the distinction, however, is
significant because it contributes to (and perhaps is the basis for) his distinction between
generic and specific Eros. David Halperin, in “Platonic Erôs and What Men Call Love”
explains this distinction and its relevance in the Symposium as follows:
Plato provisionally agrees with his contemporaries, then, in regarding erôs
as a response to the stimulus of visual beauty, but he strenuously disagrees
with them about the nature of that response. Such is the point of
seems unable to avoid the conclusion that eros is also egoistic. It seems, too, that this
exerts its influence on subsequent authors.
47
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Diotima’s crucial and much-neglected distinction between the object and
the aim of erotic desire: ‘ “Erôs is not for the beautiful, Socrates, as you
suppose.” “What is it, then?” “It is for birth and procreation in the
beautiful”’ (206e). Leaving aside for the moment what Diotima means by
‘birth and procreation in the beautiful’, we must first examine the
consequences of her denial that erôs is a desire for beauty. As her later,
celebrated account of the Platonic lover’s contemplative ascent to the
Form of the Beautiful makes clear, Diotima does not intend to repudiate in
the passage I have just quoted the common notion, which she elsewhere
espouses, that beauty is the ultimate object of erôs: indeed, she has already
admitted that erôs has something to do with beauty; it is all about beauty,
as she rather cagily puts it (῎Ερως δ’+στ,ν ρος περ, τ- καλν: 204b3; cf.
203c4, 206e1). Her insistence that erôs is a desire for ‘birth and
procreation in the beautiful’ does not bear at all on the identity of the
erotic object. Rather, in the passage quoted above Diotima is speaking
entirely to the question of the erotic aim—that is, she is attempting to
specify what the lover wants his erotic object for, what he wishes to do
with it or to accomplish by means of it. 49
Similarly, Gerasimos Santas (1988) utilizes the distinction between object and aim in
Plato and Freud: Two Theories of Love.50 Writing on Symposium 204d-205a:
We can understand Diotima’s questions by drawing a distinction between
the object and the aim of Eros, parallel to the distinction Freud draws
between the object and the aim of the sexual instinct: the object is that
from which the attraction emanates or which the lover finds attractive; the
aim is that towards which the instinct of eros strives.51
Applying this distinction, Santas argues that Diotima’s questions indicate that the
beautiful and the good are the objects of Eros. The aim, he asserts, is stated in Socrates’
49
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replies and is summarized as follows: “Happiness is the final aim of all desire, and it
consists in the possession of good things.”52 Santas derives a further proposition from
Socrates’ replies: “The lover of good things loves the good things to be his for the sake of
his own happiness.”53 This last proposition, according to Santas, articulates the “egoistic
model of eros”. This, along with his distinction between aim and object, allows him to
conclude that “Eros is egoistic relative to its aim: in loving good things the aim of the
lover is to make them his own for the sake of his own happiness. And insofar as the lover
is successful in attaining his aim eros would bring happiness to the lover.”54 Thus, Santas
concludes:
For the present, we note that the deficiency and egoistic models of eros go
well together. If one supposes that the source of eros is a perceived
deficiency in the lover, it is natural to think that the lover’s aim will be to
make up that deficiency in himself: he will love others insofar as he
perceives them to be useful or valuable to himself in making up his
deficiencies. This seems to be the conception that Plato has also of philia
in the Lysis.55
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From this conclusion, Santas proceeds to draw a distinction between generic and specific
Eros. He has already distinguished two objects of Eros, the good and the beautiful, and
so distinguishes two kinds of Eros according to these objects.56 The textual ground for
this distinction is found at Symposium 205b, where Diotima argues that the usage of
ποησις is similar to that of Eros, having come to be too narrowly applied given its original
designation. Commenting on this passage, Santas writes:
Generically, poetry is the composing of all these things, but common
linguistic practice gives the name of the whole to only a part of it.
Presumably, this common linguistic use is an abuse because it hides the
whole-part or genus-species relation that exists between poetry in general
and that part of it concerned with music and meters. Similarly, Diotima
continues, generically (to men kephalaion) eros is all desire for good
things and happiness, but those who pursue him in a variety of ways—in
money making, sports, philosophy—are not said to love (eran) and are not
called lovers (erastai), whereas those who pursue him in one particular
form are given the name of the whole, are said to love, and are called
lovers (205d). This too is a linguistic abuse, presumably for the same
reasons: it hides the relation of whole-part or genus-species, which
according to Plato’s theory holds between eros of good things and eros of
beautiful things.57
Generic Eros is “for the good to be one’s own forever.”58 “Taken in context, the
definition says that the object of generic Eros is the good or good things, and that the aim
of the lover is to make these things his own forever for the sake of his own happiness.”59
Santas goes on to examine the ensuing dialogue, and finds in the exchange from 206b-,
the definition of specific Eros: “The characteristic work of specific eros is the begetting
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of offspring on a beautiful object by means of body or soul.”60 The distinction between
generic and specific Eros leads Santas to the conclusion that “unlike the case of generic
eros, it is the beautiful rather than the good that is the attracting object; and unlike the
former case where possession of the good was the aim, here the aim is not to possess the
beautiful but to generate offspring on it.”61
Early on in his discussion of Eros, Santas distinguishes between the “deficiency
model” of love and the “egoistic model” of love. It is notable that the deficiency62 and
egoistic63 models of love are based on propositions derived from Socrates’ elenchus of
Agathon and Diotima’s elenchus of Socrates; thus Santas seems to be at variance with the
view that the initial defining of the term, while not discarded, is neither complete nor the
final formulation of the definition of the term in question. In his concluding treatment of
Eros in the Symposium, he returns to these models:
Several things are noteworthy about eros proper as defined here. It is
constituted by two desires, the desire to beget offspring, and the desire for
the lover’s own immortality. Both desires satisfy the deficiency model,
and the desire for immortality satisfies the egoistic model. Eros is
60
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presumably beneficial to the lover insofar as immortality is something
good. This eros may also be beneficial to the offspring, at least in cases
where the offspring is a sentient being, animal or human; but concern and
care of the offspring is conceived as a means to the lover’s own
immortality. Since the lover’s own immortality is the final aim of this
eros, eros proper can appropriately be said to be egoistic. We shall see
shortly that this is fully confirmed by Diotima’s subsequent explanations.
Second, the definition contains an implicit reference to the relation
between the two desires, that is, between begetting offspring and
immortality: a means-end relation. In humans this relation is recognized
by reason, as Diotima remarks; in animals presumably by instinct. Third,
possession of the beautiful object referred to in the definition is not the
aim of either desire; rather, its role seems to be as the attracting object
which sparks or releases the desire to beget. Later, in the ladder of eros,
beautiful objects also seem to assume the role as well of model for the
creation of offspring. Thus, the structure of eros proper seems different
from that of generic eros: in the latter it is the good rather than the
beautiful that is the attracting object—or perhaps happiness—and it is
possession of it, not generation or creation, that is the aim. Finally, in the
explanation we have reconstructed, the desire for immortality assumes a
new role, independent of its problematic derivation from generic eros:
even if this derivation is mistaken, as it may be, the hypothesis of the
desire for immortality may have genuine validity insofar as it explains the
behavior of courting, mating, and offspring-rearing behavior.64
Drawing upon Santas’s distinction between generic and specific Eros, Timothy
Mahoney has attempted to address the issue of egoism and Eros in “Is Socratic erōs in the
Symposium Egoistic?” (1996) His division of the positions adopted in the literature is
based not only upon authors’ explicit claims regarding egocentrism or egoism and Eros,
but also on the application of Santas’s strong distinction between generic and specific
Eros. Mahoney finds that this distinction is at the heart of fundamental disagreement
among scholars about the nature of Eros itself because he sees the dialogue’s division
into the treatment of generic and specific Eros as corresponding to the dialogue’s division
into a treatment of lesser and greater mysteries, where the lesser mysteries entail egoism
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and the greater mysteries do not. Authors addressing issues of egoism, Mahoney argues,
focus on one or the other of these definitions of Eros as primary in advancing their
arguments, and may thus be catalogued according to whether they focus on generic or
specific Eros.65 Utilizing this method of division, Mahoney identifies three positions in
the literature and describes them as follows:
1) Those who judge it[Eros] to be egoistic focus on what they take to be the
acquisitive and egocentric aspects of Socrates’s claim that erōs is wanting to
possess the good forever for the sake of one’s own eudaimonia (204e-5a, 206a).66
[Mahoney places Vlastos, Kosman, Singer, Nussbaum, and Santas in this
category.]
2) Those who judge it not to be egoistic focus on the benevolent and productive
aspects of erōs: it causes mortals to give birth to and to nurture physical and
‘spiritual’ children (206b), to sacrifice themselves for these children when
necessary (207b), and, at the highest levels of procreation, to give birth to and to
nurture true virtue (212a).67 [Mahoney places Markus, Armstrong, Gould,
65

“Those who claim that Socratic eros is egoistic focus primarily on the portion of the
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highest’ mystery (210a1). This begins her description of the ‘ladder of eros’” (Mahoney,
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renders the question of egocentrism irrelevant; because he frames his question in terms of
egocentrism, his categories of interpretation are not able to reflect the more nuanced
positions of some of the authors he cites. Furthermore, he divides categories one and two
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prior to the strong distinction drawn between these by Santas.
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Brentlinger, Kraut, Moore, Halperin, Price, and, with caveat, Irwin, in this
category.]
3) There is also a third group comprised of [sic] those who claim that erōs is egoistic
at its lower levels, but non-egoistic at its highest level. [Mahoney places
Cornford, Rist, and Moravcsik in this category.] 68
Mahoney’s own position is the third of these, and this position, along with his division of
the literature, reflects the consequences of the scholarly trend to assess the treatment of
Eros in the Symposium in terms of egoism:
At its lower levels, Socratic erōs does not allow that one is motivated to
promote the welfare of others for their own sake independently of a
concern for one’s own immortality and one’s lasting reputation. In so far
as Socratic erōs at these levels never severs one’s concern for others from
these self-centered desires, it is egoistic. But there is good reason to
believe that at the highest level of Socratic erōs the desire for one’s own
immortality and one’s lasting reputation is superseded by the desire to
promote goodness in general. In fact, at the highest level of eros,
promoting goodness in general is one’s preeminent aim and how well one
achieves it is the measure of one’s happiness. Since the preeminent aim at
this highest level of erōs is not self-centered, I conclude that at this level
Socratic erōs in the Symposium is not egoistic.69
Mahoney’s division of the dialogue according to generic and specific Eros, moreover,
appears to be a misconstrual of the structure and division of the dialogue. Socrates draws
the lines of division at the beginning of his speech, when he commends the format of first
articulating the nature of Eros and then speaking of the works of Eros. The section
identified by Mahoney as addressing ‘generic’ Eros is the section that addresses the
nature of Eros; the section he identifies as addressing ‘specific’ Eros is the section that
addresses the works of Eros. This is clearly reflected in the language of the dialogue and
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bears significantly upon its interpretation.70 Further, Vlastos’s note that Diotima never
gives up the first definition of Eros as the desire to possess the good forever is correct;
this definition is understood in a different manner in the second part of the dialogue
precisely because this latter part addresses the works—and so also the manifestations—of
Eros in the cosmos.
The four points that structure Cornford’s explanation of Eros are not immediately
apparent in the treatments of Mahoney and Santas. In these authors, the nature of Eros is
limited to a conception of a desirer who is deficient with respect to the object of his love;
even when engaged in procreation, this desirer is only a desirer possessing his initial
deficiency and because of this possession rendered fecund. The nature of Eros as
intermediate is not developed, nor the significance of his nature as at once προς and πενα;
the relationship of Eros to the education of the soul is almost nonexistent, and the ascent
passage is understood as a series of merely instrumental goods enjoyed on the way to the
final end;71 the final end of Eros as participation in divine immortality is not
distinguished from lower forms of participation in immortality because the distinction
between the two kinds of immortality is not made, and consequently the relevance of this
to understanding the activity characteristic of the highest level of the ladder of love is
missed.
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An aspect of Cornford’s analysis that is perhaps relevant in discussing Mahoney
is his emphasis on Eros as proper to the soul in its “original state”; Mahoney’s divisions
and his own position seem to presuppose that Eros begins with (or as) the basest kind of
desire, that proper to the lowest part of the soul. Halperin and Santas proceed along
similar lines. If one begins with this, then Eros can only become something beyond
appetitive desire by a radical transformation, but always remains, at root the appetitive
desire that drives humans and animals alike toward the satisfactions of hunger, thirst, and
sex.72 But Cornford, having first outlined the tripartite nature of the soul, makes clear
that the Eros in question is not the “lowest common denominator” as Mahoney’s
treatment suggests:
To return to the theory of Eros: the energy which carries the soul in this
highest flight is the same that is manifested at lower levels in the instinct
that perpetuates the race and in every form of worldly ambition. It is the
energy of life itself, the moving force of the soul; and the soul was defined
by Plato precisely as the one thing that has the power of self-motion. The
Platonic doctrine of Eros has been compared, and even identified, with
modern theories of sublimation. But the ultimate standpoints of Plato and
of Freud seem to be diametrically opposed. […]The self-moving energy of
the human soul resides properly in the highest part, the immortal nature. It
does not rise from beneath, but rather sinks from above when the spirit is
ensnared in the flesh. So, when the energy is withdrawn from the lower
channels, it is gathered up into its original source. This is indeed a
conversion or transfiguration; but not a sublimation of desire that has
hitherto existed only in the lower forms. A force that was in origin
spiritual, after an incidental and temporary declension, becomes purely
spiritual again. The opposition to Freud is not merely due to
misunderstanding and prejudice. It is due to the fact that the religious
consciousness of Christianity has been, almost from the first, under the
influence of Platonism.73
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Though Cornford is concerned to differentiate the Platonic theory of Eros from a
Freudian theory of sublimated or repressed desire, he is not troubled by issues of egoism.
Thomas Gould also concerns himself with this issue, though his treatment of Platonic
love is extended to include a discussion of Romantic and Christian love as well, since
such conceptions influence our ability to understand Platonic love on its own terms, and
indeed, contribute to the tendency to criticize its shortcomings by measuring it according
to standards of later eras. The assessment of Eros in terms of egoism indeed seems to be
such a case. The most general response to the charge of egoism would involve
addressing the issue of egoism as a meta-ethical issue, which results in recognizing its
assumptions that (1) there is an underlying human nature and (2) what this nature is
determines the very possibility of egoism with regard to the Eros in question. In brief,
the overemphasis on egoism takes Eros out of its context, and assumes that an
investigation of Eros removed from the context of Platonic metaphysics, epistemology,
and ethics can give an adequate account of Platonic Eros. As R. E. Allen has recently
written, “egoism has as its contrast altruism: but that contrast is otiose if the good of the
self is the good of others.”74 In the next section, I will briefly examine the contributions
of two authors who reject the characterization of Eros as egoistic, and who do so by
appealing to the evidence available in the Platonic corpus.
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Platonic Eros in the Mid- to Late-Twentieth Century:
The Response to the Charge of Egoism

Of those who have responded to the charge that Platonic Eros is egoistic, there are
two in particular I will discuss here because they, more than others, I think, have drawn
together a number of important features of Eros that are present in Diotima’s discourse.
Markus contributes an examination of the varying representations of Eros as god and as
relation, and a discussion of the dialectical movement of the dialogue. These two aspects
of his treatment situate Eros within the metaphysical and psychological on the one hand,
and within Plato’s dramatic and stylistic development of a theme, on the other. Kosman,
in addition to addressing specific issues with the charge of egoism, draws attention to the
presentation of Eros as metaxy and its relationship to lack or being +νδε/ς. In doing so, he
also draws attention to an aspect of Platonic Eros that is conspicuously absent from the
scholarly discussions of Eros as egoistic: the nature of the lack that is taken to be so
central to egoistic Eros. Having understood Eros first and foremost according to the
initial formulation of Eros as a desire for the beloved object that the lover necessarily
lacks, the issue of the nature of this lack is passed over.
Plato’s love is sometimes described as desire for an object not possessed.
But this is a seriously misleading representation of the view found in the
dialogues. It is true that in the Symposium eros is characterized as loving
that which it loves when it doesn’t have it: ο$κ ργον α$τ- ο0 +πιθυµε2 τε κα,
+ρ3. But that characterization does not specify an essential feature of
love’s object; it specifies rather an accidental consequent of a stronger
feature, namely that love is the desire for that of which the love is +νδε/ς,
the desire for what one lacks.
That of which one is +νδε/ς is not simply that which one does not
have, nor which one wants in the sense of desires, but that which one
lacks, or wants in the sense of needing, missing and requiring for the
fulfillment and completion of some nature. That of which a person is
+νδε/ς is thus something to which he has, under some description and
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relative to it, a claim or right. Only relative, of course, to that description:
a person might desire something upon which he had no claim, which in no
sense belonged to him, and still, relative to that desire, be +νδε/ς of the
means of acquiring it.75
Kosman’s analysis points to the need for attention to the nature of the lack of Eros, and
his further analysis in this article suggests that the lack of Eros is similar to the lack of the
sensible world relative to the forms that are its cause.76
In a well-known article, R. A. Markus notes that the elenchus is an important
element in the movement of the dialogue as a whole, from the first speech given by
Phaedrus, glorifying Eros as a god to the subsequent speeches focused on love as a
relation, and back to the glorification of Eros as a god in Agathon’s speech, only to move
once again to Eros as relation in the elenchus.77 These two depictions of Eros—as god
and as relation—are brought together in modified form in Diotima’s mythical account of
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“Since then [Phaedrus’s speech], the tendency, culminating in Aristophanes’ speech,
has been to lay all the stress on the relational quality of love: the principle of affinity of a
part for its counterpart, the cohesive force which unites them in a complete whole.
Agathon now asserts—and it is, except in rhetoric, a bare assertion—that ‘love is, in the
first place, supreme in beauty and goodness, and in the second place the cause of like
qualities in other’ (197 C).
This statement of Agathon’s, is, of course, incompatible with the Aristophanic
account, so far unchallenged, and Socrates pounces on it in his cross-questioning of
Agathon. This bit of the genuine Socratic method is intended to reintroduce into the
discussion the relational quality of love and adds nothing to the substance of what
Aristophanes has already said except Agathon’s easily won consent. The upshot of the
discussion is that ‘love’ is a word which can only be used meaningfully in phrases like
‘love of…’; but ‘love of..’ necessarily involves desire for…’ and desire for…’ is
incompatible with ‘possession of…’ Agathon is tactfully reduced to silence, but the stress
which his speech had placed on the ‘perfection’ of love at this stage in the dialogue
served as a reminder of something that risked being forgotten” (Markus, 222-223).
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the birth of Eros. Here, he is portrayed both in terms of his place with respect to the gods
and as relational as the mediating daimon between gods and men. His intercourse with
divinity is part of his nature as a daimon. In both of these senses, as god and as relation,
Eros is presented as intermediate. As the particular kind of god he is, as daimon, Eros is
the third term in a relation between gods and mortals. Indeed, the Phaedrus’s discussion
of Eros as a type of mania is suggestive of just such a relation—one in which daemonic
intervention leads the soul of man toward the divine.78 The dialogue, then, moves back
and forth between conceptions of Eros as relational and as divine, or one might say,
between conceptions of Eros insofar as it is experienced psychologically and as it may be
understood metaphysically. In the presentation of Eros as intermediate there is a constant
shifting between these two senses of Eros; and while they may be understood distinctly
and discussed separately, I think that Plato’s own usage suggests that while they are
distinct aspects of Eros, they are certainly not different metaphysical instances of Eros.
That is to say, while we may discuss the psychological apart from the metaphysical, they
are nonetheless one and the same Eros; our distinction is a distinction between perceived
manifestations, not between kinds or discrete entities. The conception of Eros as divine
possession that appears in the Phaedrus is a good example of just how Eros may be at
once a daimon that leads a soul and a relation between that soul and its beloved object; in
the Phaedrus, Eros possesses the soul, and joins it to the god in whose train it follows.
Another important contribution of Markus is his focus on the dialectical aspect of
the dialogue. At the outset of his discussion, Markus identifies his objective as “to
discern in the platonic ‘dialectic of love’ the features which have recommended it to
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Christian thinkers like St. Augustine and the pseudo-Dionysius….”79 The view he takes
understands the dialogue itself as dialectic, and the fruits of such an interpretation are
indicated by his remarks below:
I have used the word ‘dialectic’, and—objectionable as it is—used it
advisedly. For the truth about love which Socrates knows is being shown
us as mediated by Plato’s account; and the subtleties of the dramatic
structure in Plato’s account evoke a movement, not only from the
superficiality of Phaedrus’ eulogy to Diotima’s discourse initiating
Socrates into the ‘perfect revelation of love’ (210A), but also a movement
within Socrates’ own statement. In both these movements—I shall hint at
the way in which they constantly reflect each other—[the] positions
established, though they are continuously subjected to criticism and
modification, are never merely discarded. Thus Socrates in his speech is
made to cover the ground already covered by the other speakers, refining,
qualifying and deepening their contributions; and not only theirs, but what
is both more important and less obvious, also his own. The dialogue as a
whole, then, presents in a dramatic structure Plato’s view of love. Only
this view is not systematically stated, but allowed to emerge in what,
failing a better term, I have called a ‘dialectic’, in which the contribution
made by Socrates is but one, though the culminating stage.80
If Markus’s suggestion is correct, then those authors identifying the early
formulation of Eros as a desire for what one lacks have only a fragment of Plato’s
understanding of love, and have taken this one part to represent the whole. Remarkably,
this seems to be precisely what Plato finds wanting in the speakers preceding Diotima;
each considers only one aspect of Eros and so all fail to provide an adequate account of it.
The writings of Markus and Kosman suggest that a good deal is missing from
current discussions of Platonic Eros, especially those focused on the issue of egocentrism.
They draw our attention to the need for a discussion of the nature of lack in the
Symposium, with attention to the manner in which Plato treats of a theme—the meaning
79
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of lack, as the meaning of Eros, will be presented in dialectical movement. The concept
of lack plays an important role in the dialogue; it is reformulated along with the
reformulations of Eros in Diotima’s discourse, and thus develops alongside the concept
of Eros. Such simultaneous reformulations are appropriate to the nature of Eros as
intermediate or as metaxy, for it is in just this formulation that he has at once resource and
poverty. The writings of Markus and Kosman also recall the four points articulated in
Cornford’s treatment of Eros: the nature of Eros; the intermediacy of Eros; the relation
of Eros to the education of the soul and the ascent; and the final end of Eros as
participation in divine immortality. Their conceptions of Eros are situated within an
understanding of Platonic metaphysics, psychology, epistemology, and ethics.
In what follows, I will argue that the understanding of the relationship between
poverty and Eros provides the foundation for understanding that Eros is not merely or
even primarily acquisitive and egocentric. Rather, this relationship shows that Eros is
better understood as activity and disposition. Though some of the interpretations
considered above are consonant with an understanding of Eros as activity and disposition,
none adequately addresses the role that poverty plays in the movement of Eros or in the
disposition Eros.
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CHAPTER TWO
MYTH AND RELIGION IN THE INTERPRETATION OF EROS IN THE
SYMPOSIUM

I have argued in chapter one that the emphasis on the deficiency of Eros that
predominates the scholarly literature is in itself a deficient account of Eros. This is in
part a consequence of the insufficient attention paid to the development of the concept of
lack throughout the discourse of Diotima, but also due to the neglect of the theogonic
account of Eros that she provides as an elucidation of his nature and intermediacy. In this
account, Eros is presented as a child of Poverty (πενα) and Resource (προς). The
dialogue’s subsequent analysis of this account reveals that the parentage of Eros indicates
his nature: as the child of poverty he is lack or deficiency and as a child of resource he is
a way to something.81 In spite of the inclusion of a specific kind of poverty, i.e. πενα, in
this account, the argument that Eros is acquisitive or egocentric focuses on the earlier
formulation of Eros as in need (+νδε/ς) of his beloved object. Not only does such an
interpretation neglect an important development in the dialogue’s conception of lack, as I
will argue in chapter three, it fails to recognize the centrality of the theogonic account of
Eros in Diotima’s discourse. For it is this passage that most clearly articulates the nature
of Eros insofar as it involves lack and poverty, and so also this passage that is vital to
understanding the nature of his lack.
That the centrality of Diotima’s myth of Eros transforms the interpretation of the
rest of her discourse will be shown in subsequent chapters. Reading the Symposium with
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an emphasis on this myth as central to its meaning, however, requires some consideration
of the roles of myth and religion in the dialogue. The remainder of this chapter will be
devoted to a consideration of myth and religion in the Symposium. I would like to
suggest at the outset, however, that the prominence of both of these in the Symposium is
indicative of their importance to the dialogue as a whole and their relationship to one
another. Though a thorough examination of the role of myth in Plato generally is beyond
the scope of this study, I think it is necessary to make note of a few significant points. 82
For the purposes of this study, I will survey commentaries on Diotima’s myth in the
Symposium, and, by examining the meaning of the term ‘µ4θος’, and its relation to or
distinction from allegory, work toward a general understanding of the role of myth in
order to show its place within the dialogue itself, especially insofar as this bears upon the
interpretation of the relationship between Eros and poverty in the Symposium. In the
second part of this chapter, I will focus on the role of myth as providing the foundation
for prescribed action throughout the speeches in the Symposium, in order to show that this
same relationship exists between Diotima’s myth of Eros’s origins and the way of Eros
she describes in the lover’s ascent to the Beautiful.83
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Diotima’s account of Eros’s parentage is often referred to, categorized, or treated
as a myth by commentators,84 though neither Diotima nor Socrates identifies this account
as a µ4θος. It is, in fact, for this reason that Moors’s study of Platonic myth omits the
Symposium’s theogonic account from its catalogue of myths in the Platonic corpus.85
The commentaries of Dover86 and Rowe87 remark on the contents of the account of
Eros’s parentage but make no remarks concerning whether it should be regarded as myth
and what implications this might have for the interpretation of Diotima’s discourse as a
whole. The commentaries of Allen88 and Bury89 identify the account as myth, but Allen
is focused on arguing against the Plotinian allegorical interpretation, while Bury,
distinguishing his own interpretation from that of Plotinus, treats the myth as allegorical:
84
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In the allegory the qualities which characterize Eros are fancifully deduced
from an origin which is related in the authoritative manner of an ancient
theogony. The parents of Eros are Poros and Penia. Poros is clearly
intended to be regarded as a God (203B ο7 θεο, ο9 τε λλοι κα :…Προς):
he attends the celestial banquet and drinks nectar like the rest. The nature
of Penia is less clearly stated: she cannot be a divine being according to
the description of the divine nature as ε$δαµων and possessing τγαθ; κα,
καλ given in the context preceding (202c ff.); and the list of the qualities
which she hands down to her son Eros shows that she is in all respects the
very antithesis of Poros. We must conclude, therefore, that as Poros is the
source of the divine side of the nature of Eros, so Penia is the source of the
anti-divine side; and from the description of Eros as δαµων, combined
with the definition of τ- δαιµνιον as µεταξ< θεο4 τε κα, θνητο4 (202E), we
are justified in identifying this anti-divine side with mortality, and in
regarding = Πενα as a personification of = θνητ> φ"σις.90
Bury further notes that “Plotinus is not far astray when he equates πενα with ?λη, matter,
potency.”91 Where Plotinus finds every aspect of the story of Eros’s birth to serve as a
symbol with an underlying meaning, however, Bury counts the “incidental details of the
allegory, such as ‘the garden of Zeus’” to be “merely put in for purposes of literary effect,
to fill up and round off the story.”92
Allen’s comments, directed against a heavily allegorical interpretation, indicate
the more common attitude toward the myth:
The personification of Eros as a child of Poros and Penia is a fiction, its
logical force requiring us to consider Eros as the lover qua lover, the lover
just insofar as he loves. But there is an ancient tradition of interpretation,
descended from Plotinus, which takes it as something more. Plotinus
maintained that Eros is a substance (ο$σα), sprung from another substance
but nevertheless a being in its own right, and the cause of the affection of
love in the human soul (“On Love”, Ennead III 5. 3-4). Plotinus
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interpreted the myth of Poros and Penia as an allegory meant to represent
metaphysical connections….93
Allen’s comments above agree with the commentaries of Dover and Rowe in treating the
characters in the story of Eros’s birth as personifications of forces or abstractions, rather
than as indicating an underlying meaning or symbolizing an underlying metaphysical
principle. A second point of agreement among the three commentators is the
interpretation of this story in terms of what Allen calls its “logical force”; though we are
not to understand the story as an allegory in which every detail symbolizes something
else, we may discern Plato’s meaning if we read the story as a rational account. The
story may then be understood along the lines set out by Diotima in the subsequent
passage; this shows that the story is not itself particularly important, and that Diotima’s
exposition of the tale contains its meaning. Such an interpretation avoids the difficulties
involved with the role of myth in Platonic dialogues and the uncertainty involved with an
allegorical interpretation that assigns objects or concepts to every identifiable symbol in
the myth. It fails, however, to answer or even to raise the question of why Diotima tells a
story at all and why she does so in this particular place.
The treatments of Bury, Allen, Rowe, and Dover point to a difficulty in
understanding the theogonic account of Eros contained in Diotima’s discourse. There is
concern among these authors to distinguish Diotima’s account from allegory, and this
concern is, in some instances, so great that the account is not considered insofar as it is a
myth or theogony either. But whether or not the account should be interpreted
allegorically is an issue that is secondary to its status as myth. We must first determine

93

Allen, Symposium, 50.

44
whether and in what sense Diotima’s account may be considered myth; only then can we
address the issues involved with allegorical interpretation.
The difficulty of determining whether the passage in question should be
designated a ‘µ4θος’ is due, in part, to the ambiguity of the term itself. In his study of
Platonic myth, Moors notes that the meaning of the Greek term µ4θος is much broader
than its usual English counterpart:
Myth, both for Plato and for the classical Greek mind, was a flexible
commodity. The term µ4θος and related terms meaning myth-telling,
myth-teller, myth-like, and so on, can stand either for a story—be it a story
addressing the distant past or one which in some way addresses matters
which cannot be verified sensually or are fantastic—or stand for little
more than narration, saying, use of speech, word, or verbal expression
(especially so, as we shall observe, in those usages of mythical terms by
Plato which are garnered from Homer and from other poets).94
The broad usage of the term µ4θος is noted also by Brisson, who notes further that “the
meaning of µ4θος was modified according to the transformations which affected the
vocabulary of terms relating to “say” and “speech” during a period of historical evolution
which culminates with Plato.”95 The comments of both authors reveal the very broad
sense of µ4θος and the things that the term may designate, and support the inclusion of
Diotima’s theogonic account of Eros in the category of µ4θος.
The designation of a particular Platonic text as containing a µ4θος is further
complicated by commentators who wish to distinguish clearly myth from allegory. This
appears as a problem in the works of both Friedländer and Stewart.96
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for distinguishing sharply between myth and allegory is rooted not only in the attempt to
separate the neo-Platonic interpretation of Plato from Plato himself, but also in Plato’s
criticism of allegorical interpretations of myth found in his dialogues. It seems, however,
to be a mistake to attempt to draw a clear line between myth and allegory in the works of
Plato, and attempts to do so are complicated by the narrower modern sense of the English
term ‘allegory’. Today, we are inclined to think of an allegory as involving a one-to-one
correspondence between the symbol in a story and the thing it symbolizes. This is,
indeed, the sort of allegorical reading Plotinus provides of the Symposium in Ennead
III.5. As Brisson notes, however, the term ‘allegory’ from the Greek λληγορα is a later
development; the term with which Plato is concerned, 0πνοια, has a broader connotation
and does not necessarily indicate a one-to-one correspondence between symbol and
thing.97
The passages in which Plato rejects the allegorical interpretation of myth are wellknown.98 The first occurs in the Republic’s critique of myth,99 and, as Rist rightly notes,
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Plato’s objection here “is not to the allegories themselves, for he never denies that the
myths may have an “undersense” (0πνοια), but is based on the fact that young people
cannot distinguish what is allegorical and what is not, and are thus liable to be
corrupted.”100 It is notable that it is in this same passage of the Republic that Plato
advocates the view that the factual falsity of a myth is irrelevant, for though the story be
unverifiable, it reveals the truth insofar as it reveals the true nature of gods, daimons, and
heroes.101 It is this kind of factual falsity that is at issue in the second passage, from the
Phaedrus, that is also cited as an example of Plato’s rejection of the allegorical
interpretation of myth. What Phaedrus requests from Socrates in this passage is first,
confirmation that the place where they are walking is the place where “they say Boreas
seized Orithyia from the river”102 and second, to know whether Socrates accepts the story
as true.103 Socrates responds as follows:
I should be quite in fashion if I disbelieved it, as the men of science do. I
might proceed to give a scientific account of how the maiden, while at
play with Pharmacia, was blown by a gust of Boreas down from the rocks
hard by, and having thus met her death was said to have been seized by
Boreas, though it may have happened on the Areopagus, according to
another version of the occurrence. For my part, Phaedrus, I regard such
theories as no doubt attractive, but as the invention of clever, industrious
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people who are not exactly to be envied, for the simple reason that they
must then go on and tell us the real truth about the appearance of centaurs
and the Chimera, not to mention a whole host of such creatures, Gorgons
and Pegasuses and countless other remarkable monsters of legend flocking
in on them. If our skeptic, with his somewhat crude science, means to
reduce every one of them to the standard of probability, he’ll need a deal
of time for it. I myself have certainly no time for the business, and I’ll tell
you why, my friend. I can’t as yet ‘know myself,’ as the inscription at
Delphi enjoins, and so long as that ignorance remains it seems to me
ridiculous to inquire into extraneous matters.104
As Rist notes, what Socrates objects to here is the “rationalizing of mythology”.105 What
the men of science seek is a means of explaining the origin of a myth by reducing
personified forces, such as Boreas, to material forces, like wind. The persuasive force of
the myth is removed, as is its instructive element, when the myth is thus reduced to an
embellishment of the factual occurrence of a girl who unfortunately played too close to
the water on a windy day and came to a bad end. Whether or not such an occurrence took
place and on what spot is irrelevant; the point of the myth is not to relate factual truth.
There are, then, two distinct ways of erring with regard to “allegorical”
interpretation of myth. The first is to assign symbolic import to every detail of a story,
as, for example, Plotinus does in his interpretation of myth in the Symposium. In such an
interpretation, the characters, objects, and events of the story are replaced by rational
concepts, and the end result is the reduction of the meaning of the story to an array of
rational concepts and explanations. The second is to reduce the story to material or
factual elements, so that it has no meaning or import beyond its parts or its being a factual
account. In this second case whether these events happened matters; the meaning of the

104

Phdr. 229c5-230a3.

105

Rist, 8.

48
event or story does not. In both instances, the problem is that the story has not been
allowed to serve its educational end, which is to form the manner in which the soul
undergoes pleasure and pain and to inculcate in the soul an ability to distinguish the truly
fine from the base. If we take seriously the proposed educational system of the Republic,
the rejection of the allegorical interpretation of myths makes good sense, for myths are
supposed to educate the passions of the soul with regard to what is beautiful and fine, and
this is accomplished, in part, by presenting the soul with models of the beautiful and fine
that can be imitated. A rationalization of myth would thus defeat the purpose of myth
itself. Edelstein describes this functioning of myth as follows:
The myth, shaped in accordance with reason, brings to the realm of the
passions the light of the intellect; it instigates man to act with hope and
confidence toward the goal which reason has set out before him. Through
the myth the inner core of man’s existence receives the commands of the
intellect in terms that are adequate to its irrational nature. Thus man in his
entirety is put under the guidance of philosophy….106
Though the purpose of myth, as Edelstein describes it, is to guide and form the irrational
element in human beings, this does not render the myth itself irrational, nor place it at
odds with a rational account. As we shall see, the myth of Eros’s origins that Diotima
provides in the Symposium is a good example of how myth can function within rational
discourse and contribute to it.
In order to understand the relationship between myth and the nonrational, we
must bear in mind that there is more than one sense of the nonrational for Plato. There is,
on the one hand, the irrational element of the soul, both the passions of the irrational
appetites and of the θυµς. This is the nonrational that cannot attain the rational level; but
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there is also that which, like Beauty itself, is beyond rational, cannot be discovered by or
explained in terms of linear, discursive reasoning, but must be grasped intuitively by νο4ς.
In one sense, myth trains the “lower” irrational parts of man, but in another, it answers to
the rational element in its highest dimension, at the level of νο/σις rather than δινοια.
Guthrie describes the role of myth with respect to this highest element in a comment on
the Seventh Letter:
‘Whoever has followed this exploratory mythos’, concludes Plato (344d),
‘will know that if Dionysius or any lesser or greater man has written about
the first and highest principles of reality (physis), he has not in my view
heard or understood anything aright on the subject. Otherwise he would
have reverenced these things as I do, and not exposed them to unfitting
and unseemly treatment.’ It is curious that we should owe to such an angry
outburst Plato’s only personal summing-up of his epistemological
principles, yet so it appears to be. It is a mythos because the experience of
intuiting the Fifth, the highest and most knowable Being, cannot be
communicated literally, but only in metaphor—here the metaphor of spark
and flame. Plato has never hesitated to admit the existence of truths which
outrun the resources of dialectical procedure. In the Phaedo and Phaedrus
immortality can be demonstrated, but the details of life out of the body and
of transmigration can only be reflected in mythical form. The nature of
the soul is a reality of this kind: one cannot say what it is, only what it
resembles (phdr. 246a).107
This conception that myth goes beyond rational discourse, to capture what cannot be
conveyed through dialectic, is a feature of the interpretations given by both Friedländer
and Stewart. In his work on the myths of Plato, J. A. Stewart argues that “Myth is an
organic part of the Platonic Drama, not an added ornament…but the Platonic Myth is not
illustrative—it is not Allegory rendering pictorially results already obtained by
argument.”108 Rather, Stewart suggests, the myth carries the argument of the dialogue to
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a new level, one that could not have been attained in any other manner.109 Friedländer
too recognizes this as a feature of Plato’s use of myth, but distinguishes different uses of
myth both within individual dialogues and in the historical stages of Plato’s work. He
recognizes three levels or divisions, and argues that the first two of these are present
within the Symposium itself, distinguishing the mythical accounts included in the earlier
speeches in the Symposium from the mythical account in Diotima’s speech. These he
designates as pre-Socratic and Socratic, respectively:
All these speeches represent mythology on the first level. This does not
mean they are nothing but delightfully meaningless play. Would Plato
have written them down if they were? And are there not sufficient hints in
them of what is genuinely Platonic? The over-all impression, to be sure, is
as if they “mythologized” into the blue, and no distinction is made
between what is to be retained and what is to be discarded. When
Socrates begins to speak, all the earlier speeches collapse as “illusory.”
For they preceded conceptual discourse; and such a procedure, according
to Socrates, is a poor substitute for Logos and truth. In Socrates’ speech,
the fairy tale about the procreation of Eros by Poros (Plenty) and Penia
(Poverty) is, in itself, not so different from the previous tales; yet it is most
important to appreciate the changed setting. Socrates first clarified the
nature of love in rational, conceptual discourse, defining the most
important aspects. Love is love of something, namely of beauty. Love is
a desire and a want. Love wishes to possess what it lacks. This is the
109
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“truth,” before which all previous speeches with their mythical tales
vanish. Altogether different is the Socratic myth, which now follows; it is
not a will-o’-the wisp in empty space—at best, an accidental hint pointing
toward the truth; at worst confusing play—but continues upon the lines
just drawn by the Logos.110
Thus, for Friedländer, the account of Eros’s birth is a part of the whole λγος being
offered by Diotima; the account is a further development in the explanation of the nature
of Eros. The use of dialectic as a prelude to myth allows myth to move beyond the
bounds of reason. The relationship between µ4θος and λγος that Friedländer describes
lies at a point between the two erroneous interpretations of myth discussed above; myth
does not have to be allegorical in order to be part of the λγος; nor ought it be reduced to
the rational or verifiable concepts it is taken to contain or represent. The fact that myth
cannot be reduced to rational explanation of one kind or another, however, does not mean
that it is irrational. It is perhaps more properly designated as transrational, for it
embodies truths that cannot be conveyed through dialectic in a form accessible to the
rational soul, answering to the affectivity of the rational element.
This ability of myth to communicate that which eludes rational discourse is the
same ability Hannah Arendt attributes to metaphorical thinking; myth is, indeed, a kind
of metaphorical thinking.111 Arendt describes the capacity of metaphors to serve as a
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The term myth appears only five times in the entirety of Arendt’s two volume work
The Life of the Mind, and one of these occurs in titles of works she cites. Nonetheless,
her analysis of metaphorical thinking upon which I draw here continually analyzes the
relationship between sensible images and intellectual meaning, in much the same manner
as Plato himself uses images to convey intellectual meaning in Diotima's description of
Eros. Further support for such a usage of Arendt's thought here is found in her own use
of Bruno Snell's chapter “From Myth to Logic: the Role of the Comparison” in The
Discovery of the Mind (New York, Evanston: Harper Torchbooks, 1960). Additionally, as
the reader may have already noted, the investigations of this chapter have established (1)
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bridge between the world of sense and the world of thought. “No language,” she writes,
“has a ready-made vocabulary for the needs of mental activity: they all borrow their
vocabulary from words originally meant to correspond either to sense experience or to
other experiences of ordinary life.”112 In Diotima’s myth in the Symposium, this
appropriation of everyday experience for the sake of illuminating spiritual phenomena is
immediately apparent; Eros is the child of Προς and Πενα, and the description of his
nature in relation to his parents describes both the poverty (πενα) of the day-laborer and
his resourcefulness (προς) that springs from and is inseparable from his poverty. The
concrete image of the day-laborer, the physical hardships and deficiencies he endures, his
constant motion in pursuit of resources, serve as metaphors for the spiritual, emotional,
and rational aspects of human experience.

that the term µ4θος has much broader scope in Greek than it does in modern English, on
that is inclusive of metaphor; and (2) that the mythical elements of the Symposium
discussed here are never designated as myth by Plato himself, and his use of imagery her
more closely resembles metaphor than myth narrowly construed. It might be objected that
my use of Arendt here is at odds with the view of myth she expresses in the essay, “What
is Authority?” In this essay, Arendt writes of the myth of Er that it is “a myth which
Plato himself obviously neither believed nor wanted the philosophers to believe”
(Hannah Arendt, “What is Authority?” in Between Past and Future (New York: Penguin
Books, 2006), 108). The reason for her view that Plato does not believe in the literal truth
of his own myths is clarified in the next sentence, where she writes “What the allegory of
the cave story in the middle of the Republic is for the few or for the philosopher the myth
of hell at the end is for the many who are not capable of philosophical truth” (Ibid.). It
can be safely concluded from the context of Arendt’s remarks here that she is not
expressing a view that applies to all myths in the Platonic corpus. Furthermore, she here
recognizes the distinction between the literal truth of myth and the metaphorical sense,
the latter of which she clearly holds to be the conveyor of truth for Plato. In the section
of The Life of the Mind on which I draw here, it is this latter sense that she propounds.
112

Hannah Arendt, The Life of the Mind, vol. 1, Thinking (New York: Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich, 1978), 102.

53
If Arendt’s analysis of metaphor is correct, then the attempt to find a one-to-one
correspondence between symbol and concept is a mistake; the metaphor is not meant to
point through symbol to thing but through visible relation to invisible relation, and to
unite the sensible and intelligible. The myth of Eros’s origins and the description of the
Eros-daimon, in this sense, are the sensible depictions of the movements and struggles of
the human soul. The relationship Eros has to Poverty and Resource is set out in physical,
sensible terms in order to make visible this same triadic relationship as it exists in the
soul. The relation is that of the simultaneous possession of poverty and abundance, as
ultimately conveyed at the pinnacle of the lover’s ascent to the Beautiful by the term
αφθονος. Both myth and daimon indicate the mean, in the geometric sense, that allows for
the unification of the extremes.113 The different aspects of Eros do not serve as symbols
for concepts or things, but as elucidations of the concept of Eros itself, by depicting its
internal distinctions.
As Arendt’s analysis shows, myth need not be allegorized to be made intelligible,
but because myth is metaphorical, it is tempting to treat it as allegory in the narrow sense
discussed above. As we have seen however, the term ‘µ4θος’ has a very broad
designation, and since Plato himself associates myth with intuitive comprehension it
seems advisable to eschew an allegorical interpretation of Diotima’s myth in the
Symposium. The myths in the Symposium in particular are used by the encomiasts to
provide a genealogical account of Eros, and this account of his lineage stands as the
foundation for his great works; he who is of good birth produces good things. The
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relationship between the theogonies of Eros and the works attributed to him provides
further insight into the role of myth in Diotima’s account, for she too makes use of Eros’s
origins to explain his works and effects. The next section will examine the role of myth
in the Symposium, with special attention to the relationship between the theogonies of
Eros and his effects.

Mythology in the Symposium

As we have seen, the very broad designation of the term µ4θος allows for the
inclusion of the account of Eros’s origins as an instance of myth. It is further notable that
the subject of the Symposium itself places the reader quite squarely in the domain of
myth, since Eros is a figure in popular and traditional myth and he is identified as a god
to whom praise should be given at the beginning of the dialogue. Though there is only
one occurrence of the term µ4θος in the Symposium itself (in a comment made by
Erixymachus at 177a3-4),114 every speech delivered in the dialogue makes use of some
sort of myth, either by alluding to the events and personages of well-known stories, or by
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drawing on myths to provide an account of Eros’s parentage.115 Elements of myth, and
so also religion, are found throughout the dialogue and mythical accounts that are found
wanting are revised and corrected in Diotima’s discourse. The prominence of mythical
elements in the dialogue, along with Diotima’s thorough correction of her predecessors,
indicate that the mythical elements in the dialogue are significant to understanding
Plato’s account of Eros.
Further evidence for the importance of myth in the Symposium is provided by the
uniqueness of the subject-matter; the inclusion of myth in every speech; the use of myth
to establish the nature of Eros and, on the basis of this nature, to prescribe action; the use
of language and imagery of mystery religions, which are founded on myths; and the
presence of a priestess who appropriates the language and ritual of mystery religions in
order to describe the proper path (Mρθ> :δς) to the final revelation of Eros, the vision of
Beauty.
Properly speaking, the “myth” of Eros’s origins in the Symposium is a theogony,
and its presence in Diotima’s discourse is consistent not only with the theogonies
provided in the speeches given by the other speakers in the Symposium, but also with the
form and practice of encomia.116 The fact that the theogonies of Eros offered in the
Symposium appear quite properly as a consequence of the practice of encomia may
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appear to suggest that these mythical elements of the dialogue are neither remarkable nor
significant. In point of fact, however, the several theogonies offered serve to emphasize
the centrality of myth in the dialogue as a whole, for their presence repeatedly draws
attention to the mythical being at the center of the discourse: Eros. No other Platonic
dialogue takes for its primary subject a divine or semi-divine being.
Friedländer argues that the language of myth itself is significant in understanding
Plato’s import in this passage:
It would be a mistake to take—as one might be tempted to do—the story
about Penia and Poros as an allegorical symbol for the rational concept of
metaxy. As soon as Diotima begins to speak through the ‘demonic’
Socrates, Eros is present as a ‘great demon,’ and we are in a mythical
realm. And the metaxy itself is seen just as much from a mythical as from
a rational perspective referring to the cosmos, which ‘is bound together
with itself’ through this demonic realm.117
Friedländer’s comments draw attention to the importance of the mythical elements in the
Symposium, and emphasize that part of the meaning of myth is lost if it is allegorized
away. This is, in part, because the myth serves as one among other indications to the
reader that the account given by Diotima is in the “mythical” realm, and this draws
attention to another important facet of the language of the dialogue, namely its liberal use
of religious language, imagery, and allusion. Myth, while part of the historical and
literary traditions of Greece, was also alive in the religious practice of the time. Indeed,
the myths regarding the divinities at the centers of the cults of Orpheus, Dionysus, and
Demeter, may be seen as the foundation for the religious rituals of these cults and for the
practices and ways of life adopted by the adherents to these cults. The orgiastic frenzies
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involved with celebrations of Dionysus involve celebrants in the tearing apart and
dismemberment of small animals, and these animals symbolize Dionysus himself, and his
dismemberment by the Titans.118 The tympanum used to accompany dance is made from
stretching the hide of such an animal across the frame, and so the drum itself points back
to the events of the death of Dionysus. The rituals surrounding Demeter include the
sacrifice of pigs because “when Demeter’s daughter sank into the earth, the pigs of the
swineherd Eubouleus were swallowed up as well.”119 The rituals surrounding individual
gods and goddesses are incarnations of the stories of these gods and goddesses. This
connection between myth and ritual is also evident in the speeches given in the
Symposium, as each of the speakers makes use of myth first to describe the nature of Eros
and then, based on this, to recommend action and practice in erotic matters. The works
and actions of Eros flow from his nature, and the followers of Eros, possessed by him, are
like him in nature and action.
Phaedrus, citing Hesiod, Acusilaus, and Parmenides, identifies Eros as among the
oldest of the gods.120 From the evidence of these authors, Phaedrus concludes that Eros
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has no parents, since he is himself one of the original gods. The theogonies that Phaedrus
cites identify Earth, Chaos, and Eros as the oldest beings in the cosmos, and the origins of
all else. From the venerability of Eros’s age Phaedrus derives the venerability of Eros’s
gifts to humankind; Eros gives the greatest gifts to humans because he is one of the
oldest deities. The honor that belongs to the aged, to the traditional, to those descended
from honorable families, is akin to the honor that those possessed by Eros pursue. The
gift of Eros, in Phaedrus’s account, is thus the inspiration to act honorably. It is by the
inspiration of Eros that men who want to live well do so:
What it is that should guide human beings who mean to live well, in their
whole lives: this, nothing—not kinship, or public honours, or wealth, or
anything else—is capable of implanting so well as love can. What is it
that I refer to? The feeling of shame at shameful things, and love of
honour in the case of fine ones; without these it is impossible for either a
city or an individual to enact great and fine actions.121
We do not learn of Eros’s parentage, but that he is himself venerable because he is
himself an origin. As honorable himself, Eros serves as the inspiration to love honor.
Phaedrus’s account is, in many respects, a superficial one, but the relationship between
the origins of Eros and the practices that Eros inspires is clear enough. It is Eros that
makes us feel shame or pride as a consequence of our actions, and so Eros that causes us
to love honor and cultivate virtue in ourselves.
Phaedrus ends his speech as he began, by drawing from traditional mythology;
but his latter use of mythology is designed to give concrete examples of the work that
Eros accomplishes in human beings. The most enduring of honorable actions are those
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preserved in mythical accounts, like those of Alcestis and Orpheus, who both acted from
Eros. By this latter use of myth, Phaedrus gives a further prescriptive account of the
proper use of Eros, and this is captured in his concluding words:
So it is that I declare Love oldest of gods, and most honoured, and with
most power when it comes to the acquisition of virtue and happiness by
human beings, both in life and after they have ended it.122
Pausanius, immediately following Phaedrus, corrects Phaedrus’s theogony and his
explanation of it; not only has Phaedrus failed to distinguish between Heavenly and
Vulgar Eros, he has also failed to distinguish the beautiful and shameful practices (πρXξις)
attendant upon each.123 Though Pausanius proposes a genealogy different from that of
Phaedrus, it is still grounded in traditional Greek mythology. In the accounts of
Pausanius and Erixymachus, the distinction between heavenly and earthly Eros serves as
the foundation for the actions and dispositions proper to each type of Eros. Pausanius,
after distinguishing between the two kinds of Eros, states that
Every action (πρXξις) is like this: when done, in and by itself it is neither
fine nor shameful. So for example with what we are doing now: Whether
we drink, or sing, or talk to each other, none of these things is in itself
fine, but rather the manner in which it is done is what determines how it
turns out, in the doing of it; if it is done in a fine way, and correctly, it
becomes fine, and if incorrectly, shameful. This is how it is with loving
and with Love: not all of Love is fine, or a worthy object of encomium—
only the Love who impels us to love in a fine way.124
122

Symp. 180b6-8.

123

Symp. 180c1-181a6.

124

Symp. 180e4-181a6. πXσα γ;ρ πρXξις Yδ’ χει· α$τ/ +φ’ Zαυτ[ς πραττοµ5νη οQτε καλ>
οQτε α%σχρ. ο\ον N ν4ν =µε2ς ποιο4µεν, ] πνειν ] ^δειν ] διαλ5γεσθαι, ο$κ στι το"των α$τκαλ-ν ο$δ5ν, λλ’ +ν τ_ πρξει, Sς `ν πραχθ_, τουιaτον π5βη· καλPς µRν γ;ρ πραττοµενον
κα, Mρθaς καλ-ν γγνεται, µ> Mρθaς δR α%σχρν. ο?τω δ> κα, τ- +ρXν κα, : bρως ο$ πXς +στι
καλ-ς ο$δR ξιος +γκωµιζεσθαι, λλ; : καλPς προτρ5πων +ρXν.

60
One loves in a fine way when one loves with a view to inculcating virtue in the beloved;
and the beloved behaves well insofar as he yields for the sake of gaining in wisdom and
virtue, even if this is not the ultimate consequence of his yielding. Pausanius’s account
holds that one loves well when one loves what is lasting, i.e., character of soul rather than
beauty of body; when one loves character rather than body, one is not seeking merely or
primarily sexual gratification, but rather to guide the beloved in order to make him
virtuous. Heavenly Eros serves as the foundation for prescribed action in both of these
senses, it identifies the appropriate object of love, character, and it describes how one
should act with respect to this object, i.e., with a view to inculcating excellence.
Pausanius’s distinction between Heavenly and Vulgar Eros is taken up by
Erixymachus, who uses it to explain the physician’s art as consisting in the establishment
of good or heavenly Eros in the body. For Erixymachus, the two kinds of Eros are not
distinguished by their respective objects or the manner in which one loves the object;
rather, good Eros designates the proper proportion of various opposites in the body, and
the balance of these opposites results in the harmony that, in the body, is called health.
Bad or vulgar Eros, according to this account, is imbalance and lack of harmony. The
physician is able to transform bad Eros into good Eros by the proper amount of filling up
and emptying.125 Erixymachus, adopting Pausanius’s distinction between fine and
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shameful Eros, identifies fine Eros as order and concord, and shameful Eros as disorder
and discord. Where fine and beautiful Eros is found, things are in a good state and
flourishing; this truth applies not only to the bodies of human beings, but to all of nature.
Eros functions in a variety of arts and crafts as the power that establishes and maintains
order and concord. Knowledge of the medical art, according to Erixymachus, is the
knowledge that allows the physician to distinguish between good and bad Eros and also
to cause good Eros by the restoration of order and concord in instances when this has
been disrupted.126
The same theme as before comes back again: that it is the people who are
orderly that one must gratify, and in such a way that those who are not yet
orderly might become more so, and it is these people’s love that should be
cherished, and this is the beautiful Love, the heavenly one, the one who
belongs to the Heavenly Muse; the other one, the common one, belongs to
Polymnia, and he must be applied with caution to those to whom one
applies him, in order that the pleasure he brings may be enjoyed, but that
he may implant no tendency to immorality, just as in the sphere of my
own expertise it is a considerable task to deal properly with desires

distinguish between the truly fine and beautiful and the base and ugly. Xenophon’s
Symposium portrays a similar shortcoming in the character of Antisthenes, whose poverty
fails to be guided by Eros because though he has just the right amount of things, he has
them in a way that fails to appreciate their worth or to distinguish the truly fine from the
base.
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relating to the expertise of the cook, so that the pleasure may be enjoyed
without ill effects.127
Good Eros prescribes, once again, a way of life, that of balance and moderation. Where
there is order, balance, and moderation, there is health.
Aristophanes’ account is singular in many respects. He discards the theogonies of
his predecessors, choosing instead to give an account describing the fall of humanity
from a better and more perfect existence to its current imperfect state, which is the cause
of the human experience of Eros. This, in itself, sets Aristophanes’ account apart, for he
is the first of the speakers to ground his explanation of Eros in humanity rather than
divinity. Nonetheless, Aristophanes’ explanation utilizes traditional myth by alluding to
a Homeric account of the fall of humanity that arises from impiety,128 and also bears a
resemblance to the account of the different ages of humanity found in Hesiod’s Works
and Days.129 At any rate, the suggestion that the broken and incomplete nature of
humanity is a consequence of divine punishment for impiety yields an account of Eros
that, while still within the realm of myth and grounded in the mythical traditions of
Greece, is singular in advancing a definition of Eros as internal to human nature.130
There is very little discussion of Eros insofar as he is a god, but instead an exhortation to
behave piously so that the gods will assist us in finding our complements and once again
achieving wholeness:

127

Symp. 187d4-e6.

128

Symp. 190b5-d6.

129

Hesiod Opera et Dies 1. 92-200.

130

Symp. 191c9-d4, 192e9-193a1.

63
The way to happiness for the human race would be if our love were to run
its full course and each of us were to find our own beloved, returning to
our original nature. If this is what is best for us, necessarily what is
closest to this among the things presently available to us must also be best;
and this is to find a beloved with a nature congenial to oneself—and if we
are to hymn the god who is responsible for that, we should justly hymn
Love, who both provides us with the greatest benefits in the present by
leading us to what belongs to us, and accords us the greatest hopes for the
future, that if we for our part accord piety to the gods, he will establish us
in our original condition and, by healing us, make us blessed and happy.131
The account of humanity as having fallen from a prior, more perfect state falls still within
the category of myth, but less easily within the category of theogony. Nonetheless,
insofar as this myth is intended to give an account of the origin, and thus in some sense
the lineage, of Eros, it serves as a kind of theogony. Though Aristophanes gives an
account of Eros in terms of its human origin, he ends his account with an exhortation to
his audience to behave piously lest the human race suffer further punishment for defiance
of the gods. His tale thus also prescribes action on the basis of the mythical account of
Eros he has given.
Agathon’s speech, like Aristophanes’, departs from the structure adopted by
earlier speakers, but maintains the relationship between the nature of the god himself with
the effects he produces in humans. At the outset of his speech, Agathon states that he
will speak first of the character of Eros and then of his gifts to humans, though he does
not, as the first three speakers, appeal to accounts of Eros’s origins to begin his speech.
Nonetheless, Agathon pointedly rejects Phaedrus’s theogony on the grounds that the gods
would never have behaved in the fashion described by Phaedrus “if Love had been there
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among them”.132 On these grounds, supplemented by the observation that Eros is always
found among the young, Agathon argues that Eros is among the youngest, rather than the
oldest, of the gods.
Though Agathon speaks at length about the nature of Eros based upon his
observable manifestations among human beings, and draws upon the Greek literary
tradition to provide support for his characterization, he never gives a positive account of
Eros’s origins. His theogony, insofar as he gives one, is given by the negation of the
positive accounts that he rejects. The positive account of Eros’s nature is drawn in part
from the works of other poets, and his citations of great tragic poets, such as Euripides,
Sophocles, and Homer, indicate that he views tragic poetry as the source of truth
regarding the mythical portrayal of the gods.133 His rejection of the Hesiodic tradition,
however, indicates that he views tragic poetry not only as the source of truth, but also as
the purveyor of truth; the tragic poet is the authority on myth, in its transmission,
interpretation, and creation. Unlike the first three speakers of the dialogue who make use
of already established tradition to ground what they say about Eros’s nature, Agathon
cites others’ accounts only after he has described the nature of Eros. He begins with a
description of the nature of Eros, and the mythological descriptions he subsequently
utilizes reflect this initial description of Eros as young, beautiful, delicate, and soft. Like
Aristophanes, Agathon creates his own account of Eros, making liberal use of the Greek
poetic tradition to support his creation.
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Though Agathon’s account differs in many respects from the previous speeches,
the principle underlying the relationship between Eros and his followers remains the
same, for all of the speakers describe the followers or initiates of Eros as becoming or
being like Eros himself. Thus, we find in Agathon’s statement “that Love, being himself
first most beautiful and best, is then responsible for others’ possession of things of this
sort”;134 Eros is the cause of beauty and excellence in others because he is the primary
instance of beauty and excellence. Like his predecessors, Agathon concludes his speech
with an exhortation to follow Eros, and thus become like him:
He is the one who empties us of estrangement and fills us with kinship,
causing us to come together in all such gatherings as ours, acting as guide
in festivals, when choruses perform, at sacrifices; bringing gentleness,
excluding savagery; generous with good will, miserly with ill will;
gracious, kind; a spectacle for the wise, admired by the gods; coveted by
those without portion of him, prized by those with a portion; father of
delicacy, daintiness, luxuriance, charms, desire, longing; caring for good,
uncaring of bad; in trouble, in fear, in longing, in speaking, a steersman,
defender, fellow-soldier and saviour without peer, ornament at once of all
gods and all men, most beautiful and best guide, whom everyone must
follow, hymning him beautifully, sharing in the song he sings to charm the
mind of all gods and men.135
Throughout the speeches we have considered thus far, we have discerned a
relationship between the theogonic account of Eros and the practices and behaviors that
Eros inspires. It is not merely that the origins of Eros indicate his nature and so prescribe
action; it is also the case that the followers of Eros become like the god himself or, if you
will, being possessed by Eros, are led to become like him; they, being possessed by Eros,
are manifestations of the god dwelling within them. Similarly, Diotima’s portrayal of the
134

Symp. 197c1-4.

135

Symp. 197d1-e5.

66
Eros-daimon, provides a very “human” picture of Eros; the images she uses to depict
Eros in his birth and life call to mind a specifically human existence and a concretely
human experience. This human manifestation of Eros is reiterated in Alcibiades’
depiction of Socrates and echoes the description of Socrates given in the introductory
portion of the Symposium.
Diotima’s theogonic account begins when Socrates asks who are the mother and
father of Eros; she replies that it will take a long time to set out in detail, but she will tell
him anyway (εcρω).136 The first verb, διηγ5οµαι, means “to set out in detail or describe in
full”, the second verb, εcρω , means to say or tell.137 The myth of Eros’s parentage thus
begins as a saying or telling, and one that will be thorough. This is a clear indication that
what is to follow is not a story to be glossed over as mere literary embellishment, but an
important development within the full account of the nature of eros. It further suggests,
that while the account may be made sense of allegorically, it cannot be reduced to such
an interpretation, since the “myth” begins the effort to set out the nature of Eros in detail.
It seems from this that we should take quite seriously the account of Eros’s nature given
here as central to understanding Plato’s conception of eros.
The placement of the myth within the conversation between Diotima and Socrates
also emphasizes its significance. The account of Eros’s origins is offered as a second
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stage in Diotima’s speech; it follows immediately upon Diotima’s examination of
Socrates, which has established the nature of Eros as intermediate, as daimon, and as
bound to the concepts of desire and lack. This first stage of Diotima’s discourse ends
with the proclamation that one who is wise with regard to things of the daimon-world—
the world of Eros—is a δαιµνιος ν/ρ, and it is implied that this is something for which
one should strive. The nature of Eros as intermediate, daimon, bound to desire and lack
prepares the reader for Diotima’s account of his origins and reappears in her explanation
of the significance of his origins for understanding Eros’s nature.
The myth itself departs from traditional theogonic accounts of Eros, presenting
him as the child of Προς and Πενα, while nodding to tradition by placing his conception
on Aphrodite’s birthday.138 Diotima’s myth serves as a correction to the accounts that
were offered by earlier speakers, and, in the course of her speech as a whole she corrects
each of these earlier accounts. But Diotima’s myth and speech do not merely correct the
accounts of Eros offered in previous speeches; rather, she incorporates aspects of Eros
from previous speeches that are in accord with her own, while correcting those aspects
that she deems incorrect. Though it is beyond the scope of the current study to examine
every instance of this phenomenon, one example will, perhaps, illuminate what Diotima
does and why these corrections are so crucial to understanding the account of Eros put
forward in the Symposium.
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In her conversation with Socrates, Diotima refers to “a story that’s told, according
to which those who seek the other half of themselves who are in love,”139 and continues
to correct this story, saying:
But my story declares that love is neither of a half nor of a whole, unless,
my friend, it turns out actually to be good, since people are even willing to
have their own feet and hands cut off, if their own state seems to them to
be a bad one. For it’s not, I think, what it their own that either group is
embracing, except if someone calls what is good ‘what belongs to’ him,
and ‘his own’, and what is bad ‘alien’; since there is nothing else that
people are in love with except the good.140
The reference to a story in which lovers long for their other halves is clearly a reference
to the story of Aristophanes.141 But Diotima does not completely reject the points raised
by Aristophanes, as she recognizes that the soul does long for something that belongs to
it, something of which it is in need and to which it may once have been joined. It is
perhaps even accurate to say that the absence the soul experiences in longing for its
beloved object is the absence of the realm of the Forms, which are most like the soul
itself and, in their goodness and beauty, the delight of the soul. The remarks Diotima
makes in the above passage do more than allude to and correct Aristophanes; they
provide a more complete understanding of Eros itself and foreshadow Diotima’s
description of the soul’s ascent to the vision of Beauty. So it is with each of the
preceding speeches; not only does Diotima correct and revise her predecessors, she
incorporates aspects of their theories into her own; the result is that Diotima’s account is
fuller and more complete, since it has included within it all of the aspects of Eros
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considered in the previous speeches, and added to them what was lacking. This helps us
to understand Diotima’s meaning better, but also helps us to understand that the earlier
speeches of the Symposium provide the foundations for Diotima’s speech, each
contributing something to the whole as it is presented by Diotima. This relationship
between the theogonies offered in the earlier speeches and that offered by Diotima also
underscores the importance of theogony in understanding the nature of Eros.
Diotima’s myth of Eros does not stand out as something merely added to the
dialogue to incorporate a theogony. Rather, it grows out of the discourse that
immediately precedes it, and incorporates the concepts of intermediacy, intentionality,
and deficiency. Eros, in this tale, is intermediate not only as daimon, but also by virtue of
his origins, so that he is understood as comprising Προς (resourcefulness, way) and Πενα
(poverty) in his intermediacy; it is thus that the account of his origins establishes the
relationship among Eros, Προς, and Πενα.
Προς, often translated as “resource” has a rather more dynamic sense to it, for as
Guthrie notes, it means “‘finding a way’, resourcefulness”.142 Weil notes that “προς is
the origin of the verbs πρω and πορζω, literally to open the way, but above all to procure,
to supply, to give.”143 It is, indeed, reminiscent of the verbs used to describe the
daimonic activity of Eros in the preceding passage of Diotima’s speech, i.e. διαπορθµε"ω
and Zρµηνε"ω, which indicate the active nature of Eros as providing a path from the
human to the divine. This sense of προς is also noted by Dover, who writes:
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προς, etymologically cognate with περειν ‘pierce’, is applied to any means
(e.g. a path or a ferry) of getting across or over land or water; then of any
means which enable one to cope with a difficulty, or of the provision of
monetary or other resources (cf. our expression ‘ways and means’).144
The meaning of the word προς itself, and its obvious correlation with a πορος, indicates
that this element of Eros’s nature should be understood not so much as having resources,
which would have been aptly indicated in the mythical account by πλο4τος, but as being
the very way or path itself.145 Indeed, such is Eros’s nature as προς, for as daimon, he
provides a “way to” the divine.
Πενα, or poverty, contributes the other part of Eros’s nature. The dialogue’s new
epithet for the lack of Eros brings with it the connotation of deficiencies of the worker.
Such a lack is not absolute, for the worker has just enough on which to subsist, but no
excess. This sort of poverty is closely associated with the virtue of moderation
(σωφροσ"νη), since the life associated with it produces men of virtue, strength, and
endurance, who are not prone to excesses, indulgences, or softness.146 Taken with the
portrayal of Eros as daimon and as προς, this conception of poverty suggests that a life
practicing moderation is a life led by the daimon Eros. Since Eros is a daimon, such a
life is also an inspired life; one who is led by Eros is characterized by enthusiasm or
divine possession. This characterization of Eros as at once ascetic and enthusiastic may
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appear paradoxical, but Diotima’s explanation of the characteristics of Eros shows how
both his poverty and his resource are essential parts of the phenomena and the divinity
designated as Eros.
In Prolegomena to the study of Greek Religion, Jane Harrison describes ascetism
and ecstasy as the two different characterizations of Dionysus and his followers.147 There
are, in the cult of Dionysus, two distinct dispositions: one is characterized by the
gentleness with which the female celebrants suckle and care for young wildlife; the other
is characterized by the violent frenzy with which these same celebrants rend them to
pieces. Both actions occur to the celebrants as instances of standing outside of
themselves, as a kind of κστασις; both are, indeed, pictures of humanity at one with the
violent extremes of the natural world, no longer guided by human rationality or morality,
but possessed by some other power, some daimon or god. Such is the duality of Eros, at
one moment bitter, at another sweet; at one moment poor and needy, at another filled
with vision of the beautiful itself. The asceticism described by the poverty of Eros is the
condition for the resourcefulness that leads the lover to the primary instance of κστασις—
the vision of Beauty.
Diotima’s theogonic account, like those of the preceding speakers, is followed by
a description of the kind of life Eros lives as a consequence of his parentage. If the myth
in Plato’s Symposium that presents Eros as a child of poverty (πενα) and resource (προς)
is understood as central to the view of Eros articulated by Diotima, both the nature of
Eros itself and the implications it holds for the ethical life are presented in a new light.
As deficiency, Eros indicates at once a lack in the lover and the object of Eros that is
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desired by the lover. Diotima’s further explication of Eros shows that its nature does not
lie merely in its lack of the beloved object, but also in its longing for the beloved object,
and that the true nature of Eros is revealed by understanding its proper object. The object
is not merely a beautiful particular that the lover desires to possess as her own, but a
desire to possess a good. The desire to possess this good is so strong that the lover is
willing to suffer for the sake of the good: willing, in the particular, to suffer bodily harm
in order to attain or keep the good; willing, in the case of procreation, to suffer for the
sake of offspring. The poverty of Eros, then, is not merely indicative of the lack of the
beloved object, but also of the disposition of the lover as willingly undergoing
deprivations for the sake of the beloved object. Πενα, as one essential component of
Eros’s nature, describes not only lack, but a disposition toward the possession of different
kinds of goods.
In the analysis of Eros and its role in the ascent to the Beautiful, this deprivation
is not merely one aspect of the nature of Eros, but points to an understanding of poverty
as a way of being or disposition. Indeed, the joining together of the figures of Προς and
Πενα in the single figure of Eros suggests that the poverty of Eros is at once his way.
The description of Eros himself portrays him as poor and in need on the one hand, but
seeking and finding a way on the other; he is intermediate between the state of
deprivation and the state of possession. In addition to the many descriptions of Eros as
intermediate between extremes (e.g. between the mortal and immortal, ignorance and
wisdom), Eros in this way becomes intermediate as a disposition in the lover that leads
the lover to the Good. Poverty is one essential aspect of this disposition, as a way that
entails the cultivation of an appropriate lack that mediates between the lover and the
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beloved object. The nature of Eros entails poverty; it is thus in a spiritual poverty that a
way to the Good is found; one does not ‘acquire’ the Good so much as one makes a
‘place’ for it in the soul, which, being filled with Good, is united to it.
Diotima’s description of the ‘ladder of love’ in the Symposium lends itself to
understanding Eros as such a way of being and not merely as a lack that longs for
fulfillment by gaining possession of the sought object. In order to move from one stage of
Eros to another, the lover must recognize that the object toward which he is currently
directed is not perfect or complete, and so not the ultimate end of his striving. This
recognition causes him to change his orientation toward it to reflect its position in the
cosmos.148 Such a change in orientation requires adopting an attitude of detachment
toward the thing, described in the ascent passage by the term φθονος. This is an attitude
of poverty; it lets the thing be what it is and loves it insofar as it ought to be loved given
the sort of thing that it is. In recognizing the sort of love appropriate to different things,
and as proportional to different kinds of beauty and goodness, the lover recognizes also
‘higher’ objects of love and so his gaze is directed to the next level of loveable objects.
Each movement to a higher object of love results in an object that is closer to both the
beautiful and the immortal.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT OF POVERTY: FROM DEFICIENCY TO
ABUNDANCE

Much of the scholarship149 since Vlastos’s influential article has taken his
conception of Platonic Eros and ε$δαιµονα to indicate that the Platonic conceptions of
both Eros and human excellence are egoistic. Consequently, the discussion of Platonic
Eros has focused on the formulation of Eros as lack that appears in the elenchus of
Agathon and in the early portion of the exchange between Socrates and Diotima. This
formulation of Eros as lack of the desired object then becomes the definition of Eros by
which or in terms of which the rest of the exchange between Socrates and Diotima is
interpreted and understood. This interpretation presents Eros and its lack as parallel to
appetitive desire and its lack: the subject experiences some pain or absence that is
indicative of the desire to possess a certain object; upon attaining the object, the pain is
remedied, absence filled, and desire ceases. But this interpretation captures only one
aspect of Plato’s treatment of desire, and so also only one aspect of his treatment of the
lack that appears to be its concomitant.
What is absent from these discussions is a general investigation into the concept
of lack in the Symposium that would reveal its gradual development; such an
investigation would also show that a very different concept of lack is operative in Plato’s
treatment of Eros in the Symposium.150 From the beginning of Socrates’ examination of
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Agathon until the end of Socrates’ speech, the theme of lack emerges in various forms,
and is manifest in three different Greek terms: νδεια, πενα, and φθονα. Socrates’
speech, in its discussion of Eros, moves from treating its relation to νδεια, to its relation
to πενα, and finally presents it as φιλοσοφα φθονος. It is apparent, then, that there are at
least three senses of lack at work in Socrates’ speech in the Symposium, and that the
sense of lack develops and changes alongside that of Eros as the speech progresses. Of
these three words that express the lack of Eros, πενα, or poverty, stands out as holding
special significance for understanding the lack of Eros because of its presence in the myth
of Eros’s origins and because of its thematic presence in the dialogue as a whole. In what
follows, I will begin by discussing the importance of πενα in the Symposium and then
proceed to examine the various senses of lack that emerge in the discussion of Eros.

The Importance of Poverty (πενα) in the Symposium

Poverty frames the discussion in the Symposium. The opening of the dialogue
describes the appearance of Aristodemus, the follower of Socrates who is “small, always
barefoot”151 as Socrates himself habitually is; this image of the poorly clothed and
somewhat filthy philosopher is echoed in Aristodemus’ subsequent description of
Socrates, who he encounters in an unusual state: clean, well-dressed, and shod.152 Both
Aristodemus and Socrates are here portrayed as poor, for their usual habit of dress is that
of the poor. The final description of Socrates by Alcibiades again portrays Socrates as

151

Symp. 173b2-3.

152

Symp. 174a1-4.

76
poor, and as an embodiment of the Eros-daimon previously described by Diotima, even
though Alcibiades was not present for that discussion.153 The middle portion of
Diotima’s speech identifies Eros as a child of Poverty; indeed his intermediate status is
inextricably bound to poverty, and the description of his nature includes a description of
his life of poverty. The theme of poverty,154 then, is woven throughout the Symposium,
and serves as a framework for the discussion of Eros.
R.E. Allen notes that it is not only poverty that frames the drama of the
Symposium, but hubris as well.155 Allen argues that “the reader is meant to be reminded
of Socrates’ trial by Alcibiades’ speech” and draws attention to the charge of hubris he
levels against Socrates.156 This charge, as Allen notes, echoes Agathon’s charge of
hubris found at the beginning of the dialogue.157 If it is Socrates’ trial of which we are to
think, then it is perhaps also appropriate to recall Socrates’ witness to his innocence. In
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the Apology, Socrates defends his teaching with the following words: “I, on the other
hand, have a convincing witness that I speak the truth, my poverty (πενα).”158
In Greek Popular Morality, Kenneth Dover’s discussion of poverty indicates its
connection to hubris. According to his work, it was not uncommon for defendants to
invoke poverty as evidence for their innocence, particularly to show that they had not
acted out of hubris.159 In both the Apology and the Symposium, Socrates’ poverty is
presented as such a defense against the charge of hubris.
It is notable, then, that in the Symposium the Eros-daimon and Socrates alike are
presented as poor. The grasping and greedy nature of hubris is their antithesis; their
poverty is a testament to their virtue. Hubris itself is contrasted with moderation in the
Phaedrus.160 Dover draws attention to the causes of hubris and σωφροσ"νη in his
discussion of poverty, writing “the good things of life implant hybris but the bad things
sōphrosynē.”161 Thus the portrayal of both Socrates and Eros as poor suggests that
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moderation (σωφροσ"νη) is related to, if not concomitant with, poverty and so also Eros.
Poverty and hubris set the tone for the drama of the Symposium, marking the beginning
and end of the presentation of Socrates as the paradigmatic erotic man. It seems, then,
that poverty (and perhaps in particular poverty as opposed to hubris) is central to an
understanding of the Symposium. It is necessary, then, to investigate what sort of thing
poverty is and what sense it carries in the context of the Symposium and its discussion of
Eros.

The Concept of Poverty

The concept of poverty itself is quite broad; it may signify a simple lack or
deficiency; it may signify a harmful lack or deficiency; it may signify deficiency with
respect to money, material goods, physical well-being, spiritual or mental well-being.162
Poverty is also conceived of in degrees, from absolute indigence to meager subsistence.
It may indicate a void that needs filling, or it may indicate a void that remains empty. As
Plato’s discussion in Republic IX explains, mixed pleasures that arise from fulfilling
162

For further discussion and conceptual analysis of poverty, see John D. Jones, Poverty
and the Human Condition: A Philosophical Inquiry (Lewiston: E. Mellen Press, 1990). It
is notable that Jones’s description of poverty emphasizes the modern conception of
poverty as negative deficiency, just as the twentieth century Platonic literature conceives
of the negative deficiency of Eros. “In judging that people live in conditions of poverty,
we commonly say that such people lack what is needed or are fundamentally unable to
accomplish certain goals and ends or obtain a certain quality of life. The poor are
subjected to substantive deprivation, inadequate resources and so forth. Caught in such
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to be blocked, frustrated and thwarted in the realization of one’s existence. So far as
people are poor or impoverished, they are in various ways crippled and paralyzed in their
attempt to work out their lives, not merely with respect to survival but also with respect
to enhancement and flourishing. As a blockage and frustration of human life, poverty
takes on a destructive character” (Jones, 5-6).
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voids, like hunger, involve voids that require filling; but the pleasure arising from seeing
involves a “void” of another kind, one that is never filled, and such pleasures bear a
closer resemblance to those that are proper to the rational soul. In seeing, smelling, and
thinking, pleasure occurs in the activity itself, and is not arrived at as a consequence of
movement from a state of deficiency to a state of satiety. The examples of seeing and
smelling also reveal that poverty can indicate a state or disposition; in this sense it may
indicate a faculty in its potentiality, in a state of readiness, that is brought into actuality
by the presence of some object outside of it. This is, for instance, what occurs when the
eye or the soul beholds something beautiful.
There are two other kinds of conceptual distinctions that are relevant to the
discussion of poverty in the Symposium. The first distinction is between material and
immaterial poverty. By material poverty, I mean deficiencies with respect to physical or
material goods. By immaterial poverty, I mean deficiencies with respect to spiritual or
mental goods. The second distinction is between kinds or degrees of poverty. Extreme
poverty is designated by terms such as indigence and usually indicates an absolute or
nearly absolute deficiency of goods necessary for life. The term “working poor”, on the
other hand, is often used to indicate a class of people who have some goods necessary for
life, but who have only enough of these to subsist or survive. Both of these distinctions
are found in Greek discussions of poverty.
Though the term for poverty (πενα) has for its primary meaning a lack of material
goods, it is sometimes used to signify other kinds of lack as well. Xenophon, in his
Symposium, uses the term in reference to the soul.163 Euripides applies poverty to the
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body in Electra,164 and in Works and Days, Hesiod writes of “baneful, spirit-destroying
(θυµοφθρος) poverty.”165 The term poverty, then, is applicable not only to external
material goods, but to body, soul, and θυµς, and so also to immaterial goods. It is
evident, then, that the use of the term poverty and its derivatives to describe both material
and immaterial lack is not strange to the Greek mind, and that our own understanding of
the term in Plato’s writing should not be restricted to material or physical deficiencies
associated with desire.
The Greek language also distinguishes between the poverty proper to the working
man (πενα), and the absolute poverty of the beggar (πτωχεα), thus recognizing different
degrees of deficiency. The latter term, πτωχεα, does not appear in the text of the
Symposium, but two other terms expressing deficiency do appear: νδεια and φθονα.
The first term, νδεια, is used to indicate want, lack, or need; in particular, when coupled
with +πιθυµα, νδεια carries the meaning of want or need.166 Though the word is
sometimes used to indicate material or economic deficiency,167 the meaning of the word
is broader than this and can indicate a lack of any sort. The second term, φθονα,
describes “the lack of a grudging attitude, therefore ‘abundance.’”168 While this may
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seem to be a paradoxical definition, attending to the etymology of the term reveals that
the meaning of abundance is secondary, arising from the understanding that a lack of
φθνος, or envy, frees the soul from the trammels of desire, allowing it to enjoy fully the
goods of which it is possessed, thus providing one with abundance.169 Within the
Symposium, νδεια appears in the elenchus of Agathon as the term descriptive of the lack
that is common in the experiences of +πιθυµα, Eros, and βουλησις. The language of lack,
however, shifts to using πενα in Diotima’s presentation of the parentage of Eros. ῎Ενδεια
appears only twice in this discussion.170 jφθονος appears in the final section of Diotima’s
discourse, as descriptive of the philosophical disposition of the true lover at the pinnacle
of his erotic ascent. In what follows, I will examine the meaning of each of these terms,
their use in Platonic dialogues from the same period as the Symposium, and the role they
play in the development of the concept of poverty in the Symposium.
῎Ενδεια

῎Ενδεια is a rather general term for deficiency or lack. In the middle dialogues,
Plato uses the term in two primary ways. First, νδεια appears in discussions of pleasure,
and here often indicates the deficiency that is experienced as painful in appetition.171
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Socrates speaks here of the “filling of the deficiency” as a pleasure.172 Second, νδεια
appears in discussions of virtue,173 and here indicates a deficiency in two senses: as a
deficiency of knowledge (either +πιστ/µη or τ5χνη) and as a deficiency of participation in
the Form of the virtue in question (as, e.g. temperance in the Charmides).174 This sense
of νδεια appears also in discussions of the Forms and the sensible world. A passage in
the Phaedo uses νδεια to indicate lack of participation in the Form of equality, so that the
being existing in the sensible realm is characterized by this deficiency and is, at the same
time, stretching toward (Mρ5γω) the perfection of the Form that it lacks.175
῎Ενδεια in the Gorgias and the Protagoras

Both the Gorgias and the Protagoras use νδεια to indicate the deficiency
experienced in appetition. In the Protagoras, νδεια is contrasted with 0περβολ/ in the
context of a discussion of pleasure.176 Socrates argues here that “our salvation in life
depends on the right choice of pleasures and pains, be they more or fewer, greater or
lesser, farther or nearer” and so seems “first of all, to be measurement, which is the study
172
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of relative excess (0περβολ/) and deficiency (νδεια) and equality.”177 Those who err in
choices regarding pleasure and pain are described as having a deficiency (νδεια) of
+πιστ/µη (with regard to measurement).178 This deficiency is described as ignorance, and
this seems to be a way of falling short of knowledge; what is lacking here is participation
in +πιστ/µη, and in this sense, νδεια is a lack with respect to the fulfillment of one’s
rational nature.
Similarly, in the Gorgias, νδεια is used to describe a deficiency of wisdom or
justice. Later in the same work νδεια is used to describe a deficiency in skill (τ5χνη). In
the Gorgias and the Protragoras, νδεια is applied to describe a falling short of the form
of a virtue, such as wisdom, and a falling short of an ability or power, like oratory.179

῎Ενδεια in Republic IX and the Philebus

bνδεια appears again in the discussion of pleasure in the Philebus.180 Here, νδεια
is opposed to =δον/, so that those who are diseased “feel greater deprivations (νδεια), and
also greater pleasures (=δον/) at their replenishment.”181 Later in the same dialogue, in
response to Protarchus’ question as to what “kinds of pleasures that one could rightly
regard as true”, Socrates responds that these are “Those that are related to so-called pure
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colors and to shapes and to most smells and sounds and in general all those that are based
on imperceptible and painless lacks (νδεια), while their fulfillments are perceptible and
pleasant.”182
This distinction between kinds of pleasures is articulated as the distinction
between pure and mixed pleasures in Book IX of the Republic, and a further distinction is
drawn between the mixed and fleeting pleasures of the body and the pure and more real
pleasures of the soul.183 Indeed, in this passage Socrates argues that a mixed pleasure is
not pleasure at all, but merely the cessation of pain. These pleasures, which involve
constant change and motion from the state of pain to its cessation, are sharply contrasted
with the pure and true pleasures of the philosophical part of the soul. The example of
bodily pleasure, however, does provide a foundation for describing the truer pleasures of
the soul; for just as there are “kinds of filling up (πλ/ρωσις) such as filling up with bread
or drink or delicacies or food in general”, so also is there a “kind of filling up that is with
true belief, knowledge, understanding, and, in sum, with all of virtue.”184 It is clear,
however, that Plato does not mean that the filling up of the soul brings humans to an
intermediate state between pain and pleasure as does the filling up of the body. The
bodily desires require constant refilling and involve constant motion between states of
depletion and repletion; but knowledge, understanding, and virtue complete the soul in a
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way that does not require continual refilling. The question posed by Plato’s treatment of
desire and its bodily and spiritual manifestations, then, is what sort of emptiness or
deficiency is involved in each.
Aristotle argues that the view “that pain is the lack of that which is according to
nature, and pleasure is replenishment” is insufficient to account for all kinds of pleasures,
even those counted to be sensual.185 Plato’s examples in Republic IX make a similar
point; the examples of sight and smell show that not all sensual pleasures are preceded by
a painful state or, as the examples in the Philebus, a perceptible lack. This indicates that
Plato does not view lack or deficiency as a sufficient account of desire or Eros; the
description of desire as a lack of the desired object is only partial. We may be able to
distinguish particular bodily desires that involve the presence of pain and clearly involve
a painful deficiency. It is clear, though, that the spectrum of sensual experience exceeds
this model, and since desire itself is not limited to sensual experience though it be
understood as its parallel, its manifestations as proper to other elements of the soul will,
similarly, exceed a model of desire based on fulfillment of perceptible deficiency.
The imperceptible deficiency that Plato describes as present in the experience of
the sensual pleasures of sight, hearing, and smell provide a model for understanding what
sort of deficiency is involved in these instances. The pleasure of a beautiful sight
indicates that some beautiful object that was not previously present is now present and
that gazing at it is pleasant. Any object, regardless of its beauty, might have activated the
activity of seeing. The beauty of the object in particular is what makes the activity
pleasant. This indicates a further perfection of the activity of seeing rather than the filling
185
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of a deficiency; and yet, when we gaze at something beautiful the activity of seeing is
more complete and more intense, and in this sense fills the deficiency of the activity of
seeing that would occur if the visible object were deficient in beauty. There are then, two
deficiencies to be distinguished in the experienced pleasure of beautiful visions: the first
is the deficiency of the visible object, which may be more or less beautiful, the second is
the deficiency in the activity of seeing itself, which may be more or less pleasant and
intense depending on the beauty of its object.
The discussion of pleasure in Book IX of the Republic is presented in terms of
πλ/ρωσις and κεν6σις. The highest pleasures are those that do not involve kinesis, because
they are not a movement from a state of emptiness to a state of fulfillment. These are
pleasures like smell and sight, which do not involve a movement from a painful state of
deficiency to a sated state that is not so much pleasurable as an absence of pain. The true
pleasures are the pure pleasures which involve no pain or experienced deficiency.
Gazing at a beautiful object is the physical analogue of the intellectual pleasure Plato has
in mind. The intermediate state at which one arrives upon filling a deficiency is called
=συχα; this is a state of rest. If pure pleasures proceed from this state, the implication is
that stillness (=συχα) is a precondition for pure pleasure. At any rate, the pain suggested
in Plato’s treatment of pleasure here is the longing for fulfillment that involves pain; the
pleasures of smell and sight do not involve the same kind of deficiency, but rather
proceed from the intermediate state. In these cases, the powers of sight and smell are in
repose but ready to be acted upon from without and in being actuated by beautiful and
pleasant objects, bring pleasure. Had the objects encountered been ugly and unpleasant,
the consequent motion would have been aversion and been attended by pain. This is the
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analogue for what occurs at the level of mind or soul. So, what is commonly taken to be
pleasure is this movement from a state of deficiency to a state of rest. Such a pleasure is
not a true or pure pleasure in Plato’s sense, as it involves pain and because the resultant
state is not one of actual pleasure, but one of the absence of either pleasure or pain. Pure
pleasure is beyond this intermediate state, and the best kind of pleasure (or filling up) is
that of the soul, not just because it proceeds from an intermediate state rather than from a
deficiency, but also because the pleasures proper to the soul are different in kind. It is
precisely because the pleasures of the soul are different in kind that they are more stable
and more permanent. The quality of the pleasures that are proper to the soul are like the
quality of the soul itself, and so appropriate to it and to the soul’s proper activity. Thus,
the best pleasures are those achieved by the exercise of the soul’s proper activity, reason.

῎Ενδεια in the Symposium

In the Symposium, νδεια first appears as a description of Eros in the elenchus of
Agathon. The first question of the elenchus is whether Eros “is always ‘of
something.’”186 It is from Agathon’s affirmation of this that Socrates moves to a
discussion of Eros as desire. Both Allen and Bury note that the discussion in the
elenchus is designed to mark the futuristic nature of desire—that a person does not desire
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what he has at present, but may desire to continue to have it.187 It is this feature of desire
that allows Socrates to proceed to his next conclusion—that one desires what one does
not have, and thus what one lacks (νδεια). It is thus as desire (+πιθυµα) that Eros is
described in terms of its deficiency.188 This feature of Eros is reiterated by Diotima a
short time later: “And yet you’ve agreed, in Love’s case, that a lack of good and
beautiful things is what makes him desire the very things he lacks.”189 This observation,
that Eros lacks good and beautiful things, excludes him from divinity, leading to the
conclusion that Eros is a daimon and ultimately to the account of his mythical origins.
The elenchus presents the following argument: Eros is a kind of desire or wish,
and desiring and wishing are always for something, and something that we do not have at
present. In this way, the understanding of Eros as desire is the thematic introduction of
Eros as intrinsically bound to poverty. Though the myth of Eros’s parentage does not
begin Diotima’s account of Eros, the idea of poverty as essential to the nature of Eros is
present from the beginning of her account, having already been established as proper to
Eros in the elenchus of Agathon.
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Given the senses of νδεια identified previously, νδεια in the Symposium might
indicate the painful deficiency experienced in appetition; given the presence of +πιθυµα in
the elenchus of Agathon, this seems plausible. ῎Ενδεια then might be taken to indicate,
appropriately, the lack that accompanies desire, especially desire of a bodily nature. In
two of the passages (from the Philebus and the Republic) mentioned above, however,
Plato’s discussions of pleasure and desire indicate that the pleasure derived from
fulfilling a perceptible deficiency is a pleasure of the lowest order. Furthermore, his
examination of Agathon uses the example of fulfillment as an example of cessation of
desire, in a way that is parallel to the examples of the fulfillment of bodily deficiencies
given in the Republic. The filling of this lack, then, leaves the desirer (or lover) in an
intermediate state that is neither pleasure nor pain, but =συχα. True pleasure proceeds
from this state, not from a state of perceived deficiency or pain. Thus, in one sense, and
because Plato often speaks on more than one level, νδεια can be taken to be the lack that
is proper to +πιθυµα in Socrates’ initial exchange with Agathon. It is not, however,
limited to this sense.
In another sense, however, νδεια in this part of the Symposium can be taken to
indicate a deficiency in the lover himself, with respect to his participation in the Forms.
Applying such an interpretation to the meaning of νδεια in the Symposium would suggest
that the lack of Eros is descriptive of the lover’s various deficiencies with respect to
Forms. This is borne out by the later portrayal of the Eros-daimon as intermediate and so
lacking full participation in beauty, wisdom, goodness, and immortality. The lover, just
as the Eros-daimon who possesses him, is in need of beauty, wisdom, goodness, and
immortality. Possession by the Eros-daimon is a means by which to reach toward the
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perfections of the Forms, participation in which completes and perfects the lover himself.
This indicates that Eros, in its broadest meaning, is the lack of what is perfective of any
given lover, and indeed this is in agreement with the presentation of cosmic Eros in
which all things stretch toward the fulfillment of their individual Forms and at the same
time toward a participation in the immortality that is proper only to the Forms
themselves. Kosman suggests such an understanding of νδεια in the following passage:
But the conclusion is clear and interesting, for it suggests that the πρPτον
φλον is that of which we may be said to be properly +νδεε2ς, and this is our
own true but fugitive nature, that which is for us φ"σει ο%κε2ν, even if we are
separated from it. [Lysis]
The proper object of erotic love is thus understood by Plato to be
τ- ο%κε2ον κα, +νδεRς, that which belongs naturally to oneself, but from
which one has been separated. Erotic love is thus primarily for Plato selflove, for it is finally our true self which is at once native to us and lacked
by us….”Self-love” does not here mean love of love, like the
understanding of understanding in the Charmides, but one’s love of one’s
self. Nor does it mean selfish love, the vanity and egocentricism which is
assailed in Book V of the Laws. It means at the human level that erotic
self-striving which characterizes all being: the desire of each thing to
become what it is.190
Kosman’s interpretation is supported by the use of νδεια at Symposium 204a5-6, where
Diotima says that “The person who doesn’t think he lacks something won’t desire what
he doesn’t think he lacks.” This statement follows upon her account of Eros’s parentage
and her explanation of how his parentage further explains his intermediate nature. It is
necessary, on this account, that one who seeks wisdom be neither wise nor ignorant, else
he will not seek wisdom, either because he does not lack it, or because he is not aware
that he lacks it. Ultimately, the νδεια of the lover is distinct from the lack of mere bodily
desire, which ceases upon fulfillment. This may be one aspect or sense of Eros, insofar
190
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as it indicates sexual desire or desire generally.191 As noted earlier, however, νδεια and
its derivatives appear throughout the elenchus of Agathon and in the initial exchange
between Socrates and Diotima; the term gives way to πενα further along in the dialogue.
The absence of νδεια in the ensuing treatment is notable.
Πενα

Πενα is the abstract substantive etymologically related to the verb π5νοµαι and the
substantive π5νης, which means “one who works for his living, day-labourer, poor man”
and is opposed to the πλο"σιος or wealthy man.192 The kind of poverty indicated by πενα
is not an absolute impoverishment, but indicates a lack of the sort of surplus that is proper
to the wealthy man. The π5νης has just enough to meet his needs, and no more. As such,
the π5νης has no leisure, but must be constantly at work, seeking the things necessary to
his survival. Contrasted with νδεια, then, πενα indicates a more specific kind of lack than
does νδεια, and this is deficiency as embodied in the working man; not deficiency or lack
simpliciter, but with respect to the excesses of extreme lack or extreme surplus. As such,
πενα indicates appropriate deficiency, i.e., the π5νης has what is necessary for his wellbeing, but not a surplus that would be detrimental to his well-being nor a deficiency that
would be detrimental to his well-being.
Plato’s usage of πενα in the middle dialogues does not indicate the same sort of
distinct usages as νδεια. Πενα appears most frequently in general discussions of wealth
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and poverty as they are related to material possessions and consequently how these
condition the possibilities of the person or city to whom they belong. In the Phaedo and
the Symposium, however, πενα is discussed as it is related to the philosopher, and this
indicates that the term bears significantly on how the philosophical life is to be lived.
Nonetheless, because Plato’s use of πενα and its cognates is more often attributive than
descriptive, it will be useful to draw upon other historical sources to further clarify the
concept of πενα. As the discussion of πενα in section one above has shown, general
Greek usage connects πενα with σωφροσ"νη and opposes it to greed and hubris. In what
follows, I will make use of the texts of Aristophanes and Xenophon, and the historical
work of Jaeger to provide a fuller understanding of πενα and its relationship to σωφροσ"νη.
This will, in turn, provide the foundation for understanding the significance of πενα in
Diotima’s explanation of Eros’s nature and origins.
In the Symposium, the term ‘πενα’ emerges in the context of the myth of the
origins of Eros. In this myth, Diotima identifies the parents of Eros as Προς (Resource)
and Πενα (Poverty).193 The parentage of Eros is then used to describe the nature of Eros
himself:
Because, then, he is the son of Resource and Poverty, Love’s situation is
like this. First, he is always poor (π5νης), and far from delicate and
beautiful, as most people think he is; he is hard, dirty, barefoot, homeless,
always sleeping on the ground, without blankets, stretching out under the
sky in doorways and by the roadside, because he has his mother’s nature,
always with lack (νδεια) as his companion. His father’s side, for its part,
makes him a schemer after the beautiful and good, courageous, impetuous,
and intense, a clever hunter, always weaving new devices, both passionate
for wisdom and resourceful in looking for it, philosophizing through all
his life, a clever magician, sorcerer, and sophist; his nature is neither that
of an immortal, nor that of a mortal, but on the same day, now he
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flourishes and lives, when he finds resources, and now he dies, but then
comes back to life again, because of his father’s nature, and what he gets
for himself is always slipping away from him, so that Love is neither
resourceless at any moment, nor rich, and again is in the middle between
wisdom and ignorance.194
It is at once striking that, though Socrates’ speech to this point has spoken of
Eros’s lack in terms of νδεια, the term used to describe the kind of lack essential to Eros’s
nature by virtue of his parentage is πενα. Striking, too, is the choice of προς as a partner
for πενα, since its more usual complement would be πλο4τος.195 From a literary
perspective, these choices frustrate the expectations of the reader for two reasons:
because πενα has taken the place of νδεια, and because the myth of origins is introduced
immediately after a section thematizing the intermediate nature of Eros as it exists
between several pairs of opposites. As an intermediate and as a daimon, Eros is placed
between knowledge and ignorance, beauty and ugliness, good and bad; one would expect,
then, that the intermediate nature he inherits from his parents would be a consequence of
just such a pair of opposites. But this is not what follows.
Insofar as Eros is intermediate between Προς and Πενα, he contains the natures
of both. In the same way that daimons bind the all to the all, Eros binds Προς to Πενα.
Such being would not be possible in the case of opposites that must yield to one another.
Nor is this intermediacy the same as that which, lying between opposites, represents a
point on a graded scale that begins with nonbeing and ends with absolute being. Rather,
this very different kind of intermediacy lies in Eros holding together two seemingly
194
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disparate elements of being—poverty and resourcefulness. This is borne out by the text,
quoted above, that follows the myth in which Diotima describes the attributes that Eros
has inherited from each of his parents. From this singular kind of intermediacy comes a
singular kind of poverty, for though Eros is poor, he is never without resource; he is not
utterly barren, but neither is he wealthy. This poverty is a state of being in which the
poor man is continuously inventive, striving toward the things that he needs, and yet he is
never so completely deficient that he becomes mired in and paralyzed by deficiency. He
has learned to live with deficiency; it is his companion. Poverty, however, provides him
with daring and inventiveness; poverty provides him with a way to the things that he
needs.
The conception of poverty in the myth presents the lack of Eros as the lack proper
to the working man, the lack of πενα. It is this lack that depicts the philosopher not only
as lover, but as the embodiment of the π5νης, and so provides the foundation for the later
conception of him as engaging in φιλοσοφα φθονος. Such also is the depiction of the
philosopher in the Phaedo, and it is notable that poverty is mentioned as something that
does not cause fear in the philosophical soul because it is not φιλοχρ/µατος.
It is for this reason, my friends Simmias and Cebes, that those who practice
philosophy in the right way keep away from all bodily passions, master them and
do not surrender themselves to them; it is not at all for fear of wasting their
substance and of poverty, which the majority and the money-lovers fear, nor for
fear of dishonor and ill repute, like the ambitious and lovers of honors, that they
keep away from them.196
Πενα in the Phaedo and the Republic is associated with the money-loving part of the
soul, which is itself contrasted with the honor-loving and learning-loving parts of the
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soul. As is often the case with Plato, the material and tangible serves as a model for
understanding the immaterial and intangible, and here πενα forms a part of the
philosopher’s practice for dying as the tangible description of his moderation.197 But this
is not the sum of the philosopher’s moderation, for he must also steer clear of overzealous
attachment to honor, and, ultimately to beliefs that might prevent his progress toward
truth. The above passage from the Phaedo indicates that the philosopher does not live a
moderate life because he is afraid of poverty; he does not act out of fear of suffering or
deprivation. Instead, he acts out of a desire to be united with the divine, and is willing to
forego bodily pleasure for the sake of attaining the much greater pleasures proper to the
soul itself. 198
Πενα, χρηµατα, and φιλοχρ/µατος appear together in other of Plato’s dialogues as
well. The description of poverty as a corruption of a person’s financial state (χρηµατικ/)
in the Gorgias is one example of this.199 Here, poverty is not just a deficiency, but a bad
state of one’s finances, analogous to disease as a bad state of the body and injustice as a
bad state of the soul.200
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The money-loving (φιλοχρ/µατος) part of the soul is found to be at the root of
political conflict in the Republic. It is the cause of war with other states as well as the
cause of civil war.201 The healthy city, proposed in Book II, avoids the evils of poverty
and war by prescribing a life for its citizenry that aims at moderation.202 It is Glaucon’s
insistence on the addition of “things that go beyond what is necessary for a city” that
brings about the increased needs of the city and ultimately lead it to war.203 In this
instance, the city does not have enough or thinks it does not and, consequently, looks for
more outside of itself. Had it maintained its subsistence state, there would have been no
need for war, nor would it have been beset by poverty.
In Book IV, poverty and wealth are identified as the conditions that ruin good
craftsmanship.204 Poverty deprives the craftsman of what he needs to do his craft well,
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while wealth makes him less likely to practice his craft or to practice it with care.205 It is
the state intermediate between these two extremes that causes the craftsman to perform
his craft well.206 Excess and deficiency—wealth and poverty—create conditions under
which the craftsman will not or cannot work. Wealth and poverty as extremes are
harmful; what is desirable and perfective is the appropriate amount.
The passages from the Republic reveal a complexity in Plato’s characterization of
poverty and wealth, but one that seems in accord with the attitude of Plato’s Greece. On
the one hand, wealth is viewed as necessary to living a good life, practicing and acquiring
arête; one is able to cultivate perfection only when one has leisure to devote to such
cultivation. But, as Dover notes, “like the appetites and passions, wealth can in itself
distort an otherwise virtuous character.”207 And so, alongside the recognition that
poverty is not a desirable state, and that material deficiencies might interfere with the
acquisition and practice of virtue, the singular virtue of the working man (π5νης) is
articulated. Jaeger writes of this virtue of the working man in the following passage:
It is not for nothing that Greece was the cradle of a civilization which
places work high among the virtues. We must not be deceived by the
carefree life of the Homeric gentlemen into forgetting that the land of
Greece always demanded hard and constant labour from its people.208
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And again, in a passage on Hesiod’s Works and Days, Jaeger writes of the conception of
virtue that emerges from the peasant life:
In the first part [of Works and Days] Hesiod made his hearers feel the
curse of strife; now he must show them the values of work. He praises it
as the only way to arête, difficult though it is. The idea of arête embraces
both personal ability and its products—welfare, success, repute. It is
neither the arête of the warrior noble, nor the arête of the landowning
class, built on wealth, but the arête of the working man, expressed in the
possession of a modest competence. Arête is the catchword of the second
part of the poem, the real Erga. The aim of work is arête as the common
man understands it. He wishes to make something of his arête, and he
engages, not in the ambitious rivalry for chivalrous prowess and praise
which is commended by the code of the aristocrat, but in the quiet strong
rivalry of work. In the sweat of his brow shall he eat bread—but that is
not a curse, it is a blessing. Only the sweat of his brow can win him arête.
From this it is obvious that Hesiod deliberately sets up against the
aristocratic training of Homer’s heroes a working-class ideal of education,
based on the arête of the ordinary man. Righteousness and Work are the
foundations on which it is built.209
The passage from Jaeger indicates that poverty is a teacher of virtue, and of virtue of a
distinct kind. The virtue Jaeger describes as belonging to Hesiod’s peasant develops the
soul of man in a direction quite different from the aristocrat; instead of beginning with
surplus and leisure, the peasant begins with deficiency and work. If we consider the
development of the virtue of the peasant in terms of Plato’s tripartite division of the soul
we see moderation of irrational appetites, but also moderation of the honor-loving part of
the soul. As Jaeger suggests, the glory of the peasant is not in his status or reputation.210
This is not to say that his θυµς is not developed, nor that he is without a certain kind of
courage, but the power of θυµς is directed here toward perseverance and endurance
209
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through daily hardship. (It could be the root of the daring implanted by poverty, too).
This conception of virtue as endurance and perseverance is of a piece with Plato’s
description of Eros as the child of Προς and Πενα, for he must daily work for what he
needs, enduring and persevering through hardship.
Xenophon’s Symposium situates a discussion of wealth and poverty within the
context of what it means to be free or liberal—the quality of the true gentleman
(καλοικγαθοι). The focus of this discussion is of aristocratic arête, rather than of that
proper to the peasant. Yet the speakers in Xenophon’s Symposium focus on wealth and
poverty as means to achieving freedom and thus also goodness; and once again πενα is
brought to the fore as a means of acquiring and maintaining virtue.211 Bartlett notes that
“Liberality (eleutherios) generally speaking is behavior appropriate to a free man
(eleutheros) and came to signify more narrowly the freedom from an undue attachment to
wealth, i.e., generosity (see, e.g. 4.43 below and Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 4.1).”212
There are two speakers, other than Socrates himself, whose speeches are remarkable for
their focus on wealth and poverty. In the speeches of Charmides and Antisthenes, lack of
wealth is identified as the source of the speakers’ freedom.
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Poverty in these speeches is spoken of as both material and spiritual.213
Charmides praises poverty because it has freed him from many ills.214 Though he was
once wealthy, he has since been deprived of his wealth and many of the things that
followed from it. But in this new poverty, Charmides finds a new tranquility. He
identifies three ways in which his new poverty has benefited him: he no longer fears loss
of material goods, no longer fears loss of public goods such as reputation, and he is no
longer constrained by the city.215 The consequences Charmides derives from these show
that his new poverty allows him “to be bold [rather] than fearful, to be free rather than a
slave, to be tended to rather than to tend to another, and to be trusted by the fatherland
rather than distrusted by it.”216 His having nothing does not cause him sorrow, but grants
him freedom, especially from fear. Charmides concludes his speech with the following
observation: “But now I lose nothing, for I have nothing to lose, and I always hope that
I’ll lay hold of something.”217 When Callias asks him if he tries to avoid goods that come
his way, in order to avoid becoming wealthy again, Charmides responds with a
description of his attitude toward possible goods that is strikingly similar to the
description of the daimon Eros in Plato’s Symposium. He says, “This I do not do, but I
bear up with a real love of danger if I expect to lay hold of something from somewhere or
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other.”218 Charmides, much like Plato’s daimon Eros, lives with need and pregnant
expectation.
Antisthenes’ speech follows that of Charmides. He begins with a distinction
between material and spiritual poverty: “human beings do not have wealth and poverty
in their household but in their souls.”219 His explanation of this statement indicates that
the desire for more belongs properly to the soul, and in support of this, he cites examples
of those who have plenty but still desire more. In brief, it seems that the wealthiest of
men can be hungry for more wealth, and so their need or desire is not rooted in anything
material, but rather in the soul itself. “Now I for my part feel great pity for them because
of their sickness. For in my opinion they suffer the same things as someone who could
never be satiated although he had and ate a great deal.”220 The poverty he describes is
one of having just enough, sufficiency: “Nevertheless, I can eat to the point that I’m not
hungry and can drink until I’m not thirsty and be dressed in such a way that I’m no colder
when outside than the fabulously wealthy Callias here.”221 Antisthenes’ commitment to
poverty is quite striking, but it differs from the poverty that Plato seems to advocate in a
significant way. Antisthenes states that no task would be “too base” (φα4λος) for him to
perform to get what he needed to survive, and that those who “look to cheap things” are
more likely to be just than those who must have the more precious ones. This suggests,
perhaps, a vulgarity or inability to appreciate the fine; though, it might also suggest that
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the “precious” things are not themselves truly fine. Either way, it suggests that the
poverty of Antisthenes is a poverty more like that of the Cynics than of Plato’s Socrates,
for it involves a rejection of all good things, bereft of appropriate appreciation for the
truly noble, fine, and good.222 Love and desire are not ordered or trained, but quashed.
Dover notes that there is precedent for the personification of Πενα in
Aristophanes’ Ploutos.223 Though this is not sufficient to determine that Plato chose
Πενα because there was a recent precedent, it does suggest that he might have intended
some allusion to the Πενα of Aristophanes. Of particular interest is the defence Πενα
gives of herself in this play. She argues against the criticisms of two Athenian citizens
that she is of greater benefit to humanity than is wealth.
You are trying to mock and make jokes, with no concern for serious
discussion, and refusing to recognize that I produce better men than
Wealth does—better men both mentally and physically. With him, they
are gouty and pot-bellied and thick-calved and obscenely fat; with me
they’re lean and wasp-like and sting their enemies hard.224
Notable too is the passage in which Πενα distinguishes herself from the absolute
deficiency that is designated by πτωχεα:
My kind of life doesn’t involve that sort of thing, by Zeus, and it never
could. The life of the destitute (πτωχεα), which is what you’re talking
about, is to have to live on nothing. The life of a poor man (π5νης) is to
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live economically and keep at one’s work, not having any surplus but not
having a shortfall either.225
These passages from Aristophanes support the understanding of πενα as a state
intermediate between extreme deficiency and surplus, and as a state that maintains virtue.
Taken together with the passages we have considered from Aristophanes, Hesiod, and
Xenophon, we can conclude that the lack of πενα is not an absolute deficiency, nor is it
the deficiency associated with the pain of appetitive lack. It is a lack of excess, the
poverty of the working man who is just able to meet his needs, and so is in an
intermediate state between absolute deficiency, or πτωχεα, and surplus; it is an
appropriate deficiency, in brief, moderation.
The concept of lack that is presented as central to an understanding of Eros’s
nature is found in the concept of Πενα. As we have seen, πενα itself indicates a state
characterized by both industry and moderation. The poor man is not weak and
emaciated, but strong and industrious. This industrious and resourceful aspect of πενα in
Eros is emphasized by its combination with προς in Plato’s myth. Πενα is the kind of
lack that involves resourcefulness; this is revealed even in Πενα’s plot to have a child by
Resource.
Understanding πενα as a kind of moderation helps us to reconceptualize the Erosdaimon. As simultaneously poor and resourceful, he is a kind of ascetic and embodies, to
borrow a phrase from Desmond, the “praise of poverty”. But the poverty of the Erosdaimon is not merely material, and so neither is his asceticism. Plato’s extension of the
material to the immaterial yields a fuller conception of the inner life of the ascetic, the
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poverty of soul and mind that is the necessary discipline for ascending to the vision of
Beauty and for achieving the abundance and freedom of φθονος.
Our conception of poverty cannot remain defined and constrained by materiality.
Just as the objects of Eros become further removed from sensible reality as the lover
ascends toward the vision of Beauty, so also do the objects of poverty. If poverty
describes a moderation of the bodily pleasure at the lowest levels, this disposition of the
soul not to be controlled by bodily desires is descriptive of the appropriate disposition of
the other parts of the human soul as well. Moderation applies also to the spirited element
in man, that he not love and grasp at victory and honor to excess. For the rational
element, this implies that the mind must acquire a disposition of attentive waiting. The
mind must wait to catch sight of the Beautiful; vision of the highest form, of Beauty
itself, cannot be forced; the mind waits upon its object.
This disposition of poverty throughout the entire soul yields also a different
conception of the longing that is generally associated with Eros. Because Eros is no
longer the painful deficiency of appetite, the subjective experience of Eros is different.
As the Socrates-Diotima dialogue moves into its final stage, Eros is characterized by its
“lack of a grudging attitude”. If there is deficiency here, it is not a perceptible painful
deficiency within the subject. The longing of the one who waits attentively is different
from the longing of the one who grasps things (even objects of knowledge) and clings to
them, unwilling to give up falsity and opinion for the sake of truth.
Plato’s Socrates continually directs the attention of his pupils away from the
transient material goods of this world and toward the eternal immateriality that is the only
true good; and the path to this good involves always the embrace of poverty—not a
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denial that one has a mortal nature with the needs entailed by such a nature, but a denial
that this is the sum of what it is to be human. The embrace of poverty involves living in
such a way that one’s physical needs are met, but not excessively indulged and not made
the guiding principle of human existence. Rather the desire for such things that might
consume a human being is directed to other things; this is what Diotima describes in the
ascent passage. Poverty taken with προς becomes the way of Eros.
῎Αφθονος

Of the three terms that Plato uses to indicate lack in the Symposium, φθονος is
perhaps the term whose meaning is most difficult to capture. Its expression of deficiency
is most specific—it is a lack of φθνος, or envy. To be φθονος is to be without greed,
envy, graspingess.
῎Αφθονος appears infrequently in other dialogues. In the Apology it is used to
denote great quantity. In the Protagoras, it conveys generosity, as opposed to stinginess,
and in particular with regard to teaching what one knows (in this example, craftknowledge), and so a generosity of soul. Perhaps most revealing is its opposite, φθνος,
as characteristic of the tyrannical man in the Republic:
In truth, then, and whatever some people may think, a real tyrant is really
a slave, compelled to engage in the worst kind of fawning, slavery, and
pandering to the worst kind of people. He’s so far from satisfying his
desires in any way that it is clear—if one happens to know that one must
study his whole soul—that he’s in the greatest need of most things and
truly poor. And, if indeed his state is like that of the city he rules, then
he’s full of fear, convulsions, and pains throughout his life. And it is like
this, isn’t it? […] And we’ll also attribute to the man what we mentioned
before, namely, that he is inevitably envious, untrustworthy, unjust,
friendless, impious, host and nurse to every kind of vice, and that his
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ruling makes him even more so. And because of all these, he is extremely
unfortunate and goes on to make those near him like himself.226
At opposite ends of the erotic spectrum stand the tyrant and the philosopher; just as the
tryrant embodies Eros at its worst, the philosopher embodies Eros at its best; likewise
each of these types displays the attachment to or detachment from things that are
inseparable from the type of Eros by which they are defined.
In the Symposium, φθονος is joined with φιλοσοφα to describe the activity in
which the lover is engaged at the penultimate state of the ascent to the vision of Beauty.
It is, in fact, the last step the lover himself can take; this is the stage at which he arrives
and waits, hoping to catch sight of Beauty itself. And so it seems to describe a state that
is also an activity: a state that is preparation for vision, but which must remain engaged in
its activity to maintain itself, and so a sort of habit or disposition. A disposition expresses
itself in discrete moments of time through particular actions. The disposition of
moderation in the mind is built on the moderation associated with πενα; it is the extension
of this disposition from bodily appetites to the appetites of θυµς and νο4ς. When the
whole soul has acquired πενα, the whole soul is without greed in every respect, and so in
a state of φθονος.
In the progression of conceptions of lack in the Symposium, φθονος seems to
follow naturally upon the presentation of Eros as the child of Προς and Πενα. On one
conception of the spectrum of kinds of poverty and wealth, one might recognize πτωχεα
as absolute deficiency and φθονος as absolute abundance (rather than wealth as πλο4τος),
and πενα would be intermediate between the two. Indeed, φθονος is more appropriate to
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describe the wealth or abundance of the philosophical lover because it does not carry with
it the hazards attendant upon πλο4τος.

Conclusions

What emerges from the analysis of these three terms and their roles in Socrates’
speech is a clearer understanding of the lack of Eros. Plato’s treatment of lack in the
section of the Symposium beginning with the elenchus of Agathon and ending with
Diotima’s description of the ascent to the vision of Beauty, moves from deficiency to
abundance, and this movement in reflected in the changing terminology used to describe
the lack of Eros. ῎Ενδεια designates the deficiency associated with +πιθυµα and with the
impetus for self-perfection. Πενα, which brings with it moderation, designates an
appropriate deficiency. ῎Αφθονος, opposed to the φθνος of the tyrannical man, designates
the deficiency that is abundance.
We have seen that there are three terms Plato uses to designate the lack of Eros in
the discourse between Socrates and Diotima in the Symposium. The first of these is
νδεια, which indicates a lack simply taken, a deficiency. It is used primarily to designate
the kinds of lack experienced in appetitive desire, those that are filled, and whose filling
ends desire. It is also used by Plato to describe the deficiencies of material things with
respect to their ideal forms, and so in this sense also indicates the sort of interior erotic
striving of all being (and beings) on a metaphysical level. The term νδεια, however, is
prominent only in the elenchus of Agathon and the first portion of the exchange between
Socrates and Diotima. The result of this discussion is to identify Eros as an intermediary
or daimon, and this leads to the next stage of the discussion of Eros's lack.
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The second lack is the lack of Πενα, which is the lack associated with the poverty
of the day-laborer. This is not an absolute lack, nor a lack simply considered. The
poverty of the day-laborer is one of sufficiency; he has just enough to meet his needs and
no more. This is depicted, to some degree, in Diotima's explanation of the myth of Eros's
parentage. In other Greek literature, πενα appears also as a teacher of virtue, especially
the virtue of moderation. It is opposed not only to wealth (πλο4τος), but also to the
hubris and greed that are the offspring of wealth. Where extreme excess and deficiency
breed vice, appropriate deficiency breeds virtue. Πενα is also viewed as implanting
daring (out of necessity). In the Symposium, Eros as daimon, and Socrates as Eros, are
both presented as embodying this kind of poverty. This poverty, as it implants
moderation, is a poverty that is dispositional, and as a lack, is not a lack simply taken, but
a lack with respect to excess and deficiency. This picture of poverty concludes the
section of the discourse that deals with the nature of Eros itself, and the language of lack
and deficiency do not appear again in the discourse until the third and final term for lack,
φθονος, appears in the ascent passage. Πενα designates what sort of thing Eros is,
insofar as he is also Προς; φθονος describes the works of Eros, the fruits of having
acquired the requisite πενα, i.e. the disposition of moderation. At the penultimate stage
of the ascent, the lover is described as pouring forth in φιλοσοφα φθονος, or “a love of
wisdom that grudges nothing”. The φθονος is, literally, not envying or grudging. It is
opposed to the φθνος that characterizes the Republic's tyrannical man, the very picture of
Eros gone awry. jφθονος, being this lack of a grudging attitude, is often used to describe
abundance and flourishing. In the Symposium, it describes the disposition necessary for
the lover to achieve the vision of Absolute Beauty. Both πενα and φθονος describe a
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disposition essential to the true lover, the lack of graspingness that allows the lover to
view the beloved object with both clarity and appreciation; the attitude of attentive
waiting that allows the beloved object to be revealed. There is thus no desire to hold,
possess, or control what is loved, but instead a desire to dwell with it, as the soul desires
to dwell with the Forms. The disposition brought about by πενα —that of moderation—
governs not only the irrational appetitive element in man, but also θυµς and νο4ς, as each
element has its own sort of graspingness that is its own undoing.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE INTERMEDIACY OF EROS

This chapter discusses the nature of Eros as it emerges in the exchange between
Socrates and Diotima. The most significant feature of this examination is its
development of the intermediate nature of Eros, and the sense in which Eros is at once
Προς and Πενα develops out of the establishment of his intermediate nature. The
discussion of Eros, beginning with the elenchus of Agathon, introduces the conception of
Eros as involving νδεια, or lack, and from here proceeds to show the relational character
of Eros. This initial discussion of lack leads to the exposition of Eros as necessarily
relational, and further to Diotima’s description of Eros as existing between various sets of
opposites and thus as intermediate or µεταξ". It is his intermediate status that identifies
Eros as a daimon and the human being who understands the daimonic as the δαιµνιος
ν/ρ. There is a traceable development, then, of the concept of the intermediate in
Diotima’s discourse, one that begins with the recognition of Eros’s lack, and derives from
this lack a structure of Eros that expresses its metaphysical reality and the human
psychological experience of this reality. It will be the purpose of this chapter to articulate
this development.
The consequences of Eros’s intermediacy are embodied in his portrayal as
daimon, and particularly in the manner in which he includes both Προς and Πενα in his
nature. The metaphysical status of the intermediate itself bears upon the interpretation of
Eros’s nature as intermediate between these terms. In the last chapter, we examined the
sense in which the poverty of Eros is had in the disposition of temperance (σωφροσ"νη).
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This disposition of proper proportion is one manifestation of measure and is closely
related to the concepts of middle and intermediacy.227
The Eros-daimon implants the resource (προς) that is the means or way by which
the true lover ascends to the vision of the beautiful. In this sense, as a daimon possessing
the lover, Eros can be understood as Προς. On one interpretation, the disposition of
poverty necessary to the lover might be the precondition for daimonic possession; if one
is to be blessed by the gods, one must not be possessed of hubris. The disposition of
poverty, the acquisition of temperance, the having of things in appropriate proportion, are
conditions for divine blessing. On the other hand, if Eros quite truly embraces both Προς
and Πενα, it seems more likely that daimonic possession implants both the disposition of
poverty and the “energy” or motion of Προς. It is, in fact, the perfect philosophical
disposition: a mind that moves because inspired by the beauty of Truth, but which does
not cling to its own perception of the truth because it recognizes its own finitude; the
philosopher is drawn to truth itself, but willing to part with his “own” truths if they are
found inadequate or defective. Possession by the Eros daimon enables one to see beauty
more truly and this improved or keener vision allows one to desire the right objects, to
the right degree, and in the right way. The way of life Eros implants is Πενα, as the
proper amount of love for the proper sorts of things, and thus possession by the Eros
daimon yields the sort of appropriate detachment depicted in the character of Socrates.
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Joseph Souilhé. La Notion Platonicienne d’Intermédiaire dans la Philosophie des
Dialogues (Paris: Librairie Félix Alcan, 1919): 9-16.
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Eros, Desire, and Wish: Establishing the Intermediacy of Eros

The early discussion of Eros, first between Agathon and Socrates, and then
between Socrates and Diotima, introduces the triadic structure of Eros; it is this
establishment of Eros’s triadic structure that serves as the foundation for its status as
intermediate. The movement of the dialogue reveals Eros’s intermediacy to be a
consequence of his deficiency; the movement from the elenchus of Agathon, through
Diotima’s initial questioning of Socrates, arriving at Diotima’s pronouncement that Eros
is a daimon, suggests that the examination of Eros and its relationship to lack is for the
sake of establishing his nature as daimon and so also as intermediate or µεταξ". In what
follows, I will examine the development of the intermediate status of Eros as it emerges
in the elenchus of Agathon and Diotima’s questioning of Socrates.
These two passages, in addition to establishing the intermediate status of Eros,
discuss the relationships that exist among Eros, desire (+πιθυµα), and wish (βο"λησις).
Common to all of these terms is the indication that the desiring, loving, or wishing
subject lacks the object that she desires, loves, or wishes to have. Though the distinctions
among these terms may appear unimportant, they contribute significantly to
understanding the development of the concept of Eros, especially with respect to
establishing the similarities and differences among these three terms.
In order to understand Plato’s concern with distinguishing among these terms, it
will be useful to begin by noting something of the history and usage of the term ‘Eros’.
Dover’s survey of the earliest uses of Eros and related words notes that:
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Eros (with a short o), (which) in Homer means ‘desire’ for a woman (Il.
xiv 315), for food and drink (Il. i 469 and elsewhere, in the formula ‘when
they had expelled [i.e. satisfied] their eros of food and drink’) and for
other things for which one may feel a desire capable of satisfaction (e.g. Il.
xxiv 227, ‘when I have expelled my eros of lamentation’), and in Hesiod
is personified as one of the first divine beings to come into existence
(Theogony 120-2, ‘most beautiful among the immortals’).228
The example of expelling one’s “eros of lamentation” suggests the conception of
universal or cosmic Eros that is present in both the speeches of Erixymachus and
Diotima, where Eros is conceived of primarily as the cause of motion rather than as
psychological desire.229 In the formulation cited above, Eros expresses the agent’s need
or striving for lamentation in order to rid herself of it; it is a sort of κθαρσις, as one must
lament in order to be rid of lamentation. The structure revealed here is one of divine
possession, by which something apparently external takes hold of the agent, and from
which the agent is only freed when she expels from herself the very thing that has taken
possession of her.230 This might mean, however, that something further is required.
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Symp. 186a3-b2, 188a1-b6, 207c5-208b6.
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Dodds notes that this conception of daimonic possession is applied to various
emotions in the Greek world. “There are a number of passages in Homer in which
unwise and unaccountable conduct is attributed to ate, or described by the cognate verb
aasasthai, without explicit reference to divine intervention. But ate in Homer is not itself
a personal agent: the two passages which speak of ate in personal terms, Il. 9.505 ff. and
19.91 ff., are transparent pieces of allegory. Nor does the word ever, at any rate in the
Iliad, mean objective disaster, as it so commonly does in tragedy. Always, or practically
always, ate is a state of mind—a temporary clouding or bewildering of the normal
consciousness. It is, in fact, a partial and temporary insanity; and, like all insanity, it is
ascribed, not to physiological or psychological causes, but to an external “daemonic”
agency. In the Odyssey, it is true, excessive consumption of wine is said to cause ate; the
implication, however, is probably not that ate can be produced “naturally,” but rather that
wine has something supernatural or daemonic about it. Apart from this special case, the
agents productive of ate, where they are specified, seem always to be supernatural
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Lamentation may be expelled by pouring forth many tears, by wailing and beating of the
breast, but hunger is expelled by receiving food into the body. In both cases Eros
expresses a need of or for something, and this displays an intentional aspect of Eros, as
directed toward things other than itself, and as moving toward these things. In the above
examples, both hunger and lamentation are expelled and thus “poured out”; in hunger, an
appetible object is necessary to accomplish this, but this is not the case for lamentation.
Hunger begins with a void that must be filled, but lamentation does not. Another notable
aspect of this early use of Eros is that it identifies desires “capable of satisfaction”.
Dover’s analysis suggests that, historically, there is a close association among +πιθυµα
and the various words derived from Eros and +ρω.231
If we now turn our attention to the elenchus of Agathon and Socrates’ ensuing
remarks, we find that Socrates makes several attempts to formulate a definition of Eros in

beings; so we may class all instances of nonalcoholic ate in Homer under the head of
what I propose to call “psychic intervention.”
If we review them, we shall observe that ate is by no means necessarily either a
synonym for, or a result of, wickedness. The assertion of Liddell and Scott that ate is
“mostly sent as the punishment of guilty rashness” is quite untrue of Homer. The ate
(here a sort of stunned bewilderment) which overtook Patroclus after Apollo had struck
him might possibly be claimed as an instance…” (E. R. Dodds, The Greeks and the
Irrational (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1951), 5.
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“The seventh century B.C. adds the verb erān (also erasthai), ‘desire (to…)’, ‘be in
love (with…)’, of which the aorist aspect is erasthēnai, ‘conceive a desire (for…)’, ‘fall
in love (with…)’. Throughout the classical and Hellenistic periods the connotation of
this group of words is so regularly sexual that other uses of it can fairly be regarded as
sexual metaphor. The god Eros, depicted in the visual arts as a young winged male, is the
personification of the force which makes us fall in love willy-nilly with another person.”;
“Frequently Eros and erān are treated as synonymous with epithūmiā and epithūmein; so
in Xen Smp. 8.2, 8.8 the changes are rung on epithūmiā and words of the Eros-group,
with homosexual reference, and ibid. 4. 62-4, in a jocular figurative passage on
‘procuring’ enthusiastic pupils and teachers for their mutual intellectual benefit” (Dover,
Greek Homosexuality, 43-44).
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terms of its relationship to desire (+πιθυµα).232 The formulation arising from the
examination of Agathon understands Eros and desire as similar because they both entail a
lack (νδεια). At the beginning of his own discourse, Socrates indicates that he will treat
first of the nature of Eros and then of its works, and in his discussion of the nature of
Eros, the relations among Eros, +πιθυµα, and νδεια again figure prominently. In what
follows, I will first provide an overview of the various definitions offered in the section
of the Symposium beginning with the elenchus of Agathon and ending at 209b where
Diotima begins her discussion of the works or effects of Eros. After this summary, I will
examine the importance of the presence of +πιθυµα and βο"λησις in these passages, and
how this contributes to the understanding of Eros’s lack (νδεια).
The first provisional definition is in the elenchus of Agathon, where Socrates asks
whether Eros desires (+πιθυµ5ω) “that of which it is the love”.233 The next provisional
definition occurs at 202d1, where Diotima shows Socrates that his answers have led to
the conclusion that “Eros, by reason of lack of good and beautiful things, desires those
very things he lacks.”234 Eros is next defined as the wish (βο"λησις) humans have “to
possess good things for themselves forever”,235 and again, shortly after this as “every
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Bury notes that Socrates’ “encomium proper is preceded by a preliminary dialectical
discussion with Agathon, the object of which is to clear the ground of some popular
misconceptions of the nature of Eros” (introduction, xxxvi). He seems to be correct in
this, as an examination of the argument, I think, will reveal.
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Symp. 205a1. Later, however, at Symposium 206a1-10 βο"λοµαι drops out, and Eros is
simply “of” the things that are its objects (in the genitive).
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desire (+πιθυµα) for good things and happiness.”236 The final formulation of the
definition of Eros is provided by Diotima:
Eros necessarily desires (+πιθυµ5ω) immortality with the good, from what
has been agreed, since its object is to possess the good for itself forever. It
necessarily follows from this account, then, that Eros is also love of
immortality…Once she asked, Socrates, what do you think is cause (α%τα)
of this love (Eros) and desire (+πιθυµα)?...all beasts…desire (+πιθυµ5ω) to
reproduce.237
As is evident from this brief summary, the examination of Eros from the elenchus
of Agathon through Diotima’s discourse on the nature of Eros frequently refers to its
relationship to +πιθυµα and βο"λησις. Though both terms appear frequently in the
discussion of what sort of thing Eros is, they appear much less frequently after the
discussion turns toward an examination of the works of Eros, and neither term appears in
the ascent passage. The location and incidence of these terms in the various provisional
definitions of Eros that are offered as descriptions of its nature introduce νδεια as an
aspect of Eros, and suggest that βο"λησις and +πιθυµα, though closely related to Eros, may
be distinguished from it.
Bury suggests that the initial discussion of Eros in the elenchus238 in terms of
+πιθυµα and βο"λησις is aimed “to guard against a possible misunderstanding as to the
nature of βο"λησις and +πιθυµα which might arise from carelessness in analyzing the sense
of popular phraseology.”239 By popular phraseology, Bury seems to mean that people
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often speak of wanting things they already have, such as health; thus Socrates specifies
that what people really want in such cases is to continue to possess such goods as they
already have. In this sense, both +πιθυµα and βο"λησις indicate something about our
relationship to beloved objects with respect to time and our being in time. The beloved
object of which we are +νδε/ς in these instances is one which we have already but which
we recognize as good and so wish to continue to have through time. The νδεια inherent
in the structure of Eros, then, is revealed to be present even if Eros is spoken of or
understood in terms of +πιθυµα or βο"λησις, and this further emphasizes the intentional
and desiderative sense of Eros as always moving toward that of which it is +νδε/ς. It is in
terms of +πιθυµα and βο"λησις that the relation of Eros to lack (νδεια) is first
established.240
The usage of βο"λησις in this section of the Symposium suggests that it designates
a rational desire. Socrates first uses βο"λοµαι in his examination of Agathon when he
begins to speak of different sorts of objects that are desired—here health, strength, and
wealth. These are not the desires associated with the +πιθυµητικν of the Republic,241
though neither are they the desires proper to the philosophical part. Nonetheless, a desire
for continued health indicates an awareness of self and an awareness of self as persisting
through time that would be for Plato singular to a rational being. This indicates that the
objects of βο"λησις, at least in this passage from the Symposium, are the objects that can
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only be desired by a rational nature.242 This is significant not only because of its
contribution to the conception of Eros as intermediate, but also because of its temporal
relation to νδεια. If we recall Kosman’s point that we are +νδε/ς with respect to our own
nature, we find that this conception of lack is especially appropriate to our rational
awareness of our being in time; for it is our rational desire to continue being healthy,
wealthy, strong, or virtuous that follows from our awareness of our future possibilities.
mπιθυµα, in contrast to βο"λησις, is typically linked to desires associated with the
body and with those desires humans share with beasts. When Socrates draws attention to
the fact that desire ceases as soon as the desired object is attained, he seems to be
particularly concerned with these bodily desires. If limited to this model, the explanation
of Eros will be unable to account for the human ability to love an object even once it is
acquired, making the common human regard for things such as health, family, and wellbeing quite inexplicable. Such a model of Eros has the further problem of presenting
Eros as temporally insatiable and, in failing to identify different kinds of beloved objects
according to their inherent goodness, leads to the conception of Eros as tyrannical. For,
as soon as an object is acquired, a new one will come into view, and such a picture of
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Throughout the dialogues, Plato makes use of several terms (in both verb and noun
form) that indicate desire, love, and affection, including +πιθυµα, Eros, βο"λοµαι, στ5ργω,
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the relations of these various Greek terms to one another in Plato’s work. For a
discussion of the meanings of +πιθυµα, Eros, βο"λοµαι, and φιλα see W. Joseph Cummins,
“Eros, Epithumia, and Philia in Plato,” op. cit. and Drew Hyland, “bρως, mπιθυµα, and
Φιλα in Plato,” Phronesis 13 (1968): 32-46. For a broader discussion of Plato on desire,
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desire and Eros will result in the sort of Eros proper to the Republic’s tyrannical soul.243
It is clear that this cannot be the proper use of Eros for a human being, as it leads to the
destruction of the individual human being rather than its flourishing.
In setting forth the relationships among Eros, +πιθυµα, βο"λησις, and νδεια, Plato
introduces the relationship between Eros and lack.244 This lack is used to articulate the
structure of Eros, since its lack indicates the object or state for which the subject wishes,
or has desire. In this manner, the discussion of Eros and its relation to νδεια is a
preparation for the discussion of Eros as intermediate, and this discussion of Eros as
intermediate is a description of the metaphysical structure of Eros as well as the human
psychological experience of Eros.

The Structure of Eros

The depiction of Eros as deficient and as having an object introduces the triadic
structure of Eros, a structure that emphasizes the relational quality of Eros and its status
as intermediate. The elenchus of Agathon and the first major section of Diotima’s speech
reveal the structure of Eros as intermediate and as an intermediary with the ability to lead
the soul to its proper end. The description of Eros as lack is not so much a description of
subjective psychological motivation, as an articulation of the metaphysical structure of
Eros, a structure that is revealed in the unfolding of the discussion between Socrates and
Diotima.
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Bury notes “observe that the entire argument here is based on the identification of
Eros with +πιθυµα (see 205d)”(Bury, 91), and also that “the notion of Eros, it is shown, is
equivalent to that of Desire (ρως = τ- +πιθυµο4ν)—a quality, not a person” (xxxvi-xxxvii).
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An Enquiry into the Senses of Intermediacy Applicable to Eros

The discussion of Eros as intermediate occurs in three distinct moments of the
dialogue: (1) the elenchus of Agathon, (2) Diotima’s initial questioning of Socrates and
discussion of Eros as daimon, and (3) Diotima’s explanation of Eros’s intermediate
nature within the context of the myth of his origins. Diotima’s first explicit assertion that
Eros is intermediate occurs in the second of these passages in which Eros is called µεταξ",
and further described as the intermediate daimon that fills in the middle (µ5σος) between
gods and mortals.245 The elenchus of Agathon, however, sets the stage for this discussion
by directing attention to the relational nature of Eros, and is an important step in the
development of the understanding of Eros as intermediate. In what follows I will
consider what each of these three passages contributes to the understanding of the
intermediate nature of Eros. Once this investigation into the different senses of
intermediacy is complete, I will proceed to establish what can be concluded from these
senses, their order in the dialogue, and other textual evidence.
The discussion of Eros as intermediate begins with Socrates’ questioning of
Agathon, and is recapitulated and further developed when he recounts his own
conversation with Diotima. Socrates’ exchange with Agathon first establishes that love is
always “of something”.246 Having established this much, Socrates then shows that Eros
“desire[s] that of which it is the love”,247 proceeding to the stronger claim at 200b1 that
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“it’s necessary that this be so: a thing that desires desires something of which it is in need
(νδεια); otherwise, if it were not in need, it would not desire it.” The object of Eros’s
desire is beauty.248 All of this leads to the conclusion that Eros cannot be as Agathon
described him—beautiful and good—because he desires only what he lacks, and these
things are the beautiful and the good.249
R. E. Allen’s comment on this passage argues that it serves to establish the
fundamentally relational character of Eros, even though the passage does not adequately
distinguish between Eros understood as a relation and the lover himself:
The logic of this argument is obscured by the personification of Eros, and
an ambiguity in the word ‘beauty’. Love is a relation. As such, it lacks
nothing and desires nothing. It implies, however, privation or lack in the
lover. But when one distinguishes love and the lover, this argument to
show that Eros is neither good nor beautiful nor divine is inconclusive.
The lover, who lacks and is by so much imperfect, cannot be divine. But
it does not follow from this that love itself is not divine or good. Plato
later recognized this. In the Phaedrus, when Socrates comes to describe
the upward passage of Eros to the huperouranios topos, he describes it as
“a god, or something divine” (242e), since it seeks the divine; and later,
when he criticizes the Eros described in his first speech, a love which
seeks unworthy objects and leads to evil rather than good, he calls it
“sinister” or “left-handed,” a love of ill omen, (skaios Eros, 266a).250
Allen’s analysis is revealing in its distinction between personified Eros and Eros
considered as a relation, but his claim that the personification of Eros is primarily an
obfuscation is not convincing. There is good reason to look more closely at the
personification of Eros, for the way in which he is later personified by Diotima is
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foreshadowed by the analysis in the elenchus that establishes his relational quality. This
indicates that the relational quality of Eros does not describe merely the subjective and
psychological experience of Eros, but also a metaphysical reality, and this metaphysical
reality is epitomized in the personification of Eros.251 The relational quality of Eros is
vividly present in his personification as daimon and through this personification is
understood as µεταξ"; it is as µεταξ" that Eros is the way to be joined or bound to the
divine. Even though Eros is described in terms of lack in the elenchus, his essence lies in
his mediation between gods and men, without which communication between the two
would not be possible, and without which the vision of Beauty would be impossible. The
relational and intermediate quality of Eros that is here established prefigures the structure
of Eros, a structure that is triadic.
Every instance of Eros involves the lover, the beloved, and the love relationship
that binds them together in some way. Anne Carson discusses this triadic structure of
Eros as it occurs in a poem of Sappho:
But the ruse of the triangle [in Sappho’s poem] is not a trivial mental
maneuver. We see in it the radical constitution of desire. For, where Eros
is lack, its activation calls for three structural components—lover, beloved
and that which comes between them. They are three points of
transformation on a circuit of possible relationship, electrified by desire so
that they touch not touching. Conjoined they are held apart. The third
component plays a paradoxical role for it both connects and separates,
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Dover’s remarks regarding the personification of Eros, as well as Προς and Πενα,
supports such a reading. The personification of external forces as gods or daimons is a
means to articulate the working of these forces in and on human beings; personification is
a device for understanding how these forces work. “There is no reason to suppose that
Plato found this story [of the origins of Eros] in any earlier writer; the construction of
relationships between forces personified as deities is a common Greek way of
characterizing those forces (cf. 197d7 n.), and the chief purpose of the story here is to put
eros before us as a force which impels us to seek to acquire” (Dover, Symposium, 141).
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marking that two are not one, irradiating the absence whose presence is
demanded by Eros.252
Carson’s analysis of the structure of Eros in the above passage is remarkably similar to
the structure of Eros that emerges from the elenchus and continues to be developed in the
exchange between Socrates and Diotima. In both analyses, the lover and beloved are not
sufficient to account for the phenomenon of love; there must be a third element, an
intermediary that exists between the lover and beloved, preserving their distinctions while
uniting them to one another.253
The second phase of the discussion of Eros as intermediate occurs when Socrates
recounts his own conversation with the priestess Diotima about the nature of love. As
Agathon, Socrates had conceived of Eros as “a great god” who “belongs to beautiful
things.”254 Like Agathon, Socrates was forced to admit that his own speech showed that
“Love is neither beautiful nor good.”255 Socrates then asks whether this means that Love
must be ugly and bad, thinking that this must be the only alternative. But Diotima is
quick to show him that Love is not ugly or bad; rather he is in between the two just as
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as quoted in G.S. Kirk, J.E. Raven, and M. Schofield, eds., The Presocratic Philosophers,
2nd edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 190.
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‘correct judgment’ is between wisdom and ignorance.256 Eros is identified as µεταξ" five
times in this passage.257
The conclusion that Love is neither good nor beautiful leads to the conclusion that
Love cannot be a god, since all gods are beautiful and happy.258 To be happy is to
“possess good and beautiful things.”259 Love “needs good and beautiful things, and that’s
why he desires them—because he needs them”260, so cannot be a god. Repeating his
earlier mistake, Socrates concludes from this that Love must be a mortal, but is quickly
redirected by Diotima, who states that Love is in between (µεταξ") the mortal and the
immortal, a great spirit or daimon. It is important to note at this point that Eros’s
intermediate status does not necessarily indicate that he is situated between opposites that
mutually exclude one another; this is evident by Diotima’s reproval of Socrates when he
assumes that if Eros is not ‘x’ then Eros must be the opposite of ‘x’. Eros’s lack of
beauty does not render him ugly, but situates him at a point between these two extremes,
as if on a continuum whose endpoints are the ugly and the beautiful. The further
implications of this description will be discussed below.
The role of Eros is epitomized in Diotima’s description of the power (δ"ναµις) of
daimons, for the nature of a daimon here described is to be not simply in between or
intermediate, but intermediary:
256
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They [daimons] are messengers who shuttle back and forth between the
two, conveying prayer and sacrifice from men to gods, while to men they
bring commands from the gods and gifts in return for sacrifices. Being in
the middle of the two, they round out the whole and bind fast the all to
all.261
This description of the work of daimons reveals several things about the nature of
Eros. Their actions are described by the verbs Zρµηνε"ω and διαπορθµε"ω; on the one hand
they are interpreters or messengers, and on the other their action is likened to the
ferrymen who provide transport across rivers. The verb Zρµηνε"ω alludes to the god
Hermes, who carries messages for the gods. The verb διαπορθµε"ω is used primarily to
designate the crossing of a river, and may allude more specifically to “the office of the
πορθµε"ς, Charon, being ‘animas e terra ad sedes deorum transvehere’.”262 The distinct
meaning of the two verbs indicates that the work of Eros is not limited to carrying
messages from men to gods, but extends to leading souls to the gods.263 The daimons are
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“For the term Zρµηνε"ειν to describe the mediating office of δαµονες, cp. Epin. 985 B
Zρµηνε"εσθαι (δαµονας) πρ-ς λλ/λους τε κα, το<ς...θεο<ς πντας τε κα, π;ντα. Hommel
bids us take Zρµηνε4ον with νθρ. τ; παρ; θεPν (as “eiusdem atque pρµ[ς radicis”) and
διπορθµε4ον with θεο2ς τ; παρ; νθρ6πων (the office of the πορθµε"ς, Charon, being “animas
e terra ad sedes deorum transvehere”). This is probably right; but in any case it is a
mistake to regard the two words [Zρµηνε"ειν and διαπορθµε"ω] as synonymous, as do L. and
S. (s. v. διαπορθµε"ω, “to translate from one tongue into another, to interpret”)”(Bury, 98).
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Remarking on the intermediate and daimonic status of Eros, Santas writes “Plato does
not make his attitude explicit towards the main themes in Eryximachus’ speech. We may
note that in Socrates’ view (presumably Plato’s own), specific Eros is essentially
connected with begetting or creativity, and that it extends beyond sexuality. But in
Plato’s theory the lover is always a human being, and Eros mediates not between
opposites (such as the beautiful and the ugly or the good and the bad), but rather between
‘intermediates’ (what is neither beautiful nor ugly) and the good or the beautiful” (Plato
and Freud, 18). But it is clear that Plato does not have romantic love as his paradigm
here, especially prior to making any distinction between generic and specific Eros (if
indeed this exists in the manner claimed by Santas). The elucidation of the intermediate
role of Eros draws upon a Greek tradition of mantic possession by divine forces which
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further presented as filling up (συµπληρω) the space between gods and men, and thus
binding (συνδ5ω) the extremes together. This is cosmologically necessary, since gods and
men cannot mix with each other.264 On both the individual level and the cosmic level,
then, daimons serve as intermediates that join together the mortal (θνητς) and the
immortal (θνατος).265

lead the souls of men to act in certain ways, and upon mystery religions as evidenced in
several places by Plato’s language; it seems the intermediaries most natural to such a
context are those that can go between men and gods. It makes no sense to talk of
intermediates between intermediates since intermediates typically arise only in contexts
of discussions of contraries or opposites that are perceived to be unable to both be in the
same way at the same time.
264
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It is perhaps natural to wonder at this point whether Eros’s intermediate existence is
between sets of opposites that absolutely exclude each other. It is, of course, difficult to
know whether Plato intended to adhere strictly to such a doctrine of opposites here, but
his language emphasizes intermediacy, not opposition (e.g. “µ> τονυν νγκαζε e µ>
καλν +στιν α%σχρ-ν εqναι, µηδR N µ> γαθν, κακν. ο?τω δR κα, τ-ν bρωτα +πειδ> α$τς
:µολογε2ς µ> εqναι γαθ-ν µηδR καλν, µηδ5ν τι µXλλον οcου δε2ν α$τ-ν α%σχρ-ν κα, κακ-ν εqναι,
λλ; τι µεταξ", φη, το"τοιν” (Symp. 202b1-5)). In fact, the tendency toward assigning
one opposite to a thing because it is said not to be the other opposite is precisely what
Diotima criticizes at 202b1-5. Further insight into Plato’s use of intermediates and their
relation to opposites may be found in the following remarks by R. E. Allen. “Plato uses
the term intermediate in at least two distinguishable senses. Sometimes intermediates are
described as having a share of opposite qualities...in another sense, intermediates instead
of possessing both opposites possess neither” (Allen, Symposium, 49). “If intermediates
are things that may have opposite qualities, it is unhelpful to explicate intermediates in
terms of the Square of Opposition and the distinction between contraries and
contradictories; the Square, after all, has to do with statement relations, not the things
statements are about. If Eros is not beautiful, it does not follow, according to Diotima’s
account, that Eros is ugly; so beauty and ugliness are not contradictories, since if both
cannot be true, it does not follow that one must be true (201e-202a). Are beauty and
ugliness then contraries, in that both cannot be true but neither may be true? But
contrariety does not obtain if the same things may be both beautiful and ugly. Perhaps
then intermediates are subcontraries, in that both may be true. But subcontrariety does
not obtain if the same thing may be neither beautiful nor ugly, that is, if it is not the case
that at least one is true. Again, where subcontrariety obtains, I propositions are
convertible, but O propositions distribute their predicates and are not convertible. This
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Diotima’s further explanation of the relationship among these three kinds of being
elucidates the role of the daimonic in human knowledge about the divine and human
practices with regard to the divine.
It is through this that the whole expertise of the seer works its effects, and
that of priests, and of those concerned with sacrifices, rites, spells, and the
whole realm of the seer and of magic. God does not mix with man;
through this it is that there takes place all intercourse and conversation of
gods with men, whether awake or asleep; and the person who is wise
about such things is a spirit-like man, while the one who is wise in
anything else, in relation to one or other sort of expertise or manual craft,
is vulgar. These spirits, then, are many and of all sorts, and one of them is
Love himself.266
If we are to take Diotima’s claims seriously, we must recognize in this passage that the
work of priests and seers, and all human practices designed to garner divine favor, are
dependent upon daimons for their efficacy. Without the mediation of daimons, all such
practices would be in vain. This is a consequence of the radically different natures of
gods and men; because they are opposites, they can only touch through an intermediary.
Taken with Diotima’s further assertion that there are many different kinds of daimons, we
can understand the δαιµνιος ν/ρ to be like the particular daimon he knows or follows.
The myths of the Republic, Phaedo, and Phaedrus depict the souls of men following
daimons.267 In both the Republic and the Phaedo, the individual soul chooses a daimon
to follow, and in the Phaedrus, the soul possessed by Eros follows in the train of a

shows that it is a root of confusion to identify opposites with predicates; opposites are not
true or false of some subject” (Allen, Symposium, 49, n. 81).
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Resp. 617e1, 620e1-621b2, Phd. 107d5-108c8, 114b6-c8, Phdr. 252c1-253c1.
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particular god, and becomes like the god he has followed.268 In becoming like the
daimon it follows, the soul moves closer to divinity. Diotima’s assertion that one who is
wise about daimons is a δαιµνιος ν/ρ affirms this, for a human who has become like a
daimon is closer to and more like the gods; one becomes like the objects one knows. As
Eros is himself a daimon, the soul that follows Eros will become like the daimon himself,
who is described in the subsequent text of the dialogue.
The third phase of development of Eros as intermediate begins with Socrates
enquiring into the parentage of Eros.269 This prompts Diotima’s mythical account of
Eros’s origin, which she uses to explain the intermediate nature of Eros, who unites the
disparate characteristics of his parents while preserving their distinct identities. It is
noteworthy that the discussion of the intermediary role of Eros is prior to Diotima’s
mythical account of the parentage of Eros, for this account further explains the nature of
Eros as intermediary. In this sense, this examination of the intermediate nature of Eros is
preparatory, for it helps the reader to properly understand the myth of Eros’s origin.
Diotima explains that Eros was conceived on the day that Aphrodite was born, during the
celebration held by the gods to celebrate her birth.270
When they had feasted, Penia came begging, as poverty does when there’s
a party, and stayed by the gates. Now Poros got drunk on nectar (there
was no wine yet, you see) and, feeling drowsy, went into the garden of
Zeus, where he fell asleep. Then Penia schemed up a plan to relieve her
lack of resources: she would get a child from Poros. So she lay beside him
and got pregnant with Love. That is why Love was born to follow
268
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Aphrodite and serve her: because he was conceived on the day of her
birth. And that’s why he is also by nature a lover of beauty, because
Aphrodite herself is especially beautiful.271
The parents of Eros, while perhaps not precisely opposites,272 follow the pattern of
elements that exclude one another that have been set forth in the preceding passages as
the poles between which Eros exists. Eros is here presented as the consequence of the
union of Πενα, or Poverty, and Προς, or Resource. Eros is presented as in between these
two extremes—one that is without resource (πορος) and one that is resource itself
(though, notably, not wealth itself). As the child of these two, Eros is not simply a
midpoint between two extremes, but shares in the qualities of both his parents; for, as
Diotima tells Socrates, Eros’s “lot in life is set to be like” that of his parents.273 Insofar as
Eros resembles his mother, Πενα, he is “always poor (π5νης)” and “always living with
Need (νδεια)”; he is “far from being delicate and beautiful (as ordinary people think he
is); instead he is tough and shriveled and shoeless and homeless, always lying on the dirt
without a bed, sleeping at people’s doorsteps and in roadsides under the sky.”274 But all
of these deficiencies are joined with the more positive characteristics of Eros’s father,
Προς, who bequeaths to his offspring the character of “a schemer after the beautiful and
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The meanings of Προς and Πενα, as well as the significance of the myth for
understanding the nature of Eros are discussed in chapter two.
273
274

Symp. 203c6.

ΠρPτον µRν π5νης ε +στι, κα, πολλο4 δε2 sπαλς τε κα, καλς, ο\ον ο7 πολλο, οcονται,
λλ; σκληρ-ς κα, α$χµηρ-ς κα, νυπδητος κα, οικος, χαµαιπετ>ς ε, tν κα, στρωτος, +π,
θ<ραις κα, +ν :δο2ς 0πα,θριος κοιµuµενος, τ>ν τ[ς µητρ-ς φ"σιν χων, ε, +νδε3 ξ"νοικος
(Symp. 203c5-d3). “νυπδητος…στρωτος. These, too, are characteristics of the Socratic
(and Cynic) way of life” (Bury, 102).
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the good; he is brave, impetuous, and intense, an awesome hunter, always weaving
snares, resourceful in his pursuit of intelligence, a lover of wisdom through all his life, a
genius with enchantments, potions, and clever pleadings.”275
Diotima continues to apply these characteristics in order to explain Eros’s
intermediate status with respect to the same sets of extremes she cited in her initial
exchange with Socrates: immortal and mortal, wisdom (σοφα) and ignorance (µαθα),
beautiful and ugly, good and bad. The intermediate status of Eros with respect to the
beautiful and the good turns on his status as intermediate between wisdom and
ignorance—as philosopher—for it is as the supreme instance of beauty and goodness that
wisdom is desired. Diotima explains to Socrates that Eros is neither wise nor ignorant,
but again as a consequence of his ancestry—a mother “not wise and without resource”, a
father “wise and resourceful”—between these extremes. But this intermediacy is given
more explanation, for it is clear that the ignorant person cannot even desire wisdom,
having no knowledge that he lacks it; similarly, it is clear that those who are wise—the
gods—do not desire what they already have. To be a lover of wisdom, then, is to be one
that has some idea of one’s own deficiency, else there would be no movement toward the
filling of that deficiency. But this deficiency need not be understood as a void that needs
filling by some external object; it might be understood as the deficiency of a being that
has not yet fully actualized its potential, as the acorn has not yet grown into the oak tree.
But the Eros-daimon does not seem quite to fit the example of the acorn, for the things he
seeks—wisdom and beauty—are indeed outside of him; nonetheless, he cannot be said to
acquire wisdom or beauty in manner that makes these common objects his own
275
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possession in a way that excludes another person’s having it. The “objects” the Erosdaimon pursues are immaterial, so his possession of these objects will be fundamentally
different from the kind of possession that would belong to a lover of material goods,
whose consumption of these goods renders them necessarily his own to the exclusion of
others. If the Eros-daimon comes to have some share of wisdom or beauty or goodness,
these beloved objects must come to be in him in spite of maintaining existence elsewhere.
Thus, if the void of Eros becomes filled, it is filled in an immaterial manner, much like
the filling up of the soul that is described in the Republic.276

On the Diverse Ways of Being Intermediate

In each of the passages I have discussed, Eros is described in his role as
intermediate. The question of just what sort of intermediate Eros is intended to be,
however, remains. From what we have seen thus far, Eros might be understood to be
intermediate in any of the following senses: (1) as simply existing in between two
extremes, but partaking of neither,277as the daimon seems to exist between the good and
bad, the beautiful and the ugly;278 (2) as existing between two extremes while sharing in
the natures of both, and as such, of a mixed or blended nature, as the daimon-Eros exists
as both προς and πενα;279 (3) as binding together two apparently disparate or unmixable
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The Republic’s account of different kinds of pleasure identifies a state intermediate
between pleasure and pain, which is the absence of both (Resp. 9. 583b1-585b1).
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elements, e.g. opposites, and thus as mediator, as the daimon exists between men and
gods,280 facilitating communication between them.281 In what follows, I will briefly
discuss the possible meanings of intermediacy and then proceed to examine how these
senses of intermediacy apply to the interpretation of Eros in Diotima’s discourse.
The discussion of intermediates, opposites, extremes, and mixture will likely
remind the reader of the Phaedo’s discussion of opposites—the Hot and the Cold, Life
and Death—that cannot mix but must give way to one another. Though this is one
important conception of opposites and their relation to one another put forward in the
Phaedo, it is not the only such account provided there. Furthermore, the discussion of
intermediates and the extremes between which they lie in the Symposium is importantly
different from the discussion of the Phaedo. First, as Plato discusses what sort of thing
Eros is, and describes him as intermediate and daimon, he does so without recourse to the
language of Forms or to opposites that do not yield to one another. Rather, Diotima
pointedly remarks that Eros does not have to be the opposite of what he is not. Second,
Plato himself talks about intermediates in a variety of ways, both in the Phaedo and in the
Symposium, so there is no prima facie reason to employ the Phaedo’s last account of
opposites to the interpretation of the Symposium’s account of intermediates.282 Third,
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This last sense especially is suggestive of the intermediate as effecting participation,
the means of mortals participating in the life of the divine.
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The Presocratic philosophers take a variety of positions with regard to opposites,
intermediates, mixture, and blending, some of which will be discussed in an effort to
understand better the position that Plato is articulating in the Symposium. A full
treatment of these issues, however, is beyond the scope of the current investigation. For a
treatment of Plato’s use of intermediates, however, the interested reader may consult
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Diotima’s development of Eros’s intermediacy indicates that the different senses of
intermediacy she includes do not exclude one another, but all contribute to the account of
the nature of Eros.
The meaning and implications of Eros’s intermediacy in the Symposium are also
difficult to determine because of the diverse conceptions of intermediates in the thought
of Plato’s predecessors, contemporaries, and successors. As Souilhé notes in his study of
intermediates, the concept of intermediate is closely related to and sometimes used
interchangeably with the concepts of mean or middle, and measure (µ5σος and µ5τριος).283
The term ‘µ5σος’ designates not only the middle or being in the middle, but also the state
of being in the middle, i.e. moderation.284 It is found in discussions of mathematics and
music, as well as discussions of proper proportion in virtue.285 Its related verbal forms
include µεσω, “to form the middle, be in or at the middle” and µεσ"ω, “to keep the
middle or mean between two” or “to stand midway, to be neutral”.286 Similarly, the term
‘µ5τριος’ designates proper proportion, the mean or middle state and so also moderation;
and the related ‘µ5τρον’ designates both the standard of measure and proper proportion.287

Joseph Souilhé’s La Notion Platonicienne d’Intermédiaire dans la Philosophie des
Dialogues.
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Souilhé, 16; Guthrie also notes this tendency. The various senses of intermediate,
relation, and opposites identified by Aristotle at Metaphysics 5. 10. 1018a20-26 provide
further evidence of this.
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The term ‘µεταξ"’ designates more specifically that which lies between, though it also
designates the middle.288 As we have seen above, there are several corresponding senses
of intermediacy present in the Symposium, and both µ5σος and µεταξ" appear in Diotima’s
discourse.
It might seem that Eros, especially in the first two passages considered above, is
most properly understood as existing between a set of opposites, in neither of which he
shares; but in fact there are several senses of intermediacy utilized in the gradual
development of the nature of Eros as an intermediate. In the first passage considered
above, he is presented as in between good and bad, beautiful and ugly, on account of his
deficiency. He is said to have “no portion (µοιρας) of good and beautiful things.”289 Eros
shares in neither of the extremes between which he is situated, and his place is best
described as a midpoint between extremes. In the second passage, his relationship to the
mortal (θνητς) and immortal (θνατος ) is described as similar to the good and bad,
beautiful and ugly; “It’s as in the previous cases...he’s in between the mortal and the
immortal.”290 But this latter point moves the dialogue forward to speak of the power of
Eros insofar as he is a daimon, and here his intermediacy takes on a new dimension. He
is no longer merely a midpoint between extremes; as daimon he provides the middle
necessary for gods and men to communicate. It is notable that here Eros is no longer
presented as in between the mortal (θνητς) and immortal (θνατος), but as in between
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gods (θει) and men (νθρωποι); thus, the new sense of intermediacy is not in conflict with
that which preceded it, since the extremes to which Eros bears this relation are different.
This second sense of Eros’s intermediacy resembles the intermediacy of the µ5ση
or middle tone of the lyre; the µ5ση lies at an equal distance from either of its extremes as
Burnet explains in his summary of the Pythagorean analysis of the ratios of the notes of
the lyre. This term (µ5ση), writes Burnet
exceeds and is exceeded by the same number, namely 3. It is what is
called the arithmetical mean (ριθµητικ> µεστης). On the other hand, the
term 8, which represents the note of the paramesē, exceeds and is
exceeded by the same fraction of the extremes; for 8=12 -12/3=6 + 6/3.
This was called the subcontrary (0πεναντα), or later for obvious reasons,
the harmonic mean (sρµονικ> µεστης)…Now this discovery of the Mean at
once suggests a new solution of the old Milesian problem of opposites.
We know that Anaximander regarded the encroachment of one opposite
on the other as an “injustice,” and he must therefore have held there was a
point which was fair to both. That, however, he had no means of
determining. The discovery of the Mean suggests that it is to be found in a
“blend” (κρXσις) of the opposites, which might be numerically determined,
just as that of the high and low notes of the octave had been.291
As Burnet’s exposition shows, the concept of the mean has significance not just in its
indication of proportion, but also because it provides an approach to understanding the
relationships of different kinds of opposites. It is notable that Aristotle identifies several
kinds of opposites at Metaphysics V, and this distinction among kinds of opposites is
related to the different senses of mean, middle, and intermediacy:
The term ‘opposite’ is applied to contradictories, and to contraries, and to
relative terms, and to privation and possession, and to the extremes from
which and into which generation and dissolution take place; and the
attributes that cannot be present at the same time in that which is receptive
of both, are said to be opposed—either themselves or their constituents.
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Grey and white colour do not belong at the same time to the same thing;
hence their constituents are opposed. 292
The opposites at issue in the passage from Burnet above are the low and high; finding the
middle between these results in sρµονα. The discussion of the parts of the soul in
Republic IV makes use of this language, explicitly identifying θ"µος as µ5σος situated
between the extremes of the low and the high.293 The sense of the middle in the Republic
is quite similar to that articulated at Symposium 202e1-203a7, where Eros is first
described as daimon and the daimonic is said not only to exist as intermediate between
gods and men, but to fill in the middle (µ5σος). In both cases, the middle exists not just to
separate the extremes, but to allow communication between them.
Burnet’s discussion of intermediates draws attention to several significant points.
First, his discussion of the foundations of the concept of the intermediate in Greek
mathematics highlights its relationship to opposites, extremes, and proportional
relationships among these. Thus, any discussion of an intermediate as such will involve
extremes, often opposites between which it is situated, and a discussion of whether and
under what circumstances the extremes are mixable. This is, indeed, the manner in which
Diotima’s discourse proceeds, by first identifying the intermediate, then the opposites or
extremes between which it lies, and finally by examining the relationships among these.
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“La terme se trouve exprimé à 443 D. où l’on parle de la δικαιοσ"νη qui doit harmoniser
les trois parties, soit dans la ville, soit dan l’individu: eρους τρε2ς sρµονας τεχνPς, νετης
τε κσ, 0πτης κα, µ5σης...... συνδ/σαντα. C’est aux trios cordes qui formaient l’ancienne
échelle musicale que sont comparées les facultés. Le θυµς correspond à la µεσ/”
(Souilhé, 96, n. 205).
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The intermediate, on Burnet’s account, arises in response to the difficulties
presented by opposites, especially those that are, or appear to be, mutually exclusive. In
response to these difficulties, at least two distinct conceptions of combination arise. The
first is that of blending (κρXσις), and appears in the Symposium in the speech of
Erixymachus. In his account of Eros, opposite qualities present within the patient are
adjusted to bring about a balance or sρµονα. This adjustment of opposites results in a
proportionality that achieves the well-being of the patient. Opposites in this example are
not the sort that are mutually exclusive, i.e., they are not as the Forms of Life and Death
in the Phaedo that do not admit the existence of the other. The situation in the material
particulars is importantly different, since individual hot and cold elements may blend in
order to achieve a point intermediate between these opposites that is the proper amount of
each, e.g. warmth is a proportion of hot and cold. Erixymachus does not even speak of
mixing opposites, but rather of the blending (κρXσις) of them that achieves sρµονα. While
he does not, in his speech, draw a clear distinction between mixture and blending, his
description of the opposites at work in the body of a patient indicate that the opposites do
not maintain distinct identities while existing in close proximity to one another. Rather,
the blending of the natures of hot and cold produce warmth, what is intermediate between
these two extremes.294
Erixymachus’s description of good Eros as balance and proportion is perhaps as
much Pythagorean in its inspiration as it is Empedoclean or Heraclitean, and suggests a
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distinction between the conceptions of κρXσις or blending and that of mixture (µ2γµα or
µ2ξις, both derived from µγνυµι). Where the goal of combining opposites is to achieve a
sρµονα, the opposites must join together and blend in order to form the middle.295
Blending is, perhaps, a special instance of mixture. At this point, we can distinguish
κρXσις from mixture by noting that κρXσις creates something new by achieving sρµονα.
The blending of hot and cold, for example, produce an intermediate like warmth. The
blending of high and low, strictly speaking a proportion of high to low, yields a new note,
a middle term. Significantly, however, this new term is achieved by the blending of the
high and the low, and has its being in the proportion itself. Such a middle is health for
the body, whose being also depends on the proper proportion itself. The distinction
between κρXσις and µ2γµα is significant, for in the first, a new entity is created and
maintained by the blending of opposites. In the second passage discussed above,
however, Eros is identified as a daimon that joins men to the gods precisely because men
and gods cannot mix. The relationship between gods and men is presented as that of
opposites or extremes that exist in close proximity to one another, held apart by an
intermediate, but not yielding their individual identities.296 This suggests that the
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intermediate status of Eros is what allows men to mix with gods in a manner that is akin
to participation. The daimonic, being able to communicate with both gods and men, is
able to join them together. Mixture, then, has a distinct sense, and is one possible way of
describing how µ5θεξις occurs.297
From this analysis of the mean, the significance of intermediates as mathematical
objects becomes more evident; intermediates are not merely matters for mathematicians
and musicians, for their ability to express relationships between various kinds of
opposites is not limited to the mathematical realm. This point is made clear in Souilhé’s
La Notion Platonicienne d’Intermédiaire, which distinguishes among the psychological,
moral, political, and cosmogonical senses of intermediates in Plato’s dialogues and in
Plato’s predecessors.
Thus far, we have seen that the initial exposition of Eros as in need of the
beautiful and the good emphasizes his relational character and introduces the triadic
structure of Eros. Eros’s intermediacy is not here presented as a mixture or unification of
the opposites between which he lies, but rather as a point between them. This, of course,
does not mean that Eros bears no relation to these extremes. While Eros is not a mixture
of these extremes, his place between them emphasizes that his relation to the extremes is
essential to his nature. The very fact that Eros is neither good nor bad makes it necessary
for Diotima to clarify, later in her speech, the proper use of Eros. The establishment of
the intermediate nature of Eros, however, is what positions her to embark upon such a
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discussion. In identifying Eros as an intermediate, she points to a problem with Eros
generally: it may lead to either good or bad. This indicates, as we shall see in the next
chapter, that the human use of Eros is of primary importance. Nonetheless, though
Diotima acknowledges that Eros in itself is neither good nor bad, she maintains that it is
always of or directed toward the good and the beautiful. It is this very fact, after all, that
has revealed Eros’s intermediate nature. This must mean, then, that when a person has
Eros for the bad or the ugly, Eros is badly directed.
In the second passage considered above, Eros is again presented as in between the
extremes of good and bad, beautiful and ugly, but further positioned in between the poles
immortal and mortal, wisdom and ignorance; his position with respect to divinity and
knowledge is added to the discourse. Eros’s relationship to these new extremes is
slightly different from those identified in the first passage, for to be a daimon, between
immortal and mortal, is to have a share of what belongs to each in a way that is similar to
what the person with true opinion has. The person with true opinion is said to have
something of the real, but without being able to give an account of it. Eros’s position
with respect to mortality and wisdom is similar. His daimonic nature is not the same as
the immortal nature of the gods; yet he is not subject to death as are mortal beings. He
has a kind of immortality, since he does not die, but it is not the immortality of the gods,
who do not merely exist forever, but who also are not subject to change and motion. This
peculiar kind of intermediacy is more fully developed in the passage immediately
following Diotima’s account of Eros’s origins, and is discussed below.
The most significant sense of intermediate in this second passage is the
identification of Eros as daimon. It is in this passage that Eros is first called daimon and
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that the man who truly understands the daimonic is called a δαιµνιος ν/ρ; here that Eros
is portrayed as moving between gods and men, even as ferrying prayers and gifts of men
across the chasm that divides mortal from immortal, and so as binding the all to itself;
here that Eros is clearly a mediating intermediary. This sense of intermediacy
corresponds to the µ5ση. Just as the µ5ση must lie between the high and the low, so also
must Eros lie between the gods and men. The sense of intermediacy here is of the
intermediate that joins together elements that otherwise could not touch. The opposites
here are mutually exclusive, and the chasm that separates them is filled by intermediates.
But by separating the beautiful from the ugly, the intermediate also holds them together.
The movement of an individual soul from ignorance to wisdom, from ugliness to beauty,
and from mortal existence to immortal existence depends upon the intermediate. This
passage presents an account that makes it necessary that the intermediate actually exist if
we are to take seriously the metaphysical structure of Eros that Diotima has been
propounding. One means of making sense of the reality of intermediates and their
metaphysical role in the Symposium, is to consider the evidence found in accounts of
Plato’s mathematical objects.
Both Burnet and Ross present an account of intermediates that is based on Plato’s
recognition of mathematical objects and thus recognizes the metaphysical importance of
intermediates as a link between the sensible and intelligible realms. From the passages
examined in section two of this chapter, it is evident that the Eros-daimon is presented as
intermediate at least in part to establish a metaphysical continuity between gods and men.
But as much as the existence of intermediates is important to establish this continuity, so
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also is it necessary to adequately describe the phenomena of human experience. Ross
captures this necessity in his comment on the Phaedo in the following passage:
It would be a mistake to describe Plato as having, either at this or at any
stage of his development, made a complete bifurcation of the universe into
Ideas and sensible things. For one thing, we have the casual reference to
‘equals themselves’—an allusion to mathematical entities which are
neither Ideas nor sensible things, an allusion which paves the way for the
doctrine of the ‘intermediates’. Plato very likely at this stage did not
himself appreciate the significance of his own allusion. But he very
certainly recognizes the existence of another type of entity which is
neither an Idea nor a sensible thing; for there is a whole section in which
he describes soul as akin to the Ideas and not to sensible things in respect
of unchangeability, and yet nowhere suggests—and indeed how should
he?—that souls are themselves Ideas.298
As Ross notes, it is not only the existence of mathematical objects, but the existence of
other things that appear to defy classification as sensible or ideal that calls for a new
category. Daimons, being immaterial but many in number, belong neither to the sensible
nor to the ideal realm;299 their converse with both gods and humans places them between
these classes of beings. The discussion of the parts of the soul in Republic IV centers
around the same problem, namely that the description of the observable powers of the
soul yields the identification of a power that is neither purely rational nor purely
irrational.300 This third power lies between the extremes that are opposed to one another,
and is ultimately seen to mediate between them. The human soul itself provides another
instance of this phenomenon, for it seems to exist in a sensible medium while persisting
298

David Ross, Plato’s Theory of Ideas, 2nd edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1953), 25-26.
299

The fact that daimons are seen as moving and existing as part of the cosmos, rather
than outside or of beyond it, provides further reason to exclude daimons from the sensible
or ideal realms.

300

Respublica 4. 435b1-441b1; cf. Souilhé, 95-97.

143
through change in a manner that suggests it is more like the eternal and unchangeable
Forms. The ability of the soul to interact with both the material and immaterial realms
suggests that it is itself intermediate between these extremes and that this intermediacy
allows for its mixing with each. Again, the observable phenomena provide evidence for
an underlying metaphysical reality.
Aristotle’s concise summary of Plato’s view of mathematical objects as
intermediate between the sensible and intelligible provides a framework for
understanding the metaphysical importance of Eros’s intermediacy:301
Further, besides sensible things and Forms he says there are the objects of
mathematics, which occupy an intermediate position, differing from
sensible things in being eternal and unchangeable, from Forms in that
there are many alike, while the Form itself is in each case unique.302
As Aristotle notes, mathematical objects are distinct from Forms because there are many
of them rather than one, i.e. there are many different circles studied by the
mathematicians, though none of these are circularity itself. If we apply this framework to
gods, humans, and daimons in the manner suggested by Diotima, daimons exist in a
manner similar to the mathematician’s circles. According to the myths found in the
Phaedo, Phaedrus, and Republic, there are at least as many daimons as there are souls,
301
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for each soul has its own daimon to follow.303 Because there are many diverse instances
of daimons, they are not τ δαιµνιον itself; on the other hand, daimons, as immaterial
beings, do not belong to the sensible realm either. Just as the mathematician’s circles are
not enmattered, so also are daimons free of matter; just as the mathematician’s circles are
different from one another in having radii of varying lengths, so also are daimons
different from one another in having different orientations toward different gods (e.g.
Aphrodite or Zeus). Just as the existence of the mathematician’s circles does not
preclude, but rather necessitates the existence of circularity itself, so also the existence of
the Eros-daimon does not preclude the existence of a Form of Eros. If Eros itself exists
as a Form and the Eros-daimons that are actual in the many different instances of love
exist as intermediates, then there is one primary instance of Eros, and it may be
understood as a real relation. There is no reason to assume that Eros cannot exist as a
Form because it is a relation, since relations such as equality, sameness and difference are
also identified as Forms.304 The proper object of Eros as Form is the loveable, that which
is good and beautiful; so much is stated in Diotima’s discourse. This, then, articulates the
ideal Eros, and the many manifestations of Eros that exist in the daimonic realm or the
sensible realm approximate this ideal Form to a greater or lesser degree. This allows also
for the existence of many distinct instances of Eros as an intermediate (metaphysically)
and accounts for instances of misdirected Eros and the variety of loveable objects among
human beings. This metaphysical understanding of intermediates, then, helps to elucidate
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the underlying metaphysical structure of Eros that provides the foundation for
understanding its use, work, causality, and moral status.
In the third passage, Diotima draws together these different elements of the nature
of Eros, presenting them unified in the myth of Eros’s origins. It may be true with
respect to good and bad, beauty and ugliness, considered absolutely, that Eros cannot be a
mixture of these opposites; but it is certainly not the case that Eros is in between the
natures of his parents in this sense, for Diotima describes Eros as sharing in the qualities
of his parents and inheriting the characteristics of both. In some curious fashion, Eros is
able to be poor, but never without resource.
A further sense of intermediacy is suggested by Eros’s position between wisdom
and ignorance, and as moving toward wisdom. In this sense, the extremes are conceived
of as the absolute endpoints of a spectrum; what is intermediate lies at a point on the
spectrum in between. Conceived thus, the intermediate may lie at a number of points on
the spectrum, closer to or further from either of the absolutes that lie at the extremes.305
This allows Eros to be understood as a moveable intermediary, by which the lover (or
philosopher) makes progress toward or falls away from the positive end of the spectrum,
or absolute beauty, as he will be described in the ascent passage later on. This sense of
the intermediate is expressive of the stages through which something changes on its way
to full development; it is the way to completion. This is consonant with Diotima’s
description of the Eros-daimon as one who knows or finds a way to something, as Προς.
In another sense, the intermediate status of Eros is evidenced in his life of poverty
(Πενα). Insofar as he is poor (π5νης), he lives the labourer’s life, having just enough, but
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neither excess nor deficiency. His very existence is intermediate between privation and
excess; he is never absolutely full, nor absolutely empty. The moderation implanted by
poverty is itself an intermediate state, one that is characterized by proper proportion.
A further aspect of this intermediate existence is depicted in Diotima’s description
of Eros as moving from being in need of something to pursuing something. This aspect
of Eros as daimon and µεταξ" includes in the conception of Eros a source of motion. The
life of Eros is described as one of continual flux, and this reveals also his similarity to
sensible being, ever falling short of perfection and fulfillment, but ever striving toward it.
This depiction of the life of Eros emphasizes the movement of Eros itself within the
human being he possesses, as the human being moves toward fulfillment of the
perfections possible for him.306 This constant motion of Eros is described by Diotima as
occurring throughout the cosmos and within individual beings.307 Bury’s comment on
this aspect of Eros’s existence distinguishes between the causal effect of Eros in the lover
and causal effect of Eros that animates the cosmos:
Lastly, we should notice the emphasis laid on the fluctuating character of
Eros, whose existence is a continual ebb and flow, from plenitude to
vacuity, from birth to death. By this is symbolized the experience of te
φιλκαλος and the φιλσοφος, who by a law of their nature are incapable of
remaining satisfied for long with the temporal objects of their desire and
are moved by a divine discontent to seek continually for new sources of
gratification. This law of love, by which τ- ποριζµενον ε, 0πεκρε2, is
parallel to the law of mortal existence by which τ; µRν (ε,) γγνεται, τ; δR
πλλυται (207 D ff.)—a law which controls not merely the physical life
but also the mental life (+πιθυµαι, +πιστ[µαι, etc.). Accordingly the Eros306
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daemon is neither mortal nor immortal in nature (π5φυκεν 203 E), neither
wise nor foolish, but a combination of these opposites—σοφ-ς-µαθ/ς and
θνητ-ς-θνατος—and it is in virtue of this combination that the most
characteristic title of Eros is φιλ-σοφος (which implies also φιλαθανασα).308
The motion implanted by Eros is a consequence of his nature as comprising Προς and
Πενα. This nature of Eros is a result of his genesis, as Diotima states near the end of her
description of his parentage.309 As Souilhé notes, the structure of Eros put forward here
suggests that Eros is a product of a genesis that proceeds from the opposites Προς and
Πενα, in a way that is similar to the double genesis from opposites described in the
Phaedo:
Notons la similitude des termes par lesquels Platon décrit l’instabilité
d’Eros dans le Symposion et las génération des contraires dans Phédon. –
Eros qui est situé entre deux extrêmes, puisque οQτε Sς θνατος π5φυκεν
οQτε Sς θνητς, reste come flottant et sans cesse en voie de transformation,
λλ; τοτR µRν τ[ς α$τ[ς =µ5ρας θλλει τε κα, ζ_, eταν ε$πορ/σw, τοτR δR
ποθνxσκει, πλιν δR ναβι6σκεται (Symposion 203E).
Par sa nature, il réalise assez bien la définition des doubles
intermédiaries de Phédon qui sont des γεν5σεις, tels que καταδαρθνειν et
νεγερεσθαι, ποθνxσκειν et ναβι6σκεσθαι (Phédon, 71B.C.D.E.), grâce
auxquels est possible la transformation des contraires. C’est par un milieu
que les absolus passent de l’un a l’autre.310
This double genesis gives an account of the metaphysical status of Eros as an
intermediate whose being is derived from the genesis of each of the extremes between
which he lies. The motion attendant upon Eros is the motion derived from his status as
an intermediate.
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This last sense of intermediacy, that of the double genesis, indicates the
relationship between intermediate status of Eros and the motion imparted by Eros. This
relationship is indicated also by the passages depicting Eros as the source of the
animation of the cosmos. It is difficult to determine the precise nature of Eros’s motion,
since it seems, given his intermediate status, to flow from both extremes, and so not to
lead exclusively to goodness as the ascent passage seems to suggest. Diotima addresses
this, however, when she moves to the next stage of her discourse, in which she addresses
the use and work of Eros. It is by means of this discussion of the use and work of Eros
that his motion is more fully explained and the implications of this motion for morality
and human flourishing are clarified.
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CHAPTER FIVE
METAPHYSICS, MOTION, AND MORALITY

In the last chapter, Eros’s lack was seen to provide the foundation for his
intermediate status. This intermediate status is a central feature of the nature of Eros, and
allows for an understanding of Eros at three distinct metaphysical levels: as Form or real
relation, as daimon or metaphysical intermediate, and as cosmic force or motion. Though
the establishment of the intermediate nature of Eros allows Diotima to incorporate
multiple senses of Eros’s metaphysical reality into her speech, it also raises some
questions about the use of Eros, or the moral consequences of his intermediate nature,
and so also about the motion for which Eros is responsible. The various senses of
intermediacy we have identified in chapter four show Eros to be bidirectional, since he
may move both from man to god and from god to man. But the presentation of the final
mysteries of Eros in the ascent passage present a more unidirectional picture of Eros’s
movement, i.e., it seems that the lover is necessarily led upward, and toward the divine.
As we shall see, this is in part because the ascent passage describes the proper use of Eros
to achieve ε$δαιµονα. It will be the purpose of this chapter to examine the relationship
between the metaphysical status of Eros as intermediate and the use that humans make of
Eros, and this itself reveals that the motion of Eros is made good use of by humans when
directed toward human perfection.
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The Metaphysical Status of Eros as Intermediate

The characterization of Eros as daimon and intermediate suggests that Eros has a
real existence as a daimon. One notable proponent of this view is Robin, who notes that
Eros in the Symposium is synthetic, and that his intermediate nature is a consequence of
this:
Mais ce n’est pas seulement sur la nature synthétique de l’Amour
qu’insiste le Banquet, c’est aussi sur sa nature intermédiaire. Cette
seconde caractéristique est d’ailleurs étroitement liée à la première: la
nature synthétique de l’Amour fait de lui un intermédiaire entre les
qualités opposées que cette nature a pour function d’unir.311
Robin continues to argue that as an intermediate, Eros has a real and independent
existence, namely as a daimon.312 It is notable that Robin’s position regarding the
metaphysical reality of Eros is not dependent upon the acceptance of the existence of
mathematical objects. This position is also held by Plotinus, and though Robin finds that
Plotinus is not a reliable source of Plato’s original meaning,313 he still maintains that
Plato’s assertion that Eros is a daimon establishes the metaphysical status of Eros as an
independent being. In partial support of his claim that Eros is a daimon, Robin cites the
use of daimons in both the Pre-Socratic philosophers and poets, and Plato’s other
dialogues.314 Within the Platonic dialogues themselves, Robin identifies two distinct
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kinds of daimons: the soul and the tutelary spirit.315 The Eros of the Symposium and the
Phaedrus is of the latter type, and it is by daimonic possession that one is transformed
into a δαιµνιος ν/ρ. For Robin, becoming a δαιµνιος ν/ρ leads the soul to a keener
vision of the Beautiful and so also to the ascent to the vision of Beauty itself; in this
sense, Eros is the source of motion toward the Beautiful itself.
In addition to Robin, Rist, Cornford, and Friedlander identify the soul as a
daimon.316 Where the soul is considered as daimon, it is on the grounds that its rational
faculty is like the divine. Though its rational faculty raises the soul toward divinity, its
habitation in the body mixes it with mortality. The soul, in this sense, is very like the
daimon-Eros described in the Symposium, since it binds together the human and the
divine. If we bear this in mind, the cathartic regimen of the Phaedo that demands of the
philosopher a progressive and habitual disassociation from his body follows quite
naturally, since it is by this purification from the mortal element that the soul will regain
its divinity. When the philosopher frees his soul from its bodily fetters, his soul becomes
possessed by a daimon and he has truly a god within him.317
It may be the case that Plato intends the Eros-daimon to be identified with the
soul in the Symposium, but identifying him as a tutelary spirit is an equally viable
alternative. Given the passages in the Phaedo and the Phaedrus that describe the soul as
following daimons, it seems plausible that Eros might be one such daimon. The guiding
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power of the daimon is appropriate to the Symposium’s description of the lover as being
led in the ascent passage. Understanding the Eros-daimon as tutelary spirit rather than
soul appears to have one distinct advantage; it maintains the sense that Eros comes to the
soul from without, and that, without this divine intervention, the soul would not acquire
the vision necessary for its ascent to the divine. What remains true in the Phaedo,
Phaedrus, and Symposium, however, is that the soul must regain its vision of the Forms if
it is to draw near to the divine; in the Phaedo this is accomplished by the practice for
death, and in the Phaedrus and Symposium by association with the Eros-daimon.
Regardless of whether the Eros-daimon is here meant to designate the soul, it does seem
that Plato intends the Eros-daimon to depict or point to some metaphysical reality.
Allen objects to this interpretation of Eros as having metaphysical reality, as
articulated in the positions of Cornford, Robin, and Plotinus, on the grounds that they
make an ο$σα of Eros:
It will be evident that both Cornford and Robin, like Plotinus, treat
Eros as a substance in its own right, an ο$σα. Once this is done, it is but a
short step to suppose that it is identical with soul, and its identification
with self-moving motion in the Phaedrus appears to follow as of course.
It seems evident that Eros cannot be identified with self-moving motion.
For if Eros were a motion, it could not be self-moving: arising in lack,
ending with fulfillment, the child of both Προς and Πενα, it is motion a
quo and ad quem. Eros cannot be identified with soul, conceived as selfmoving motion, because soul is immortal and Eros implies lack of
immortality.
Nor can Eros be said to be moved by its objects. Eros involves
furtrity: the object of desire is not a presently existing thing, but a future
state of affairs involving possession. The thirsty man desires, not water,
but to possess water. Since desire implies lack of possession, the object of
desire does not exist when desire exists. So the object of desire is
peculiarly evanescent: when desire is, it is not; and when desire is not, it is
not. Insofar as desire implies possession of an unpossessed object, its
object is, and is necessarily, nonexistent. What is nonexistent cannot
move anything, either as efficient or as final cause.
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If Eros is not a motion, neither is it a “force” nor a “moving fund
of energy.” The hydraulic metaphor for desire, as a stream capable of
being diverted into other channels is helpful precisely because it states a
common-sense truth: that human beings must often choose between
gratifying contending kinds of desires, and their choices shape their
character. Because desire is a relative, desire is not a substance, as
Plotinus had it, nor a force nor a fund of energy, as Cornford had it, nor
the soul, as Robin had it; these are metaphors that merely obscure. The
ascent to Beauty is, and is explicitly said to be (210A), that of the lover. If
we choose to describe this as the ascent of Eros, we do so by virtue of the
logical import of a literary fiction, namely, Diotima’s personification of
Eros; Eros is the lover qua lover, the lover just insofar as he loves. The
lover insofar as he loves is neither a motion nor a force nor a fund of
energy; and since he is not, qua lover, immortal, neither is he his soul.318
Allen’s argument from the position that Eros is a relation and as such has no
independent existence fails on several counts. In the first place, as we have seen, Plato
explicitly names Eros as an intermediate, and this implies actual existence. Furthermore,
as Souilhé’s analysis shows, this intermediate status provides a means for explaining the
motion of Eros “a quo and ad quem” by understanding it as the double genesis from
opposites described in the Phaedo. This provides an interpretation of Eros as source of
motion that does not entail the identification of Eros with soul; it leaves open the
possibility that Eros is something that comes to be in the soul from without. The soul
may be self-moving as the Phaedrus claims, and yet be acted on by other things. Second,
the various senses of intermediate discussed above entail that the intermediate actually
exist. Furthermore, the naming of Eros as a daimon supports the view that Eros exists
independently. The fact that Eros may be identified with motion, the origin of motion, or
the force that binds two things together does not, for Plato, preclude the possibility of its
independent existence. As we have seen above, it is both plausible and likely that Eros
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exists as Form at the purely intelligible level, as daimon at the intermediate level, and in
the motion of the cosmos at the sensible level.
It need not be the case that Plato means for Eros to be understood literally to be a
daimon. As we saw in chapter two, Plato’s use of mythical elements often do not intend
to convey a literal truth, but rather to use a more sensible image to convey meaning that
would be difficult to grasp in any other way; the sensible image points to an invisible
reality. In the case of the Eros-daimon, this would mean that Eros does have a real
existence and its interaction with gods and men is similar to that ascribed to the Erosdaimon in Diotima’s speech. The intermediate existence of the Eros-daimon explains the
metaphysical ground of the phenomenon of love. The psychological experience of Eros,
however, is better conveyed by appealing to the imagery of divine possession; for
humans experience Eros as coming to them from without, taking hold of them, and
leading them toward certain objects. The image of the Eros-daimon provides Plato with a
means of conveying the metaphysical reality of Eros and its structure, as well as the
psychological experience of Eros.
The diversity of beloved objects among human beings remains a difficulty on this
account of Eros. It seems there is no way of accounting for the fact that human beings
choose different kinds of goods to pursue, and the diversity of chosen goods among
human beings appears to indicate that Eros arbitrarily directs different people toward
different objects. This unresolved difficulty calls our attention to the motion of Eros, and
in particular to the relationship between the motion of Eros and its use for human beings.
Thus far we have seen that Eros as intermediate must have a real existence, and
that, whether this existence is as rational soul or tutelary spirit, Eros carries with him
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motion. Eros is himself a mover in this sense, and because he is a source of motion, he is
a catalyst for action. We have seen already that Eros’s intermediate nature is
bidirectional, since there could not be converse between men and gods if the case were
otherwise; indeed, it seems that Eros leads as often to bad as it does to good, and this
remains a puzzle. But, as we shall see in chapter six, Eros is manifest at various levels in
the soul, and it is only the lover led in the correct way who is able to ascend to the vision
of the Beautiful itself; thus the proper use of Eros will be related to this upward journey,
just as the misuse of Eros will be to lesser destinations. In the next section, I will discuss
the relationship of Eros to the good and bad, and so also the question of the proper use of
Eros.

The Use and Work of Eros as Intermediate: The Moral Consequences of the
Metaphysical Status of Eros’s Intermediacy

Given that Eros is an intermediate, the question arises as to the consequences of
this status for the relationship of Eros to virtue. But the meaning of Eros’s intermediacy
seems consequent upon the interpretation of Eros as designating only a relation or as
additionally designating something metaphysical. Since Allen takes the personification
of Eros to be an obfuscation of the philosophical analysis of Eros as relation, he
understands its intermediacy in a manner that reflects this. He provides the following
analysis of intermediates:
Sometimes intermediates are described as having a share of opposite
qualities; if Eros were intermediate in this sense, it would be both good
and bad, beautiful and ugly, mortal and immortal. In another sense,
intermediates instead of possessing both opposites possess neither. In the
Gorgias (467 ff.; compare Lysis 216dff.), for example, intermediates are
actions and physical objects that take their value, not from their own
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nature, but from their purpose or use; they are neither good nor bad in
themselves. The intermediate character of Eros is of this kind. In itself, it
is neither good nor bad; it takes its value from its objects. Thirst, for
example, the desire to drink, is neither good nor bad in itself; its value is
determined by the effect of its gratification in particular circumstances.319
For Allen, then, because Eros is merely relational, it is the sort of intermediate that is
neutral because of its existence between good and bad. It can be directed toward bad
objects, and Allen’s argument concludes that it is the choice of object that determines the
worth of Eros. An example of Eros directed toward something bad is found in the
description of the tyrannical man in the Republic, whose Eros is directed toward the
wrong kinds of objects; but the love of the wrong objects does not seem adequate to
account for the anarchy that characterizes the tyrannical man. He is insatiable in part
because he loves the wrong kinds of objects too much, and in part because he is unable to
distinguish between the better and worse objects available to him. Eros does not rule and
corrupt the tyrant merely because he pursues the wrong objects; the tyrant is ruled by the
objects of his desire because he has an improper relationship to them.
Allen’s remark above that “actions and physical objects that take their value, not
from their own nature, but from their purpose or use” does not seem to resolve this
difficulty; indeed, it further complicates his assessment of the intermediate nature of Eros
and of desire. If we consider a particular action, like running, it is apparent that the
ability to run is a good, though it may be used badly.320 The ability to run is essential to
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Like Allen, he indicates here that the situatedness of the action determines whether it is
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commentators, did not distinguish a mean between two extremes (black, white, grey)
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the survival of a number of animals, including humans, if only for the purpose of fleeing
danger. But the final good of such an ability is the well-being of the agent who possesses
it. The end of this ability and the end of the agent coincide.
This analysis applies also to desires that are instilled in animals and human beings
for the sake of their preservation, namely those bodily desires for things like food, drink,
and sex, that preserve both the individual and the species. The desire to drink, simply
taken, is a desire for a good necessary to the preservation of the human being.321 One
might desire inappropriate beverages (antifreeze) or desire them in inappropriate
quantities (vats of wine), and this impropriety of the desired object is revealed in its
negative effect on the good of the human being, i.e. on his health in this case. The fact
that antifreeze and vast quantities of wine have negative effects on a particular individual
does not mean that they are not good in themselves. They have at once an intrinsic
goodness and a goodness (or lack of goodness) in relation to different objects; this latter
aspect is what Allen terms the use or purpose of the object.
Allen uses the terms ‘use’ and ‘purpose’ interchangeably, but there seems to be an
important distinction between the terms. The use of a thing is determined by its proper
from something which in itself is neither because outside their range, appears from Gorg.
467e. There as examples of what is between (µεταξ") good and bad he gives sitting,
walking, running, stones and wood, on the grounds that they are sometimes one or the
other, sometimes neither. Yet surely the difference is real and important. An
intermediate like greyness cannot be either of the extremes; what by itself bears no
relation to the extremes can, by the addition of circumstances or motive, become either
(running to save a drowning man, running to commit a murder; running leading to health,
running leading to a heart attack)” (Guthrie, History, 4: 225).
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end or τ5λος; this is specifically indicated in the Symposium when Socrates asks Diotima
what use (χρεα) Eros has for human beings.322 In the ensuing discussion, the structure of
Eros does not change, he is still “of beautiful things” and so still intermediate.323 Diotima
reformulates Socrates’ original question so that it asks “Why…is Love of beautiful
things?”324 The ultimate answer to Socrates’ original question comes only after the
question has been reformulated twice more. The answers to the intermediate questions
establish first that “the person who loves, loves beautiful things” in order “to possess
them for himself.”325 The triadic structure of Eros is present in this formulation, but to
the understanding of Eros as intermediate between the lover and beloved is added the use
(χρεα) of Eros. The above answer is, of course, not the final answer, but once Diotima
has established that in loving beautiful things the lover loves good things, the ultimate
answer to Socrates’ question regarding the use of Eros is finally given: “the person who
possesses good things” will “be happy”.326 This discussion indicates that there is a direct
connection between the use (χρεα) of Eros and the end or perfection of human being. All
human beings have ε$δαιµονα as their natural end. This end or perfection is not some
purpose that the individual sets for himself, though he has a natural inclination toward it;
nor does it differ from one human being to another. Indeed, we find the universality of
this end for all human being confirmed in the text immediately following this passage:
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“This wish, then, this love—do you think it common to all human
beings, and that everyone wishes always to possess good things, or what’s
your view?”
“The same as yours,” I replied; “that it’s common to everyone.”327
We should, then, understand ‘use’ not as an instrumental means to acquiring some object,
but rather as the appropriate directing of an activity proper to an individual being toward
its proper end.
We can only speak of Eros being misused or badly directed if there is a proper use
of Eros, and the fact that there is a proper use of Eros is supported by its situation within
the framework of a teleological cosmos. There is a sense in which Allen’s statement that
“its [the desire to drink] value is determined by the effect of its gratification in particular
circumstances” is true, but it falls short of the complete truth by neglecting the
teleological structure inherent in desire. There are proper objects of desire because
certain things are objectively better for certain kinds of beings.
There is evidence for Eros having a proper use not just in the above passage from
the exchange between Socrates and Diotima, but also in the speeches of Pausanius and
Erixymachus. The discussion of Eros in the Phaedrus and the identification of σκαις
Eros in that same work further indicate both the potential misuse of Eros and the fact of
its having a proper use.328 Further evidence is seen in Dover’s analysis of Eros as it is
treated in a passage from Democritus focusing on the relationship of prostitution to Eros;
this analysis distinguishes between what he terms non-legitimate and legitimate Eros.329
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His further analysis suggests a reluctance among Greek authors to apply the term Eros to
relationships other than “those homosexual relationships from which what is not dikaios
is excluded: rape, fraud and intimidation are obviously excluded, and the trend of the
whole speech [of Aiskhines] shows that prostitution is also excluded.”330
The intermediate nature of Eros does not conflict with its having a proper use, but
supports it. Simone Weil writes that “no human being should be deprived of his metaxu,
that is to say of those relative and mixed blessings (home, country, traditions, culture,
etc.) which warm and nourish the soul and without which, short of sainthood, a human
life is not possible.”331 Her understanding of the µεταξ" is grounded in her understanding
of Greek philosophy, and her insight here is that these µεταξ" are the various beloved
objects—objects that may be used for good or evil purposes—that populate the daily
lives of men. The µεταξ" make up the world in which we, as humans, live and love; they
“form the region of good and evil”332 precisely because they are the stuff of love, and
serve as the means by which we move toward one pole or the other. Like Eros itself, the
µεταξ" exist for the sake of the good of human beings; but also like Eros, when misused,
the µεταξ" corrupt the very beings they were meant to perfect. The Gorgias provides an
example of such an intermediate in its discussion of rhetoric, with the important
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conclusion that if rhetoric is not ordered to the good of the human being, it does not, in
fact, have any use.333
Χρεα and ῎Εργον

After identifying the χρεα of Eros as ε$δαιµονα, Diotima turns to the question of
the ργον, or work, of Eros. Her question arises after she has summarized the results of
her discussion with Socrates thus far: “we can sum up by saying that love is of
permanent possession of what is good.”334 Diotima’s discussion of the work of Eros
follows closely upon her discussion of its use for human beings, and it is evident that, for
her, the work of Eros can only properly be understood in relation to its use for human
beings, in this case, joining them permanently to what is truly good and beautiful.
Burnyeat’s discussion of the proper use of objects in the Republic suggests that
the use of objects has an objective determination and that this is further related to the
function (ργον) of the object.
The correct way to design and use a shuttle is determined by its function,
to help turn thread into cloth. The correct way to design and use a couch
is likewise determined by its function, to help turn the impressionable
young into worthy citizens. There are constraints in both cases: you need
a sound knowledge of the material you have to work with (the potential
and limitations of woolen thread and human nature), and a clear
understanding of the end-product you are aiming for (high-quality cloth,
high-quality citizens). These constraints make it possible to give an
objective account of what a shuttle or couch is and how best to use it. The
long discussion of musical poetry in Republic II-III can be read as Plato’s
account of the objectively best way to use couches and tables for the
education and cultural fulfillment of human nature. Republic X confirms
that “the excellence, the beauty, the rightness of every implement, living
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thing, and action are determined solely by reference to the use for which
each has been made or grown” (601d). The use of a couch is not just
reclining. It is reclining to participate in a culturally intense social
gathering.335
Burnyeat’s discussion is different from our own in that it examines objects produced by
human beings, rather than something like Eros, which is one of many naturally occurring
phenomena named by them.336 But this fact about Eros more strongly supports
understanding it in terms of Burnyeat’s distinctions; for as much as reason and order are
discernible in products made by human beings, even more is reason discernible at work
in the order of the cosmos. Burnyeat’s discussion of objects in the Republic suggests that
both the use and the function of objects are objectively determined, rather than arbitrarily
imposed by human beings. Further, the use and function of objects are closely related to
one another, and the proper use of an object is subservient to its function. The ργον of
the axe is to cut, and it is only properly used when it is employed in this work. The ργον
of the shuttle is to weave cloth, and it is only properly used when it is employed in this
activity. In Burnyeat’s examples of the couch and the shuttle, both objects act on the
material proper to them in order to transform it; in similar fashion, Eros acts on human
nature to transform it. The proper use of each object yields a good product: the properly
used shuttle weaves good cloth, the properly used couch forms good citizens, properly
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used Eros yields ε$δαιµονα.337 The ργον of each object is an activity: shuttles are made
for weaving, and couches for cultivating good citizens, axes for cutting. Diotima’s
question at 206b1 supports this connection between ργον and activity:
Given then, that love is always this,” she replied, “how will those pursuing
it do so, and through what activity (praxis), if their intense eagerness in
pursuing it is to be called love? What really is this thing that it does (το
ργον)? Can you say?338
The ργον of Eros is procreation or participation in immortality,339 and its proper use is
ε$δαιµονα. From the connection between the work of Eros and its proper use, we can see
that the ργον is revealed in the activity, and the χρεα in the finished product. Since the
χρεα in this instance, however, is state or disposition, there is a discernible relationship
between the use and work of Eros, such that the two may coincide. In chapter six, we
will see that this occurs when the rational soul pursues the proper path of love and
achieves a share of immortality by contemplating the Beautiful itself. In this instance, the
rational soul engages in its highest activity, contemplation, and at once achieves its best
disposition, ε$δαιµονα.
The discussion of the use (χρεα) and function or work (ργον) of Eros points to the
multifaceted nature of Eros. Plato’s presentation of Eros through Diotima’s discourse has
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moved from identifying the lack of Eros to the intermediate nature of Eros; as
intermediate, Eros is presented as the desire of the lover for the beloved object, and so
also as the force that moves the lover toward the beloved; as intermediate, Eros unites the
lover and the beloved object. But Eros has also a proper use and a proper work,
according to the kind of being to which he is joined. Eros, like the cosmos he inhabits, is
subject to rational order. Though Eros animates the cosmos and causes all beings to
strive toward participation in immortality, he causes this striving in accordance with the
proper end of each kind of being. Consequently, his proper use for human beings is to
lead them toward states of ε$δαιµονα, and his proper work is manifest in the various kinds
of procreation that afford them participation in immortality.
Though the discussion of the nature of Eros includes discussion of his use, work,
and cause, this does not obliterate the triadic structure of Eros that was discussed earlier.
Eros still joins the beloved to the lover, but his intermediacy is understood to include use,
work, and cause. This point is important for understanding how Eros is related to issues
of psychological motivation, motion, and beloved object. Allen’s suggestion above, for
instance, that “intermediates are actions and physical objects that take their value, not
from their own nature, but from their purpose or use”340 indicates that the purpose or use
reveals a psychological motive on the part of the agent or lover, such that the purpose or
utility of an action reveals why we act and the purpose or utility of an object reveals why
we pursue it. In brief, such purposes and uses reveal why we find certain actions and
objects loveable. It is not difficult to deduce from this analysis that all such intermediates
are merely instrumental to the attainment of some good identified by the agent. On this
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analysis, the purpose we have for acting or pursuing an object is the reason we give for
the action we choose, where reason determines the value of the object or action rather
than recognizing the intrinsic worth of the action or object. Insofar as reason determines
the value of an object, it does so with respect to achieving some end, not with respect to
the intrinsic goodness of the object and not with respect to an awareness of its place
within a rationally ordered whole. As I have argued above, this assessment of Eros and
intermediates is incommensurate with Platonic teleology.
The ramifications of such an assessment of Eros’s intermediacy are insidious, for
it is precisely the issue of psychological motivation that lies at the heart of the charge of
Eros’s egocentrism. This assessment results from the failure to distinguish the proper use
of Eros that is consequent upon his nature as part of a teleological universe from the
purposes proposed by a human agent that direct him toward particular objects and
actions. Ends are inscribed in the natures of things, whereas purposes are reasons rational
beings provide. Ends determine things like the matter used for the making of an axe and
the form that the axe must have; humans use the axe for the purpose of chopping wood
.341 “Agents and actors have “purposes” by which they determine themselves to certain
actions. Purposes are motives, “motors” propelling us toward destinations.”342 It is not,
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then, egocentric for a human to move toward ε$δαιµονα by virtue of Eros; rather, it is the
natural end of a human to be so moved by Eros, it is this very movement that brings him
to the completion of his nature. Nor is the human participation in immortality an instance
of egocentricism, for this participation is, once again, an instance of humanity fulfilling
its natural perfection within the cosmos.
Catherine Osborne identifies the issue of psychological motivation and its relation
to the beloved object as central to the interpretation of love generally and Eros
specifically as acquisitive, possessive, and egocentric. “It is plain,” she writes, “that most
thinkers have taken for granted the idea that love can be analysed and classified on the
basis of the needs, desires, or motives that give rise to it.”343 In this passage, Osborne is
considering the structure of Eros in itself and responding to several other accounts of
love. Nonetheless, her overarching concern is the recent tendency among scholars to
divide love into the categories of acquisitive and egocentric on the one hand, and utterly
selfless and giving on the other.344 Since Eros is typically placed in the first of these
categories on the grounds that one loves an object for some purpose or other that benefits
the lover, she is particularly concerned here to discuss psychological motivation. While
she identifies an important problem in recent literature on love and Eros, her failure to
distinguish clearly among terms such as need, desire, and motive obfuscates her analysis.
For example, she criticizes Aristotle’s account of friendship as an instance of the
philosophical tendency to assess love according to “the motives (for pleasure, for profit,
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or for the good)” for friendship.345 That pleasure, profit, and the good are psychological
motives is not, strictly speaking, true for Aristotle. In the Nicomachean Ethics, for
instance, he writes: “The kinds of friendship may perhaps be cleared up if we first come
to know the object of love. For not everything seems to be loved but only the lovable,
and this is good, pleasant, or useful….”346 The ensuing discussion in chapter three
demonstrates that the object of love remains the good, pleasant, or useful with respect to
the lover himself. At best we might say that Aristotle’s analysis indicates a psychological
motive in the lover with respect to the beloved object; but Aristotle’s analysis is not of
the subject and his motives, rather it is a sketch or outline of relationships among friends.
This, in itself, sets Aristotle’s account apart, since his subject is φιλα rather than Eros.
But, more importantly, it highlights the flaw in Osborne’s analysis. She moves from a
critique of analyses of love that depend on need, desire, or motive as tools for
categorization to a critique of the Aristotelian account of friendship that depends upon the
beloved object for categorization. While the Aristotelian account may indicate the
existence of a psychological motive in the lover or friend, it maintains the distinction
between psychological motive and beloved object that Osborne’s treatment obscures.
Osborne’s treatment neglects to distinguish among needs, desires, and motives,
and furthermore, to distinguish the various senses of motive. Needs, for our purposes, are
deficiencies in the subject that must necessarily be filled to ensure the well-being of the
subject. Such things might include food, drink, housing, and companionship. That these
things are needs does not exclude them from also being desires. Often, the subject
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desires those things necessary for her own survival and well-being. In this sense, needs
and desires may overlap or coincide. Desires are distinct from needs in two ways,
however. First, it is possible to desire things that are contrary to the needs of the subject,
as when someone with dropsy strongly desires drink when what he most needs is to
abstain from it. Second, it is possible to desire things that are not, strictly speaking,
necessary for the survival and well-being of the subject. This occurs, for instance, when
someone desires not drink simply to satisfy thirst, not merely adequate quantities of
water, but a fine single malt scotch. In these senses, needs and desires are distinct from
one another, and the scope of desire is broader than the scope of need. In neither case,
however, is it necessary to appeal to motive in a psychological sense in order to consider
their natures.
‘Motive’ is itself an obscure and imprecise term with many possible
significations. First, in its contemporary usage, it often signifies psychological
motivation for action; but such motivations might be further distinguished as (a) reasons
for acting identified by the agent, or purposes; (b) needs (thus deficiencies), such as
hunger or thirst, that are nonrational catalysts for action; (c) desires as distinct from needs
but inclusive of emotions such as anger; (d) any of the above-mentioned of which the
agent is not aware. Second, the term motive might designate a moving force, an origin or
source of motion. Third, as in Osborne’s assessment, a beloved object might be
designated a motive.
Osborne argues against the position “that the status of the beloved determines the
kind of love or the motives for it” focusing on three examples of love generally deemed
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not respectable.347 The first of these she calls “love in bad taste” and describes as
occurring when “the lover finds beauty in an object which educated or fashionable taste
scorns.”348 The second, “excessive love”, “is love that goes over the top for something
that does not merit such devotion.”349 The third is “love that is motivated”, and its lack
of respectability lies in the fact that the lover loves his object not for itself, but for
“motives of personal gain”.350 These considerations lead her to the following conclusion:
Saying that love is unseemly if it is motivated by some further hope of
gain implies that there is always some motive for love. This is precisely
what I shall argue is a mistake. On the contrary we need to recognize that
love is a motive, if you like, among other motives; where some other
motive explains my action, the action is not motivated by love. If love is
the motive, no further motive need be sought. So it makes nonsense to
look for a motive for love, though it may make sense to ask for motives
for action. If we see love as an attitude, rather than a response provoked
by some object of desire or concern, we shall be less likely to seek a
‘motive’ for the response.351
Osborne’s position, as she states it here, intends to further clarify her claim that most
treatments of love depend on “needs, desires, or motives” on the part of the lover “that
give rise to it [love]”. But in this formulation of the problem, she is claiming that the
beloved object is the source of these categorizations. The consequence of this statement
is that both the lover and the beloved are sources of the needs, desires, and motives that
cause the love relation. Can it really be the case, especially for thinkers such as Plato and
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Aristotle, that both lover and beloved are sources of “needs, desires, or motives” with
respect to the same love relation, in the same way, and at the same time?
As soon as we identify an object or person as beloved, we identify it as loveable.
Any classical analysis of such a statement would recognize the beloved as good,
beautiful, and therefore loveable, by virtue of its being at all. This is a central truth for
Plato—all that has being is also good, because being itself is good. It is because of the
intrinsic goodness of an object or person (however slight that goodness might be) that
love in the lover arises. This structure is fundamentally different from an account of love
that begins by examining the subjective psychological motivations of the lover because
the beloved object is not merely a good for him, but exists as objectively good insofar as
the beloved exists at all. To explain love in terms of psychological motives is to
determine the beloved’s value according to the purposes set by the lover that the beloved
might serve, rather than to recognize that the beloved shares in goodness insofar as he
shares in being. It is not, then, the beloved himself that is objectionable, but the purpose
for which the lover loves him. This is precisely Plato’s point in his caricature of such
“reasonable” but utilitarian Eros in the Phaedrus.352 Eros in its true form never permits
us to use others so badly; in fact, Eros is divine precisely because it comes from outside
of us, as daimonic possession, and gives us the ability to see the beloved as intrinsically
good. Daimonic possession leads the soul to love appropriately because it gives the soul
the vision of goodness and beauty as they exist objectively, and not merely as they exist
for the individual, as part of the grandeur of the cosmos.
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In the Symposium, Pausanius suggests such a distinction in distinguishing the
beloved himself (always desired under the auspices of beauty of some sort) and the
manner in which one loves, which is tied to what the lover hopes to get from or give to
the beloved. If we recall Diotima’s discussion of the use and work of Eros, we find
another such distinction. The object of Eros does not change—it is always of the
beautiful and good. The use of Eros for human beings is the attainment of ε$δαιµονα, the
beautiful and good state of the human being. The works of Eros are found in the various
activities of lovers by which they participate in immortality. If we return to a
consideration of the triadic structure of Eros, we find that Eros still joins the lover to the
beloved object. The use of Eros and the work of Eros belong to him as intermediate; they
are the means by which he brings humans to ε$δαιµονα and participation in immortality.
Eros does have a motive in the psychological sense, and this is what Plato designates the
use of Eros for human beings, but it is part of the nature of Eros itself and of human
beings themselves.
We have seen that Eros’s intermediate status affords him real existence, and that
this real existence involves the motion not only of the cosmos, but also of the individual
souls. The theme and structure of daimonic possession is suggested by Eros’s description
as intermediate, and yet the gods do not bless those possessed of hubris, but those who
cultivate poverty. Analogically, this means the daimon or tutelary spirit comes to be in or
takes possession of the human being only if the proper disposition, i.e., poverty, is
cultivated and present in the agent. The sense in which the Eros-daimon leads the lover
toward the vision of Beauty is discussed further in chapter six, and the further relation
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between divine possession, katharsis, and the practice of poverty are discussed in chapter
seven.
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CHAPTER SIX
POVERTY IN THE ASCENT TO THE VISION OF BEAUTY

In previous chapters, I have argued that the parentage of Eros353 is central to
understanding his nature, that this nature is epitomized in the myth of his parentage that
describes him as at once poor and resourceful, and that the kind of poverty distinctive of
Eros is πενα because it makes possible φιλοσοφα φθονος. It remains, however, to
investigate the consequences of this understanding of Eros’s nature, as Diotima herself
does in the last major section of her discourse, that which addresses the question of the
cause (α%τα) of Eros.
This chapter will examine the presence and role of the Poros-Penia image in this
last section of Diotima’s discourse.354 From the beginning of the section discussing
immortality and procreation, Diotima’s language no longer refers to the Poros-Penia
image of Eros and does not make explicit use of the imagery of lack or need. Yet, there
is in her initial description of Eros as the child of Poros and Penia a depiction of the
continual motion that belongs to him as their child: “His nature is neither that of an
immortal, nor that of a mortal, but on the same day, now he flourishes and lives, when he
finds resources, and now he dies, but then comes back to life again.”355 This image of
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perpetual motion reappears in the discussions of immortality and procreation in this last
section of Diotima’s discourse; not only is this motion present in the discussion of
immortality and procreation, it is present also in the ascent passage,356 as the lover moves
upward toward the final vision of the beautiful. Poverty, as it appears in the discussions
of immortality, procreation, and ascent, is revealed as dispositional, in relation to a
resourcefulness and productivity, and is embedded in the descriptions of Eros that occur
at each level of soul; in the ascent passage itself it appears in the ‘relaxing’357 of the
soul’s passion toward objects it has found σµικρς in relation to other objects; it is
captured in the description of the penultimate stage of the ascent, which presents the
lover as procreating in φιλοσοφα φθονος, and is the precondition for the vision of beauty
itself. There are, however, also some structural elements of the dialogue to which I
would like to draw attention as providing a framework for understanding the overall
import and implications of the ascent passage. Therefore, I will begin with a brief
discussion of these elements, the way they draw the reader’s attention to the question of
the α%τα of Eros, and suggest a division of the discussion between 207a5 and 212 d1 that
is parallel to the tripartite division of the soul described in the Republic. The question of
the α%τα of Eros frames the discussion of immortality and procreation within which the
ascent passage is situated as the way to the best form of participation in immortality.
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The Structure of Socrates’ Discourse

The structure of Socrates’ discourse is indicated by Socrates himself, when he
twice refers to the oratorical method earlier espoused by Agathon.358 At the beginning of
his own encomium, Agathon finds fault with all of the preceding speakers for
“congratulating humans on the goods the god is responsible (αcτιος) for giving them”
rather than “eulogizing the god” and saying what kind of character Eros must have on the
basis of the goods he provides to humans.359 The correct way (τρπος Mρθος) to give
praise, Agathon argues, is “to describe in speech what sort of character whoever is the
subject of the speech has in virtue of which he is actually responsible (αcτιος) for what.
Thus it is right and proper for us too to praise Love himself first for what he is (ο\ς +στιν),
then for his gifts (τ;ς δσεις).”360
Socrates’ first reference to this method is at the beginning of his examination of
Agathon: “Well now, my dear Agathon: you seemed to me to make a good start to your
speech, when you said that one should first of all display the sort of character Love
himself has, and then go on to what he does.”361 This remark leads into his questioning
Agathon regarding a specific ο\ς +στι of Eros that he had not mentioned, whether “Love
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[is] of the sort to make him love of something, or of nothing.”362 This elenchus of
Agathon begins the section of Socrates’ account that will address the nature of Eros.
Socrates’ speech regarding the nature of Eros is centered on this particular ο\ς +στι,
which serves as the theme for his further variations. It is notable, however, that Socrates
has slightly reformulated Agathon’s statement of method. Where Agathon speaks of “ο\ς
+στιν”, Socrates speaks of “:πο2ς τς +στιν”; where Agathon speaks of “τ;ς δσεις”,
Socrates speaks of “τ; ργα”. While Agathon incorporates “αcτιος” as a way of speaking
of the things Eros causes in virtue of his character, Socrates makes no mention here of
αcτιος or its cognate α%τα.
Socrates’ second reference to Agathon’s method occurs just before he begins
recounting what he learned from Diotima. Here, Socrates says, “Now one should do,
Agathon, as you did, first describing who Love himself is and what sort of character he
has, and then going on to what he does.”363 His formulation here differs slightly from the
first; instead of “:πο2ς τς +στιν” Socrates uses “τς +στιν : bρως κα, το2ς τις”, and so
moves from speaking generally of what sort of thing Eros is to speaking about who he is,
and with the interrogative “πο2ος” of what sort he is.
Two particular aspects of Plato’s language here seem to bear upon the
understanding of the ascent passage and its place in the discourse as a whole. The first is
Socrates’ use of τ; ργα in place of Agathon’s τ;ς δσεις; the second is Agathon’s use of
αcτιος in relation to the nature of Eros, language that is echoed in Diotima’s discourse
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when she takes up the question of the α%τα of Eros. The first of these, the substitution of
τ; ργα for τ;ς δσεις, occurs in both of Socrates’ statements of method, and so seems
rather more than accidental. What then, might be the purpose of such a substitution? τ;
ργα is the substantive derived from the verb ργω, to work, while τ;ς δσεις is the
substantive derived from the verb δδωµι, to give. τ; ργα,364 as “the workings” or “the
works or deeds” of Eros, then, has a more active connotation than its counterpart in
Agathon’s formula, so that Socrates’ formulation leads the reader to think of what Eros
does or effects rather than what he dispenses to humans in the manner of “gifts”. This
prefigures the active role that the Eros-daimon will have in binding together the realms of
the divine and the human.365 Furthermore, thematic in the dialogue as a whole is the idea
that Eros in some way makes humans better,366 and these two different formulations of
the interaction between Eros and humanity bring to focus a distinction between two ways
of conceiving of Eros: as one whose gifts are passively received or as one whose deeds
and works may be shared or participated in by humans. It is only the latter of these two
conceptions that fully captures the sense of the daimonic in Greek life.367
The second significant aspect of Plato’s language appears in Agathon’s
formulation of method. Agathon suggests that the things caused by Eros are in some way
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indicative of his character; indeed Agathon states that it is “in virtue of which [this
character] he is actually responsible (αcτιος) for what.”368 This allusion to the significant
issue of α%τα and its relation to giving an account of the nature of things is taken up again
in Diotima’s formulation of the cause (α%τα) of Eros that begins the discussion of
immortality and leads eventually to the ascent passage.
Oddly, after the second time he recommends the aforementioned method,
Socrates proceeds in the very next sentence to declare his intention of abandoning it,
since “it seems…easiest to go about describing him [Eros] in the way the Mantinean
visitor once went about it, by closely questioning me.”369 Given this, it is difficult to
determine whether Socrates seriously intends to abide by the oratorical method he has
endorsed. Yet, an examination of the discourse of Diotima as a whole reveals that, even
though the form of the discourse is largely dialogue, it may be divided into sections
according to the questions that are raised within it, and these sections do follow the
oratorical method espoused by Socrates, investigating first the character of Eros and then
his works.
It is clear that the first part of the dialogue between Socrates and Diotima (201d1204c6) sets out to clarify the character or nature of Eros, or in Socrates’ words “τς +στιν :
bρως κα, πο2ς τις”—who he is and of what sort he is.370 Thus, this early part of their
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The “πο2ς τις”, translated by Rowe as “what sort of character he has”, is broad enough
to indicate character in the sense that it would apply to any god, demi-god, or human and
so indicate virtue or vice, but might also look ahead to the description of Eros as
intermediate and as daimon.
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exchange establishes that Eros, because lack, and thus imperfection, are part of his
nature, cannot be a god. Further discussion of his nature as intermediate between the
human and divine leads to the conclusion that he is a daimon. This nature is further
explained by the theogonic account of Eros, and the qualities of both his parents are used
to explain the particular kind of intermediate nature he possesses.371 Thus, at the end of
this section of the dialogue, the reader has already in his mind that Eros is a daimon,
intermediate, always accompanied by a kind of lack or need, but never wholly without
resource (πορος). The next section of the dialogue proceeds to examine the use (χρεα)372
of Eros to humans, and the answer to this question lies in the fact that it is by virtue of
Eros that humans aims at happiness; this recognition of the universal nature of Eros as a
desire for happiness leads to the further conclusion that all humans have in common this
desire for happiness and so are lovers, regardless of the fact that the common usage of the
term Eros has a much narrower designation. This section of the dialogue ends by
answering the questions of whom and of what sort Eros is with the following
formulation: “Love is of permanent possession of what is good”.373
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The next major section of the dialogue is clearly marked by Diotima’s transitional
question to Socrates: “Given, then, that love is always this,” she replied, “how will those
pursuing it do so, and through what activity, if their intense eagerness in pursuing it is to
be called love? What really is this thing that it does (τ ργον)?”374 Diotima explains that
its activity or work—that by which it is pursued—is procreation, and that this takes place
“in relation both to body and to soul.”375 Diotima’s further explanation of this statement
reveals that “all human beings…are pregnant both in body and in soul, and when we
come to be of the right age, we naturally desire to give birth.”376 It is this giving birth
and participation in procreation that gives mortal creatures a share in the divine.377 The
work of Eros, then, seems to be this “procreation (γ5νεσις) and giving birth (τκος) in the
beautiful.”378 Furthermore, procreation is the means by which humans participate in
immortality,379 and these two—procreation and immortality—are added to the preceding
formulation of Eros as “permanent possession of what is good” in the formulation at
206e5: “Love is of procreation and giving birth in the beautiful.” This is the final
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Diotima can make such an assertion because, as she explains, “procreation is
something everlasting and immortal, as far as anything can be for what is mortal; and it is
immortality, together with the good, that must necessarily be desired, according to what
has been agreed before—if indeed love is of permanent possession of the good. Well,
from this argument it necessarily follows that love is of immortality as well” (206e7207a3).
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reformulation of the nature of Eros, and the one the reader is left to take with her to the
next part of Diotima’s discussion, which is pursued under the auspices of seeking the
cause (α%τα) of Eros.
The fact that Diotima inquires after the ργον of Eros at 206b3 indicates a new
stage of the discussion; it fulfills Socrates’ stated intention to speak first of the nature of
Eros and then of his works. Further evidence of this is provided by Diotima at 204d,
when she summarizes the discussion that has gone before: “Love’s character, and his
birth, are as I have said; and he is of beautiful things, according to what you say.” It is
evident, then, that Socrates’ intention to speak first of the nature of Eros, and then of his
works is reflected in the structure and language of the dialogue itself. In the course of
Diotima’s speech, she moves from speaking of the parentage of Eros to his use (χρεα) for
humans to his activity or ργον, and finally to his α%τα. Two of these terms, use (χρεα)
and cause (α%τα), stand out because they were not forecast by Socrates’ statement
regarding method.380 In neither of the two reformulations of Agathon’s method for
encomia does Socrates mention α%τα, though Agathon himself had used the cognate αcτιος
to indicate what Eros causes as a result of his character.381 It is somewhat surprising,
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It might be argued that both terms could be included in τ; ργα, but the distinct terms
themselves positioned within the questions that shift the direction of the dialogue suggest
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then, to find the question of α%τα as the catalyst for a major turning point in the dialogue;
for without its mention, Diotima might not have the occasion to explain the relationship
of immortality and procreation to Eros. It is further significant that the question of Eros’s
α%τα is the setting of the Lesser and Greater Mysteries of Eros. In what sense, then, is
α%τα meant in this passage and what role does it play in the understanding of the ascent
and final revelation of Eros?
The Symposium does not offer a discussion of α%τα, though Diotima’s placement
of the subject of Eros’s α%τα suggests that it falls within the domain of the works of Eros.
There is, further, Agathon’s usage of αcτιος, which is suggestive of a relationship between
what sort of thing something is and what it causes (or that for which it is responsible). In
this sense, α%τα indicates something flowing from the nature of the thing. Such an
understanding of α%τα is consonant with Socrates’ discussion of α%τα in the Phaedo,382
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Socrates argues in the Phaedo against those who misunderstand the true nature of
α%τα, especially those who posit material elements, such as air and water, as causes.
These people, he says at 98c1-3, do not “assign any real causes for the ordering of
things.” Rather, as he says at 99b3-5, “whoever talks in that way is unable to make a
distinction and to see that in reality a cause is one thing, and the thing without which the
cause could never be a cause is quite another thing. And so it seems to me that most
people, when they give the name of cause to the latter, are groping in the dark, as it were,
and are giving it a name that does not belong to it.” In this passage, speaking of bones
and sinews as the mistaken causes of his presently being seated in a prison cell, Socrates
distinguishes his rational choice as cause from the material causes of his being. This
seems to be the sort of cause he has in mind at the beginning of his discussion of α%τα at
Phaedo 97c2-6, where he says of Anaxagoras’s theory, “I was pleased with this theory of
cause, and it seemed to me to be somehow right that the mind should be the cause of all
things, and I thought, ‘If this is so, the mind in arranging things arranges everything and
establishes each thing as it is best for it to be. So if anyone wishes to find the cause of the
generation or destruction or existence of a particular thing, he must find out what sort of
existence, or passive state of any kind, or activity is best for it.” This is, of course, just
the sort of thing that the Form is, and Socrates’ subsequent discussion in the Phaedo
makes it clear that these realities are the true objects of knowledge. See also the
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which suggests that approaching an understanding of things according to their α%τα is to
understand that the only cause of a thing’s being is its participation in the Forms.383 Α%τα
in this sense is not to be understood linearly, as an articulation of beginnings and the
consequences that follow from them;384 rather the α%τα are the Forms or perfections
toward which sensible being strives. Thus, in asking for the α%τα of Eros, Diotima is
asking for the perfect instance of it, and this prepares the way for her discussion of the
various ways of participating in Eros, all articulated as images of desire for
immortality.385
The ascent passage proper begins at 209e5, situated after Diotima’s question
regarding the α%τα of Eros and after her initial discussion of immortality and procreation
that serves as answer to that question. The entire discussion of the α%τα of Eros, then,
can be divided very broadly according to her discussion of immortality and procreation
between 207a5 and 209e4, and the Greater Mysteries of Eros that belong to the ascent
passage.386 Both sections are united, however, by the themes of immortality and
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telling of the final revelation, the text moves definitively beyond the preceding depictions
of Eros.
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procreation that serve as their subject.387 These sections should be understood, then, as
one prolonged discourse on the themes of immortality and procreation insofar as these
are the α%τα of Eros. Viewed from this perspective, a tripartite structure of the text from
207a5 to the end of the ascent passage emerges, along the lines of the tripartite division
of the soul articulated in the Republic.388 The different descriptions of the lover’s activity
and procreation are descriptions of the kind of procreation proper to each part of the
tripartite soul. Just as, in the Republic, each part of the soul has its proper pleasure,389 so
in the Symposium, each part of the soul has a proper activity in the pursuit of its proper
pleasure.
This structure is further suggested by the introduction, early on, of a distinction
between kinds of immortality, according to the manner in which mortal and immortal
beings participate in immortality. The mortal immortality of which Diotima speaks is the
perpetuation of the name or image of an individual that occurs in time; such is the
immortality insured to all beings that generate offspring.390 The immortality proper to
divine beings, however, is of a different nature, because the divine, being perfect, is
387
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removed from time and change. Existing as it does beyond the realm of temporality and
flux, the divine is truly immortal, “by always being the same in every way.”391 It is worth
considering why this distinction is introduced at all, much less at this particular place,
since Diotima never takes up the issue of the immortality proper to gods or of the gods
themselves in what follows. It seems, then, that the distinction between kinds of
immortality only makes sense if there is a divine part392 in humans that can enjoy
immortality in the manner of the divine, in addition to the ability to participate in
immortality that belongs to humans as mortal beings.
Given this understanding of α%τα, then, the passage regarding immortality should
be understood in terms of the relation of the realm of becoming to immortality itself;
indeed, what serves as answer to Diotima’s question is a description of participation in
immortality from the lowest grade of sensible being to the highest grade of being in
humans, the rational element. The discussion of procreation that is woven into the
discussion of immortality is structured not only by the distinction between procreation of
body and soul, but more fundamentally according to the distinction Diotima draws
between mortal and divine immortality. Nested within this distinction between mortal
and divine immortality is a description of the manner in which the three different
faculties of soul participate in immortality, each according to its proper object of desire.
The desire to be immortal seems to be the soul’s desire to dwell with the Forms, to
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This part of the human soul, however, does not seem to be made explicit in the
Symposium, if it is to be identified with νο4ς. What is present in the Symposium is the
claim at 206c6-7 that “living creatures, despite their mortality, contain this immortal
aspect, of pregnancy and procreation.”
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become more like that which, in its essence, it is itself; this is what moves it toward
knowledge.
Eros, the Tripartite Soul, and Participation in Immortality

The passage from Symposium 207a5-212b1 depicts the different sorts of
procreation and so also immortality at work in the cosmos. Diotima gives an account that
begins with the most general and universal instances of procreation and ascends to the
more specific and limited instances of procreation that are singular to human beings,
beginning with the physical aspects of human beings, proceeding to the affective393
aspects of human beings, and finally to the rational aspect of human beings. Out of this
description arises an account of the manner in which the human soul participates in
immortality insofar as its Eros is directed toward the objects proper to each of its parts,
beginning with the appetitive, proceeding to the affective, and finally to the rational.394
The first instance of this occurs immediately after Diotima asks about the cause of Eros,
when she describes the physical procreation common to all animals, and also to the
appetitive element of the human soul:
What do you think, Socrates, is the cause of this love, and this desire?
Don’t you see how terribly all animals are affected whenever they feel the
desire to procreate, whether they go on foot or have wings—all of them
stricken with the effects of love, first for intercourse with one another, and
then also for nurturing their offspring, so that the weakest are prepared to
393
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join battle with the strongest on their offspring’s behalf and even die for
them, torturing themselves with hunger so as to rear them, and doing
everything else necessary?395
Diotima’s first description of the cause of love and desire, then, is articulated as an
instance of appetitive nature. This passage suggests that Eros is a motive force in all
living beings, driving them toward procreation, and disposing them to suffer for the sake
of their offspring. In the animal world, this investment in the well-being of offspring is
particularly puzzling, since this investment does not appear to be grounded in rationality.
As Diotima continues, this appetitive drive is more clearly linked to the desire for
immortality, but once again, at this primordial level, the desire for immortality is not one
grounded in the rationality of the beings who exhibit it.
Diotima’s description of procreation as the mortal participation in immortality
occurs in the following passage:
The same account applies to animals as to human beings: mortal nature
seeks so far as it can to exist for ever and to be immortal. And it can
achieve it only in this way, through the process of coming-into-being,
because it always leaves behind something else that is new in place of the
old, since even during the time in which each living creature is said to be
alive and to be the same individual—as for example someone is said to be
the same person from when he is a child until he comes to be an old man,
and yet, if he’s called the same, that’s despite the fact that he’s never made
up from the same thing, but is always being renewed, and losing what he
had before, whether its hair, or flesh, or bones, or blood, in fact the whole
body.396
Her first descriptions of procreation as participating in immortality, then, show that this
procreation exists at all levels of mortal being; even the component parts of the human
being are seen to be in a state of fluctuation, coming into being and passing away to be
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replaced again. At its most general and universal level, Eros is the natural motion of the
cosmos. In this brief description, Diotima provides a graded presentation of the activities
of Eros in the cosmos—the everlasting coming-to-be and passing away of things occurs
at a microcosmic level in the human being, as it does also in the physical preservation of
any individual organism; at the macrocosmic level of physical procreation, animals and
humans leave behind images of themselves in their offspring. The desire for immortality
is explained in terms of reproduction, and the changes of both the body and the soul that
take place within an individual while he appears to remain the same are used as examples
of the kinds of reproduction that allow mortal beings to pursue a more divine life. Thus,
in two ways, humans are seen to participate in immortality by procreation. The desire for
physical procreation that Diotima cites at the beginning of this section is the desire proper
to the appetitive element.397 The irrational or appetitive element of the soul is responsible
not only for animating the internal procreation necessary for growth and nutrition of the
body, but also for the impulse that extends beyond the body-soul composite in
procreating new physical beings.
The procreation that is proper to the soul belongs, in one sense, to the honorloving part of the soul, or spirited element.398 The lover of honor procreates for the sake
of immortal fame.399 Diotima gives two examples of this kind of lover. There are those,
like Alcestis and Achilles, who sacrificed themselves for their loves so that their names
397
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At 208c-d humans are “ready to brave any danger for the sake of this, much more than
they are for their children; and they are prepared to spend money, suffer through all sorts
of ordeals, and even die for the sake of glory.”
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would be remembered for their magnificent deeds.400 The second set of honor lovers she
describes, however, are those who leave behind magnificent works, as do poets and
craftsmen.401 This honor-lover is described in greater detail, and in relation to his
beloved. Upon finding someone beautiful in both body and soul, the lover “ε$πορε2
λγων”; he is full of things to say about what will make his beloved good.402 It is notable
that the lover is not said to procreate λγοι in this instance, and this distinguishes the lover
at this level from the lover at the first stage of the ascent passage. Rather, this lover
produces beautiful works, the immortal children of the soul—in poetry, laws, virtue; the
lover is inspired by the beauty he perceives in the beloved, and gazing upon this beauty,
generates works in praise of it. The comments here regarding the poets and craftsmen as
being pregnant with φρνησις and the other virtues seem to have at least a two-fold
significance. On the one hand, it is unlikely that Plato or his Socrates would endorse the
position that poets and craftsmen would have the truth regarding virtue;403 and, taking
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“Wisdom and the rest of virtue; of which all the poets are, of course, procreators’:
presumably an ironic compliment to Agathon, and Aristophanes, both of whom might
like to think of themselves as having some sort of wisdom (here phronêsis, as at 202a9,
203d6), of the sort generally attributed to Homer and Hesiod (cf. d3-4n.), but neither of
whom has actually managed to show much evidence of wisdom. Whatever we suppose
to be P.’s general view of poets, the handling of the two actually present in Symp. renders
it actually impossible that ‘of which all the poets are procreators’ could be taken as
seriously and literally meant—unless, of course, Diotima is a real and independent
individual, whose actual views S. (P.) is reporting. Since the evidence against this
overwhelmingly strong, the ironic reading—for which Apology 22a-c would provide
good background reading—seems inevitable.” C.J. Rowe, Commentary on Plato:
Symposium, 190, n. 209a3-4.
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this passage as a description of the thumotic soul suggests also that the kind of virtue
spoken of here is not the complete, final, or best virtue attainable by man. So there is, in
this sense, an ironic, mocking significance to the passage. On the other hand, the
thumotic soul desires to be perceived as noble, good, and virtuous, and so engages in
those activities that will help him gain such renown, without adequate attention to the
true nature of his behavior or perhaps because, without reflection or contemplation, he
takes conventional views on virtue to be the model for his behavior. In this sense, the
description of this lover is most apt. Even the description of the poets404 as lovers of this
sort makes sense in this context, for their odes praise and chronicle the sort of virtue that
is valued by society; and any created likeness of virtue by the poets remains a likeness
and so at best an image of actual virtue.
It can be seen from this, that the section of Diotima’s discourse from 207a5 to
212b1 is organized in three parts that correspond to the divisions of the soul in the
Republic, such that they reflect the appetitive, spirited, and rational elements of the soul.
This section describes the lives of those who imitate mortality at the level of body and at
the level of honor, parallel to the lives dominated by the lower two of the three elements
of the soul articulated in the Republic.405 The lover who is initiated into the final
mysteries of Eros has moved beyond both of these sorts of love and procreation; for his
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Hesiod and Homer are cited as examples here, more perhaps for longevity than
content. It is puzzling, for instance, that no mention is made of Pindar, who is so notable
a poet if one is looking for a poet full of words on virtue and what makes men good.
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Rowe links the passage regarding honor with philotimia, but does not link the
preceding section to the appetitive element of the soul.
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love and procreation are proper to the rational element in man so that even when he gazes
merely on a beautiful body he generates λγοι.
At the lower two levels of soul, there is evidence of the nature of Eros that is
described in the theogonic account of his origins. The poverty of Eros is depicted in the
sacrifice and suffering that is embraced by lovers for the sake of participation in
immortality; parents are willing to forego certain pleasures, or to endure pain and
hardship, in short to dwell with poverty, as a means or way to ensuring the well-being of
their offspring. Similarly poets and craftsmen willingly endure hardships for the sake of
their ‘immortal offspring’—those works of art or laws or famous deeds that history
should not forget—and in this sense, they too embrace poverty as a means or way to a
share in temporal immortality. The lover who is not directed toward love of such images
of virtue and such temporal, worldly immortality, is the lover who enters upon the
Greater Mysteries of Eros, those which are proper to the rational part of the soul. The
immortality to which he aspires is divine, for his final end will be to dwell with the Form
of beauty itself. Diotima indicates that the lover who begins the ascent at the rational
level is already apprised of the workings of Eros at all of these other levels, not only with
regard to the soul, but also with regard to the work of Eros as a cosmic force that
animates and perpetuates the cosmos and its inhabitants.406 It is at this level that the full
force of all that has gone before is brought to bear.
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“ ‘Into these aspects of erotics, perhaps, S., you too could be initiated’: evidently (see
e.g. Gorgias 497c, with scholiast; and Burkert 1983:266) initiation into the Lesser (or
‘Small’) Mysteries, at Agrae (‘in the city’), was a necessary qualification for initiation
into the Great(er), at Eleusis; and on any account it must be true that S. will have needed
to learn what has gone before in order even to begin to grasp what follows. But
Diotima’s main point is just about the relative importance, and difficulty, of the two sets
of ideas; it hardly matters that the real Greater Mysteries were evidently not particularly
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Diotima marks the beginning of a new section of her speech and of her teaching
with the following words:
Into these aspects of erotics, perhaps, Socrates, you too could be initiated;
but as for those aspects relating to the final revelation, the ones for the
sake of which I have taught you the rest, if one approaches these
correctly—I don’t know whether you would be capable of initiation into
them. Well, she said, I’ll tell you this next part, and spare no effort in
doing so: and you must try to follow, if you can. It’s like this, she said.
The person who turns to this matter correctly must begin, when he is
young, to turn to beautiful bodies, and first, if the one leading him leads
him correctly, he must fall in love with a single body and there procreate
beautiful words….407
Her speech clearly indicates a turning point in the description both of erotics and the
human participation in immortality through procreation. Diotima distinguishes this
passage as containing the highest mysteries of Eros. The preceding teachings408 were

difficult…Pace Riedweg 1987:2-29, it is unnecessary to go back and re-read Diotima’s
preliminaries in the light of the new image, which is suggested above all by the idea of
the final vision of Beauty (210e-212a).” Rowe, Commentary on Plato: Symposium, 193,
n. 209e5-210a1.
407
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Diotima has throughout utilized language from the mystery religions, and her
language here designates what is to follow as +ποπτικς (highest mystery). If we are to
take the descriptions of human participation in immortality that begin at 207c5 as a
parallel to the initiation rites of mystery religion, we might recognize that there is an
analogous movement from concern with body to concern with soul. Whether the
activities described at each level are intended as prescriptions for behavior rather than as
descriptions of the activities characteristic of souls dominated by one of the two lower
elements is dubious. It is not, at any rate, necessary to read these two lower levels as an
indication of prescribed action, as Guthrie notes that τελετ can indicate sacred writings
as well as initiatory rites. W. K. C. Guthrie, Orpheus and Greek Religion (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1993), 201-204. With this in mind, it is not difficult to
understand all that Diotima transmits as a teaching and not a blueprint for action. Thus,
contra Nussbaum’s suggestion in The Fragility of Goodness, there is no reason to
suppose that any part of Diotima’s discourse recommends promiscuity en route to the
vision of the beautiful itself. See page 181, where she writes that “we can perhaps,
though with difficulty, get ourselves, in imagination into the posture of seeing bodies as
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necessary, but seem undesirable as ends to pursue in themselves, since they are, as
Diotima emphasizes, for the sake of the final revelation. This is an indication that the
lover who pursues these highest mysteries must already have been initiated into the
Lesser Mysteries, and that he knows the things about erotics that Diotima has thus far
explained. Her language here also indicates that what follows is a description of the
correct way of pursuing erotics and so also that the preceding ways are deficient, since
she describes the would-be lover as “wanting to search after or pursue correctly”(MρθPς
µετw) the highest mysteries, distinguishing qualitatively the activity of this lover sharply
from those of the two preceding lovers. Twice more, in the space of five lines, Diotima
emphasizes the Mρθς quality of the way the lover must proceed in order to achieve the
final revelation.409
Within these same lines, Diotima moves between referring to the lover’s progress
as his own seeking and as his following another. Her first description of this lover, using
the subjunctive form of µ5τειµι, indicates a searching after, or following after. Her second
formulation states the necessity of “going correctly” (MρθPς %ντα), and is followed by the
first mention of a leader (=γο"µενος) who is responsible for leading his youth correctly.
The verbs used in both places are ambiguous; it is unclear whether the one embarking on
these final mysteries is seeking or being led. The significance of the leader at 210a6 is
also ambiguous. It is not clear who the leader is; in the traditional pederastic relationship,

qualitatively interchangeable with one another—because we have, or can imagine having,
relevant experiences of promiscuity or of non-particularized sexual desire.”
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one would expect the lover to be leading the beloved.410 But Diotima’s depiction of Eros
throughout her speech has been from the perspective of a lover who seeks his beloved, so
this seems implausible. Rowe suggests that:
If we follow out the metaphor of the Mysteries, ‘the one leading him’ will
be a mustagôgos, someone who guides the new initiates. In the real
Mysteries, this will apparently have been a person already initiated and
responsible for keeping the new initiates both in order and informed…in
the present context the ‘mystagogue’ will be someone already initiated in,
i.e. experienced in, ‘loving correctly’, but also, insofar as the initiate’s
progress will be a philosophical one (see e.g. d4-6n.), in philosophy.411
It is possible, however, that this leader is none other than the daimon Eros described
earlier by Diotima, and this would not be incompatible with the understanding of a
daimon as mystagogue. If such were the case, the daimonic possession of the lover
would lead him through the stages of loving correctly, and yet this same lover would be
seeking and active in his own right.
This model of divine possession helps to answer the question of how the lover
moves from one stage of the ascent to the next, since the daimon is able to cause motion
in the human being. It does not seem, however, to be the complete answer. The allusions
to mystery religions, the description of the lover as “going correctly”, and the description
of the actions of the lover at each stage of the ascent, together suggest that Diotima is
describing a practice, analogous to religious ritual that, if employed, will assist the lover
in his progress. The description of Eros as a “co-worker (συνεργς) with human nature” at
the end of Socrates’ encomium also emphasizes the joint contributions of Eros and
410
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human beings.412 In the examination of the ascent passage itself, then, how are the
contributions of Eros and the lover revealed? What does our understanding of Eros as an
intermediate who is both πενα and προς contribute to an understanding of the ascent
passage? In what sense can this section of the dialogue be seen as a continuation of the
explanation of the desire for immortality as α%τια? How does the understanding of the
ascent passage as an expression of this desire for immortality as proper to the rational
element influence its interpretation?
The very first stage of the lover’s progress presents a structure and motion that is
reiterated in subsequent stages. The lover first loves a single beautiful body, and in doing
this, generates beautiful λγοι. The lover then realizes “that the beauty that there is in any
body whatever is the twin of that in any other”; or, conceived more generally, that there is
some other beautiful object of the same kind as his beloved object.413 From this
realization, he moves to the realization that beauty exists in all objects of this same sort,
in this case, all bodies; his love is extended to include all instances of this beauty, in this
case, beauty of all bodies. The result, then, of loving one particular sensible body is the
recognition that it shares something with other beautiful bodies, such that for the one who
wishes to “pursue beauty of outward form, it’s quite mad not to regard the beauty in all
bodies as one and the same.”414 Thus, from the love of all bodies comes the realization
that there is something shared or universal in the beauty that belongs to bodies; it is this
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recognition of the universal beauty of bodies that prompts the lover to regard the beauty
of a single body as something paltry and to love it less.
This is the first instance of a recurring realization and movement on the part of the
lover. At each stage of the lover’s progression, he begins by loving a particular kind of
object, generates something as a result of his love, and proceeds to the recognition that
the beauty in his beloved object is only one instance of the beauty he seeks. At the first
two stages, this discovery leads him to think415 that the beloved object is trivial (σµικρς),
and so to be less ruled by his beloved, as at the first stage he is said “to relax this
passionate love for one body.”416 There are two moments of poverty in this movement.
The first occurs as a result of the lover’s generation; his very loving causes him to pour
himself out and thus to become poor. The lover is then filled again with a greater vision
of beauty, one that is more universal than his last. After this comes the second moment
of poverty, when the lover recognizes the smallness of the beauty he first loved and
releases himself from its hold.
Once the lover loves all bodies, he moves on to the recognition of beauty of soul
without, it appears, first recognizing the triviality of physical beauty. Rather, the lover
recognizes that beauty of soul is τιµι6τερος—more honorable—than beauty of body.
Again, at this level, the lover loves a single object, in this case a beautiful soul, and
consequently procreates λγοι. This time, however, the λγοι are both begotten and sought
after, and they are of a particular kind, those “that will make young men into better
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men.”417 In generating λγοι that will “make young men into better men” the lover will
have cause to think about practices, customs, and laws, as those things that are designed
to teach and guide the young.418 Customs and laws are both products of convention; they
have been alluded to previously in the section regarding the honor lover in the reference
to governance of cities and households that is connected to the discussion of virtue as
“things that it is fitting for the soul to conceive and to bring to birth.”419
The lover, who is still by virtue of the initial description himself being led, at this
stage seems to find his own beloved and so to become a leader of sorts himself. He
delivers λγοι to his beloved in order to improve him; he loves and cares for the boy, so
that at this level there is an indication that the beloved object is tended by the lover,
where there was not at the prior level. Because he wants to improve the beloved, the
417

Symp. 210c2-3

418

“ ‘And gives birth to the sorts of words—and seeks for them—that will make young
men into better men’: the words ‘and seeks’ (delayed also in the Greek) are frequently
bracketed by editors, but on inadequate grounds. Thus Dover says ‘the…seeker has
already found his partner…, he does not “seek” arguments [logoi in the Greek: it seems
better to keep the more neutral ‘words’], and toioutous [‘the sorts of’] obviously looks
forward to hoitines…[‘that will…’]’; but as Sier sees, it is exactly the lover’s seeking for
things of the right kind to say that will ‘compel’ him to ‘contemplate beauty as it exists in
kinds of activity…’ (c4: he will have to look at the different kinds of things people do,
etc., if he is going to ‘care for’ his beloved), and it is also what makes sense of ‘that will
make young men into better men’. (The general point was seen by Stallbaum and Rettig
in the last century; Bury unfortunately rejects their defence of ‘and seeks’ as ‘futile’.)
Since the lover is being guided and taught, it surely fits that he shouldn’t have the right
sorts of logoi off pat—he’s bursting with ideas, but will also need to do some seeking,
inquiring (presumably with his guide, but no doubt also with his beloved). If Love, and
the lover, is a philosopher (see d4-6n.), this should hardly come as a surprise; contrast the
lover of 209b8-c1, or indeed our lover at the beginning (210a7), both of whom do have
things off pat, in a way distinctly unlike Diotima’s picture of the perpetually indigent
Love. In short, removing ‘and seeks’ is not only unjustified, but does some damage to
the argument” (Rowe, Symposium, 195, n. c2-3).
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lover is “compelled…to contemplate beauty as it exists in kinds of activity and in laws,
and to observe that all of this is mutually related, in order that he should think beauty of
body a slight thing.”420 Upon the realization that the beauty of laws and practices is
shared and universal, again the lover realizes that the beauty that attracts him is present
not only in physical manifestations, but also in the human soul and those human
creations—laws and practices—that can cause it, i.e. the soul, to grow in beauty. And,
once again, the realization of this beauty causes the lover to think differently about
beauty of different kinds, namely that of body, for he realizes that beauty to be σµικρς
when compared to the beauty he has seen in laws and practices. Thus we can see that the
lover begins to love that beauty which is further removed from physical particulars, so
that his love for an object is proportional to its place in a hierarchy that begins with one
particular body and extends to the universal principles embedded in practices and laws.
But, this sort of principle is not yet the highest, and so the lover continues his ascent.
The next manifestation of beauty the lover gazes upon is that in “the different
kinds of knowledge”, and this stage is marked by several differences from those that have
preceded. It is first notable that this contains the first clear statement that the lover is “no
longer slavishly attached to the beauty belonging to a single thing—a young boy, some
individual human being, or one kind of activity.”421 This stage is also marked by a strong
ambiguity in the language of leading. The image of the lover being led, obscure from the
outset, was turned about at the prior stage, as he became the leader of a beloved. At this
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level, there is no explicit mention of his beloved, and the Greek formulation422 further
obscures the personages doing the leading and being led. The third rather remarkable
feature of this stage is that the lover himself, because he is “no longer slavishly attached
to the beauty belonging to a single thing…may cease to be worthless and petty
(σµικρολγος).”423 This is striking because at the previous stages, the lover recognizes
some object external to himself as σµικρς; in this case, however, though his vision of
beauty continues to grow to include more universal objects, Diotima does not state that
he finds either activities (+πιτηδε"µατα) or kinds of knowledge (+πιστ/µη)424 trivial as a
consequence of his increased vision. Rather it is the case that the lover himself becomes
a person not concerned with trivialities or caught up in them because he does not devote
himself exclusively to one person, custom, or activity; hence he is not ruled by any of
these things. This poverty with respect to individual objects of affection is echoed in the
passage that follows, in the description of the lover procreating beautiful “words and
422

“ ‘After activities, he must lead him to the different kinds of knowledge’: the
translation here accurately represents the Greek in not identifying either the subject or the
object of the ‘leading’, but the Greek even omits the ‘he’ and the ‘him’. In a way not
explicit identification is needed; we know who is doing the leading (the leader) and who
is being led (the lover). However the sudden use of the transitive verb, with no subject,
and with the likely candidate for the role last mentioned seventeen lines ago (in a6), is
striking (that the object is unspecified is less so, since the obvious candidate for that role
has been present all the time). Nor, if there are two relationships involved (guide/lover,
lover/beloved), is the question ‘who must lead who?’ obviously otiose. In that case, it is
not unreasonable to suspect a deliberate ambiguity: perhaps both guide must lead lover,
and lover the beloved (that is, on separate occasions)? It is already fairly clear, after all,
that both lover and beloved will progress; and if they do, they presumably do in the same
way” (Rowe, Symposium, 196, n. c7-8.)
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thoughts in a love of wisdom that grudges nothing.”425 For the abundance of the lover—
his procreation of beautiful words and thoughts—is of a piece with his freedom from the
kind of Eros that dominates a lover obsessed by his beloved. This disposition, the love of
wisdom that grudges nothing, is the state the lover must achieve if he is to attain the
vision of the beautiful itself.
But instead, turned towards the great sea of beauty and contemplating that,
[he] may bring to birth many beautiful, even magnificent, words and
thoughts in a love of wisdom that grudges nothing, until there, with his
strength and stature increased, he may catch sight of a certain single kind
of knowledge, which has for its object a beauty of a sort I shall describe to
you.426
It is only after the lover has achieved this state, in which he is himself no longer
σµικρολγος, that he is able to “catch sight of a certain single kind of knowledge,”427 that
of beauty itself.428 It is in catching sight of beauty itself that the lover is moved to the
final stage of the ascent.
Each stage of the ascent has described the disposition of the lover toward
potential objects of affection; at this level, his gaze moves upward from “kinds of
knowledge” or, more properly perhaps, multiplicity of knowledge to “catch sight of a

425

Symp. 210d5-6.

426

Symp. 210d3-7.

427

Symp. 210d6-7.

428

Good was earlier substituted for beauty at 204e1-3; the daimon Eros was described as
intermediate between the beautiful and ugly, wisdom and ignorance, immortal and
mortal, good and bad; there is perhaps, then, good reason to view the beautiful, good,
immortal, and wisdom as coextensive, though not as identical. Participation in the
immortal, then, is also participation in the good, the beautiful, and the wise; but to
participate or share in it is not to be the same as it.
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certain single kind of knowledge.”429 Where before the lover beheld the beauty
belonging to knowledge generally, as knowledge of various things exists in its various
forms, now the lover will behold a knowledge that seems to sit above the rest, and this is
knowledge of beauty itself, the beauty by which all other knowledge is made beautiful. It
is at this level that Diotima describes life430 as “worth living for a human being, in
contemplation of beauty itself.”431 The final goal of loving and living, then, is to engage
in the activity of contemplating beauty. As the lover gazes at this highest beauty, once
again, he will recognize that it is a finer thing than all of the other beautiful objects, that it
is not “of the same order as…gold, and clothes, and the beautiful boys and young
men.”432 And at this level the lover procreates “true virtue”; but following from this, “it
belongs to him to be loved by the gods, and to him, if to any human being, to be
immortal.”433
Rowe suggests that “the general upshot [of the ascent passage] is that the
conversion away from the individual—whether lover or beloved?—is an epistemological
process, involving the acquisition of that ability to grasp the general/generic which is
blocked by too great an attachment to the particular; that is, so the context seems to tell
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us, to particular, physical, instantiations of beauty.”434 While the epistemological process
does seem to serve as the analogue here, it seems that the context and purpose of the
dialogue demand an application in terms of affectivity, so that Rowe’s phrase “too great
an attachment to the particular” is more to the point. What is described in the ascent
passage is certainly proper to the soul considered as a rational being, and particularly in
terms of his rational element, but considered here insofar as it is erotic or affective.
The continued presence of γ5νεσις and τκτω link the ascent passage back to the
discussion of procreating and begetting as participation in immortality, and so also to the
discussion of the α%τα of Eros. In the context of this discussion, the ascent passage
follows the descriptions of the two lower parts of the soul participating in immortality
through the kind of procreation available to each of them, and so may be viewed as
descriptive of the erotic movement of the rational element as it participates in
immortality. If the α%τα are to be the Forms, then the Form of both Eros and +πιθυµα is
the desire for immortality, and so what follows is a description of the various ways that
the cosmos and its inhabitants strive to become like the Forms; for the rational element in
human beings, the process involves the distancing of the soul or mind from the
particularity, changeability, and sensuality of the material world. The structure of this
section of Diotima’s speech as a description of the ways in which the parts of the soul
participate in immortality also suggests that the immortality participated in at the highest
level of the ascent passage is more akin to divine immortality than it is to temporal or
mortal immortality. Just as the powers of the soul exist within an hierarchical order, so
also do the activities that are its participations in immortality. The lower parts of soul are
434
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only able to participate in immortality in the way Diotima describes as proper to mortals,
by leaving images of themselves behind in the temporal realm. Such immortality is
distinguished from divine immortality: “And in that way everything mortal is preserved,
not, like the divine, by always being the same in every way, but because what is
departing and aging leaves behind something new, something such as it had been.”435
The immortality attributed to the lover who achieves the highest stage of the ascent and
beholds beauty itself seems to be of this divine order; for in the course of the ascent, he
has himself been transformed and become more like the Forms his soul desires. In his
beholding them and dwelling with them, he shares in the immortality that is theirs, that of
always being the same.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
κθαρσις AND THE PURIFICATION OF EROS

The themes of impiety and hubris appear throughout the Symposium. The first
and last speeches are given by men who will be tried for crimes of impiety toward the
Eleusinian mysteries, Phaedrus and Alcibiades. And, as noted in chapter three, the
dialogue presents two members of the drinking party as charging Socrates with hubris,
Agathon at the beginning of the party, and Alcibiades at the end. But this charge of
hubris is subtly countered in the drama of the Symposium by Socrates’ evident poverty,
and poverty appears throughout the dialogue as a counterpoint to this worst of all possible
kinds of greed that is the ruin of man.
The kind of poverty we find at the center of Eros’s nature is closely associated
with σωφροσ"νη, or temperance, the very virtue which requires of humans that their
desires be ordered toward the right things and to the proper degree, the virtue that
supplants greed. The practice of this virtue is the practice of poverty, and entails the
turning of the soul away from material goods and pleasures toward the more substantial
goods and pleasures that belong to the soul as a consequence of its very nature. The
Phaedo describes this transformation of the soul as practicing for death, and this practice
itself is called κθαρσις. The κθαρσις described in the Phaedo parallels the ascents of the
soul to the vision of the Good and the Beautiful described in the Republic and
Symposium.436 This parallelism suggests that the processes described in the Republic and
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Symposium are cathartic processes. In the case of the Symposium itself, this implies that
the effect of Eros rightly directed, is κθαρσις, and that the elucidation of various levels of
ascent to the vision of the Beautiful is an elucidation of the stages of this κθαρσις.
Where the Phaedo describes κθαρσις in terms of man’s rational element, however, the
Symposium describes a κθαρσις of man’s affective element. In what follows, I will
discuss the nature of κθαρσις, the concept of κθαρσις put forward in the Phaedo, and
show how this conception of κθαρσις is present in the Symposium’s presentation of Eros
as comprising Poverty and Resource.

The Concept of Kθαρσις in the Phaedo and the Sophist

In the Phaedo, the true philosopher (Mρθς φιλσοφος) is described as practicing for
death,437 and this practice, insofar as it aims for the separation of the soul from the
pollution of the body, is described as κθαρσις. The term κθαρσις itself has several
applications, descriptive of the purification needed by the body for physical health,
descriptive of the purification of both body and soul needed by initiates of mystery
religions, and finally descriptive of the philosophical process by which the soul is
purified of the confusion and misdirection that results from its communion with the
body.438 We might, then, distinguish three distinct senses of κθαρσις: medical (of the
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body), religious (ritual purifications of both body and soul), and philosophical. Though
Plato’s sense of κθαρσις in the Phaedo is primarily philosophical, it seems best
understood in relation to and as arising from the others. Evidence from both the Phaedo
and the Sophist shows that Plato applies the concept of κθαρσις to both body and soul. In
the Sophist, Plato identifies κθαρσις as a kind of separation and distinguishes purification
of the body from that of the soul.439 In the Phaedo, Plato presents κθαρσις as necessary
for the proper attitude toward bodily pleasures as well as for the proper orientation of the
soul toward the divine, suggesting both a kind of bodily κθαρσις and a spiritualintellectual one.
Each of the kinds of κθαρσις mentioned above requires a cleansing, and it is by
means of this cleansing that a certain kind of health is achieved; that which cleans the
physical, leads to physical health; that which cleans the spiritual and intellectual to
spiritual and intellectual health. In the Phaedo, Plato describes a κθαρσις that benefits
the health of the whole soul, so that his description of the philosophical life is not limited
to describing the life of a rational ego, but encompasses the desires and passions shared
with animals, the passions singular to man in his aspirations to glory and fame, and the
passion most singular to man in his desire for truth.440 Plato’s presentation of κθαρσις in
the Phaedo has three distinct aspects: (1) it is necessary for the proper attitude toward
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bodily pleasures (2) it is necessary for the acquisition of pure knowledge, and so also for
the proper orientation of the soul toward the divine (3) it involves a practice and a
habituation of the soul, and so a way of life or ‘βος’.441
In the Phaedo, as in the Sophist, κθαρσις is defined in terms of separation. The
Phaedo’s initial definition of κθαρσις is offered by Socrates:
And does not the purification (κθαρσις) consist in this which has been
mentioned long ago in our discourse, in separating, so far as possible, the
soul from the body and teaching the soul the habit of collecting and
bringing itself together from all parts of the body, and living, so far as it
can, both now and hereafter, alone by itself, freed from the body as from
fetters?442
Kθαρσις, as a process of separating the soul from the body, and as the teaching of a habit,
is a kind of practice. This means, on the one hand, that the κθαρσις is not achieved all at
once and in one moment. It also means that the actual doing, the activity, of κθαρσις is
repeated. Whatever this activity turns out to be, it will be an activity that must be done
repeatedly, and, since the end of this activity is separation from the body, the repetition of
the activity that achieves this end will move the soul gradually toward its purification.
The repetition is not merely the doing of the same thing over and again, but the doing of
an activity at increasing levels of perfection. There is a second sense in which the
activity associated with κθαρσις is not merely replication, for the κθαρσις the
philosopher undertakes is one of both body and soul. This is illustrated in the Phaedo’s
discussion of practicing for death.
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The practice for death that Plato describes in the Phaedo involves a κθαρσις of
both the body and the soul. One reason that the philosopher in the Phaedo is presented as
practicing for death (or dead already) is his attitude toward worldly or temporal goods.
This is in fact one reason that Simmias gives for most people’s poor opinion of
philosophers—they seem so insensible as to be dead already.443 The philosopher does
not “care much about the so-called pleasures, such as eating and drinking…[and] the
pleasures of love…the possession of fine clothes and shoes and the other personal
adornments.”444 Rather, Socrates proposes that the philosopher will either despise such
things or desire them in a way that is proportional to their necessity for life.445 The
philosopher, then, adopts an attitude that might be described as frugal; he does not reject
bodily goods and pleasures altogether, but rejects the attitude that seeks these goods more
than they are necessary, to the exclusion of other more important goods. In this respect,
the philosopher lives a life of poverty; part of his practicing for death involves disdain for
material goods, bodily pleasures, and the indulgences of the dandy. The κθαρσις, or
separation from the body, regards the necessary desires described in the Republic,446 and
thus also entails a proper disposition toward the pleasures associated with these desires.
The philosopher’s practice for death is not limited to purification from pleasures
associated with the body, but includes also purification from knowledge associated with
the body, that which is gained by means of sensation. Even the best of the senses, i.e.
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sight and hearing, yield only inaccurate knowledge.447 Sense knowledge, and so the
body, do not seem to bring the soul to pure knowledge. Pure knowledge, in this case, is
“to understand the true essence of each thing”448 and is best achieved by one “who
employs pure, absolute reason in his attempt to search out the pure, absolute essence of
things”.449 Plato’s description of the soul’s separation from the body indicates that the
separation from the body, accomplished completely only in death, involves the
withdrawal of the soul, so far as possible, from its sharing in the activities of the body.
The separation at which the soul aims is akin to the separation ascribed to the Forms, for
it is only the soul that is καθαρς that will dwell with the Forms after its final separation
from the body.450
The soul’s best disposition in this life is described here:
But it thinks best when none of these things troubles it, neither hearing nor
sight, nor pain nor any pleasure, but it is, so far as possible, alone by itself,
and takes leave of the body, and avoiding, so far as it can, all association
or contact with the body, reaches out (Mρ5γηται τo4 nντος) toward the
reality.451
This passage makes clear that the κθαρσις of the soul applies both to the activities of
thinking and sensing. In one sense, this indicates that the philosopher’s practice applies
both to mind and body. The Phaedo is concerned with how we can think well, and the
ways in which our body interferes with this, through its material needs, desires,
447
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sensations, and perceptions. Nonetheless, there is an indication that even when the soul
is “alone by itself” it desires in some sense, for it “reaches out toward” the Forms. The
term Plato uses here is from the verb ‘Mρ5γω’, which may also mean “to yearn for” and is
related to ‘nρεξις’ or desire. Given Plato’s identification of three different kinds of
pleasure proper to three different powers of soul in the Republic, it seems that he is
alluding to the desire and pleasure proper to the rational element here. This aspect of the
rational element is central to understanding what rationality is for Plato; it is at the heart
of the coincidence of Truth, Beauty, and Goodness, and the reason why one who seeks
truth also seeks goodness.

The Method of Kθαρσις

Subsequent to this description of the need for a κθαρσις of the rational element in
man, Socrates describes a method of ascending to the highest of (principles or realities).
This “hypothetical method”452 is itself a κθαρσις, and describes the means by which the
philosopher moves closer to knowledge of the Forms. Socrates’ brief description of this
method begins with the assumption “that there are such things as absolute beauty and
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good and greatness and the like.”453 It is these absolute realities that cause things to be
and to continue in existence.454 In giving an account or explanation of a thing, it is these
absolute realities to which the true philosopher appeals. “…and when you had to give an
explanation of the principle, you would give it in the same way by assuming some other
principle which seemed to you the best of the higher ones, and so on until you reached
the one which was adequate.” This is the procedure proper to philosophers.455
The method described is an ascent that works its way toward knowledge of the
highest possible principle of explanation. The κθαρσις here described can be thought of
in terms of clarification, for it is by the removal of the nonessential elements that the
philosopher comes to know what is essential, and so also comes to know the Form itself.
Though the description given in this section of the Phaedo is a description regarding
objects of knowledge, this same description applies to the philosopher’s knowledge of
himself as a soul. As he separates himself from the matter of the body, from the
mutability of the material world, and gathers his soul up into himself, his soul is
separated from these things and becomes more itself. The nature of the soul itself is
clarified by this process—a process of κθαρσις.
Plato’s description of the hypothetical method offers a method for seeking the
truth of things. Though the ultimate objects of knowledge are essences or realities, the
end of philosophical method seems to encompass both disposition and attainment of this
end. The method itself requires constant practice. With respect to both knowledge and
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the body, this account of κθαρσις requires the philosopher to become distanced from
certain things, to voluntarily undergo deficiencies. The hypothetical method itself
involves a willingness to be deprived of one’s current hypothesis—one’s convictions,
one’s trusted reality—in order to come closer to pure knowledge. Cornford describes the
Phaedo’s emphasis on the withdrawal of the soul from the body as having “brought out
the ascetic strain in Socrates, the man of thought to whom the body with its senses and
appetites is at best a nuisance.”456 But this is not to say, as Cornford goes on to note, that
Socrates has “ignored or ‘abolished’ the passionate side of human nature…the man of
thought was also the man of passion, constantly calling himself a ‘lover’.”457 Curious as
it may seem, it is the relinquishing of passion that allows Socrates to become truly
passionate; his willing poverty allows him to appreciate things according to their place in
the cosmos. It is by not holding too tightly to bodily and material goods that one is freed
from paying them constant attention; one is no longer ruled by longings for these
transitory goods. Rather, by not clinging to them, one enjoys them when they present
themselves, and does not suffer from worries about their cessation. One may be truly
grateful for what is at hand, and truly present to the beauty and goodness of the moment.
This is, as we have seen in chapter three, the disposition designated by ‘φθονος’.
With respect to both knowledge and pleasure, the separation of soul from body is
deemed necessary because the association and community (κοινωνα and :µιλα) with the
body misleads the soul, directing it toward and making it like the inconstant and
transitory nature of body and matter. As always with Plato, the soul becomes like the
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things on which it gazes and with which it spends its time. In terms of both the
intellectual and moral lives, then, the soul’s bodily habitation presents obstacles to it.
The practice for dying is, in the case of the body and the soul, done in order to make the
soul most like the realities that it resembles, i.e. the Forms.458
Virtue and κθαρσις

After the initial discussion of κθαρσις and its relation to sensation and pleasure,
the Phaedo offers another definition of κθαρσις:
And virtue which consists in the exchange of such things for each other
without wisdom, is but a painted imitation of virtue and is really slavish
and has nothing healthy or true in it; but truth is in fact a purification
(κθαρσις) from all these things [pleasures, pains, fears], and self-restraint
and justice and courage and wisdom itself are a kind of purification
(καθαρµς). And I fancy that those men who established the mysteries
were not unenlightened, but in reality had a hidden meaning when they
said long ago that whoever goes uninitiated and unsanctified to the other
world will lie in the mire, but he who arrives there initiated and purified
will dwell with the gods. For as they say in the mysteries, “the thyrsusbearers are many, but the mystics few”; and these mystics are, I believe,
those who have been true philosophers.459
This second definition of κθαρσις distinguishes between real and apparent virtue. In the
two conceptions of κθαρσις discussed above, the concept of purification and the practice
for death were applied to the bodily appetites and the rational faculty. Here, these same
concepts are applied to the moral virtues, and the conception of moral virtue that informs
this application is built upon what was previously established with regard to bodily
pleasures and pains. It becomes clear in this passage that moral virtue encompasses
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pleasures and pains that are not, strictly speaking, bodily. Such pleasures and pains are
those Plato associates with the middle part of the soul in the Republic, and they are
brought to mind here in part because of the emphasis on the virtue of courage.
The perfection of the soul is not a merely “rational” enterprise, for it must acquire
virtues as well as knowledge. Truth is able to achieve this, and the virtues are described
as “καθαρµς”, which may indicate that they are the means of purification, but also that
they are states of purification.460 This double meaning of καθαρµς suggests that virtue, as
a practice, is the means by which the soul is purified, but that this practice which by
means of repetition becomes habit is thereby also a purified state or disposition. Virtue
understood as a habit is thus a state of purification, but the actions that continue to flow
from that habit are virtue as practice continuously enacted, and so also practice
continuously purified. It is in this sense that κθαρσις is thus both disposition and
activity.
Also notable in the above passage is that it develops a distinction between real
and apparent virtue, where apparent virtue involves a false ordering of pleasures and
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pains.461 The false order of pleasures occurs when one pleasure is chosen as supreme and
other pleasures are foregone for its sake. For example, a lover of money foregoes the
pleasures of fine food and drink so that he can retain his money. Though he may appear
moderate, he is not, since he checks his desires for fine food and drink only for the sake
of a pleasure he has chosen to preference—that of having money. He has not purified
himself of love for material goods in this instance, but developed instead a form of greed
with respect to a particular object. This greed prevents him from loving and desiring
higher goods, like the virtues themselves, that are proper to the soul. His actions and
habits are also governed by this love that he has made supreme, so that all he does is
ordered to achieving this one purpose—the accumulation of wealth. Plato’s distinction
here between real and apparent virtue emphasizes the importance of properly ordered
desire, where the proper orientation of desire is made possible by knowing truth and thus
what is truly desirable.462
The Sophist provides a clearer set of distinctions regarding κθαρσις,
distinguishing between κθαρσις of soul and body, and then further distinguishing kinds
of κθαρσις proper to the soul itself. The two kinds of purification of the soul are based
upon the two kinds of evil that may befall the soul. The first kind of evil that may befall
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the soul is disease, or discord, the “dissolution of kindred elements” in the soul, and this
is called vice. The second kind of evil is deformity, “the want of measure” in the soul
that makes itself evident in the soul’s motion, especially its cognitive motion, and this is
called ignorance.463 When the motion of the soul repeatedly fails to hit its mark, this
indicates a lack of measure or symmetry in the soul itself. This want of measure is the
cause of the movement of the soul going astray and not hitting its mark. The Stranger
describes this sort of ignorance as “the aberration of a mind which is bent on truth, and in
which the process of understanding is perverted.”464
The Sophist’s description of the deformity of the soul as a want of measure
implies that the motion or Eros of the soul is affected by the disposition of the soul itself.
Purification removes these evils from the soul, leaving behind only what is good.465 As
such, the purification described in the Sophist is therapeutic. The method of purification
is not the same for both kinds of evil, but is specific to each. This passage from the
Sophist shares with the Phaedo the principle of κθαρσις as the means by which the soul
is rid of those things that are detrimental to it, as well as the application of this principle
to the moral and theoretical virtues alike. The soul is a thing with motion, and this
motion is Eros. Eros has a natural or proper object, i.e., the Beautiful itself, and goes
astray when it aims at this but does not hit it. A perversion of Eros in this sense would
be, e.g., taking the beauty of a particular body as Beauty itself, because this would
amount to confusing a particular instance of beauty with Beauty itself, and mistakenly
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taking this particular beauty as the proper object of Eros. The lover’s mistake in this
example becomes more apparent if we bear in mind the use and work of Eros discussed
in chapter four. Teleologically, Eros is the human means to ε$δαιµονα and participation
in divine immortality. The latter of these, in particular, is only achieved by the soul’s
vision of the Form of Beauty itself.
It is habituation that creates the measure and symmetry needed in the soul if Eros
is to hit its mark—if it is to lead the soul to Beauty itself. In the Sophist, education and
instruction are the cures for the ignorance that is exemplified in the soul’s want of
measure. Cornford suggests that the description of the Symposium depends on prior
habituation, on having attained σωφροσ"νη, the disposition of poverty. Poverty, at the
levels of bodily appetite and θυµς, is the condition for the ascent in the Symposium.
Poverty applied at the next level is a poverty of mind, but with regard to its desire for
truth under the aspect of the beautiful. The rational order is also an aesthetic and moral
order. As much as the soul desires to gaze on Beauty, its attitude or disposition toward
its objects must remain free of graspingness and greed.
Croissant’s exposition of κθαρσις in Aristote et les mysteres shows that the
mystery religions in general made use of music and rhythm within their rites to
accomplish κθαρσις.466 The divine enthusiasm achieved in the ritual supplants the
enthusiasm that is characterized by imbalance, and in its place reestablishes balance and
proportion. What is restored, according to Croissant, is balance and proportion; but she
argues that Plato views this as a lesser achievement, (in the religious rituals), as it is a
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“physical” balance that is achieved.467 Indeed, this is the sort of balance that Plato
describes in the Republic when he discusses the musical and physical education of the
guardians. The important contribution of Croissant’s discussion is that it highlights the
sense in which habituation is central to the concept of κθαρσις that Plato appropriates
from the mystery religions. The rituals and initiations there are practices that are
designed, in part, to restore balance and proportion to the body and soul. It is by means
of the periodic ritual dances that participants are relieved of ailments and restored to
health; just as the body requires regular food and exercise to maintain itself, so also with
the passions. The rituals and initiations are repetitious, they must from time to time be
repeated. In this sense, the engagement in dance is both habit and responsible for
maintaining disposition. The practice is engaged in at regular intervals, as any habit, and
the consequence of the maintenance of this habit is the maintenance of a balanced and
proportioned disposition.
As Croissant’s discussion indicates, the concept of purification is closely bound
up with that of madness or µανα, since it is by µανα that κθαρσις is achieved. As
Burkert notes in Greek Religion, “the aim [of µανα], nonetheless, in reality and in myth,
is to bring madness back to sense, a process which requires purification and the purifying
priest.”468 The discussion of madness in the Phaedrus supports this description,
especially in its account of the second kind of madness that frees people from evil by
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means of κθαρσις.469 For Plato in particular, it seems that µανα is not merely a means of
returning to sense, but the means by which man transcends sense, and, by allowing
himself to be possessed by a god, becomes divine himself. This divinization of the
human being is at once the product of purification and the purified state of man, i.e., the
soul liberated from the bondage of place and time.
In addition to this conception of κθαρσις as restoring order via µανα, the mystery
religions provide a conception of κθαρσις as progressive and transformative. Burkert
writes:
Every initiation means a change in status that is irreversible; whoever has
himself initiated on the basis of his individual decision separates himself
from others and integrates himself into a new group. In his own eyes the
mystes is distinguished by a special relation to the divine, by a form of
piety.470
The interpretation of κθαρσις as not only a process, but also as the acquiring and
maintaining of a disposition through habit and practice is supported by Plato’s
appropriation of the language and imagery of mystery religions in the Phaedo and the
Symposium. This language appears in both the Phaedo and the Symposium. It seems we
tend to think of a “process” in linear fashion, starting with A and ending with B, where A
might be transformed by the process it undergoes in such a way that nothing of its
original state remains. But neither the “process” of the κθαρσις, nor the “process” of
469
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ascent is such a thing; the process of purification makes A more what it essentially is by
removing what is extraneous, on the one hand, and by the establishment of habit and
disposition on the other. The establishing of a habit and disposition is gradual, and one
action, every time it is performed, adds strength to the habit and grounds the disposition.
The transformation that occurs, then, is not one that obliterates the beginning, but one
that builds upon and further completes the individual engaged in the initiations. What is
paradoxical is that this completion is a process more akin to refinement, where the
individual becomes more truly herself by the progressive removal of what is inessential
to her being. Like the movement toward truth in the Phaedo, and like the dialogical
movement of the Symposium itself, the erotic ascent is a description of such a refinement.
In both dialogues, Plato appropriates language and imagery from mystery
religions, and by their employment contributes to the conceptual framework of the
process of κθαρσις. In the Phaedo, the most significant terms employed are τελετ/,471
βος,472 µελ5τηµα.473 The term τελετ/ is used generally of the rituals belonging to mystery
religions.474 τελετ/ designate the rituals and initiations in which a mystes would engage.
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Such initiations are frequently purificatory, but are also closely bound up with the way of
life adopted by members of a particular cult. Such a way of life is designated by the term
βος. Burkert’s description of the Pythagorean way of life, according to the oral teachings
or akousmata, provides an illustration of the way that ritual and practice transform daily
life:
To take the akousmata seriously means a disconcerting narrowing of life.
As one rises or goes to bed, puts on shoes or cuts one’s nails, rakes the
fire, puts on a pot or eats, there is always a rule to be observed, something
wrong to be avoided.475
Burkert’s description draws our attention to the different ritualistic facets of religious life,
and points to a distinction between the rituals and initiations of ceremony and those of
daily life. Rituals and initiations are instances of ceremonial purification, but the daily
rituals adopted by the practitioners of the religion are the stuff of the way of life, and it is
these daily practices that are ultimately transformative of individual habits and
dispositions. In this way, the βος is a constant and continuous purification. The
difficulty and arduous nature of such practice is indicated in the Phaedo by the term
‘µελ5τηµα’, which “is regularly used of practicing an activity requiring effort and
attention.”476
In the Symposium, the terms τελετ/ and βος appear again, and the allusions to
mystery religions, especially the cult of Demeter, are more vivid given the presence of a

Le Banquet, in which he notes that the term τελετ/ is synonymous with the intitations of
mystery religions, indicating a lack of distinction between ritual and initiation.
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Rowe notes that the formulation at 67e5, “meletan + infinitive…is regularly used of
practicing an activity requiring effort and attention” (Rowe, Phaedo, 144-5).
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priestess, the depiction of an νοδος or ascent, the specific naming of the mysteries at 209e
and the description of the final vision of Beauty in terms of the final revelation of the
mysteries, as +ποπτικς. The understanding of τελετ/ and +πιτ/δευµα as making up part of
the βος of the mystes is further clarified by the structure of the ascent to the vision of the
Beautiful, which is itself described in terms borrowed from the Eleusinian mysteries.477
The use of religious language and imagery in the ascent passage, the centrality of
the theogonic account of Eros, and the presentation of Eros as a daimon, together suggest
that Plato intends his readers to understand Diotima’s account within a religious context.
This supports an understanding of the ascent passage as a kind of κθαρσις. Though
neither κθαρσις nor µανα are explicitly named in the ascent passage, they are present in
the imagery of the Eros-daimon, the poverty of Eros, and the imagery of the ascent
passage. The Phaedrus’ inclusion of Eros as one of the four kinds of madness lends
further support to such an interpretation, but the evidence of the Symposium, with its
portrayal of Eros as daimon, provides good grounds for considering the effects of Eros,
i.e. possession by a daimon and thus µανα, as a purification.478 The connection between
Eros and κθαρσις is further suggested by the thematic development of Eros as bound to
poverty that was discussed in chapter three.
If we adopt Burkert’s description of the relationship between µανα and κθαρσις,
that “the aim [of µανα], nonetheless, in reality and in myth, is to bring madness back to
sense, a process which requires purification and the purifying priest”, then possession by
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the Eros-daimon is the µανα that is at the same time the κθαρσις necessary for the soul’s
ascent to the Beautiful. This might be understood with respect to the various aspects of
Diotima’s account of Eros. The ambiguous leader of the lover in the ascent passage turns
out to be the Eros-daimon, which moves the soul upward to the vision of Beauty. The
ascent passage itself describes a gradual purification from association with the body, in a
manner parallel to that described in the Phaedo. The lover who ascends is freed from and
purified of the “hubris” of the body that is opposed to the poverty embodied in the Erosdaimon. In the Phaedrus, the person possessed by gods is purified of something and also
produces something as a consequence of this purification, e.g. the Pythia of prophecy, the
poet of poetry. In the Phaedo, the consistent notion of κθαρσις is the deliverance or
release of the soul from the fetters of its association with the body. In the Symposium, we
see these senses of µανα combined. At every stage of the ascent passage, the lover is
further separated from what is petty, material, and temporal; and at every instance of
gazing on beauty, he produces something beautiful. His madness is not unlike those
Plato describes in the Phaedrus, for just as the prophetess and the poet, he produces
beautiful things as a consequence of divine possession.
The relationship between µανα and κθαρσις captures the sense in which the Erosdaimon is at once Poros and Penia, at once moving forward and poor. Perhaps, more
fundamentally, this relationship between madness and purification, resource and poverty,
expresses a paradox of human existence. Pieper describes just such a paradox in his
discussion of the Phaedrus:
On the one hand man is of such a nature that he possesses himself in
freedom and self-determination; he can and must examine critically all
that he encounters; he can and must give shape to his own life on the basis

224
of his insights. On the other hand this same autonomous man is
nonetheless so much involved in the Whole of reality that things can
happen to him and he can be dislodged from his own autonomy. This
need not take only the form of forcible restriction. Provided that the man
does not close himself off obdurately, it may take such a form that in the
very loss of his self-possession another fulfillment is granted him, one
attainable in no other way.479
The same strange duality that Pieper describes is present in Diotima’s account of the
lover’s ascent to the Beautiful. The movement from one stage of the ascent to the next is
dependent on the lover realizing the paltry nature of the beloved object, on his reflective
interaction with the objects and persons around him. At the same time, Diotima refers
time and again to a leader or teacher who guides the lover from one stage to the next, and,
in the final vision of Beauty, the lover must wait for the Beautiful to reveal itself. The
lover must do preparatory work, he must journey as far as he can on his own, but the final
revelation comes to him from without, has its source outside of him, and he can only
make himself receptive to it.

Conclusion: The Purification of Eros

As we have seen, Plato’s use of the term ‘κθαρσις’ shows that it is a process by
which the soul separates itself from the body, and that this process brings the soul to the
fulfillment of its own nature. In the Phaedo, this κθαρσις applies not only to the rational
part of the soul, but also to the appetitive parts of the soul, and because of this involves
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both moral and intellectual virtue.480 The κθαρσις described is not a merely linear
process, but is transformative of the soul because through practice it instills habit and
disposition, from which flow virtuous actions. To this concept of κθαρσις the Sophist
contribrutes an understanding of κθαρσις as corrective of the motion of the soul, so that
the purified motion is more able to hit the mark at which it aims. In the Symposium, Plato
makes use of the language of the mysteries, whose initiations are cathartic, to describe a
progressive and transformative κθαρσις of rational affectivity. Loving rightly is the
positive articulation of the process of purification, whose negative articulation is the
poverty of Eros.
Though the Phaedo’s treatment of κθαρσις remarks on the proper attitude toward
necessary desires and the desires proper to the middle part of the soul, this treatment is
given in terms of the soul’s capacity for thinking, rather than loving. In the Symposium,
on the other hand, we are presented with an account of how the soul moves from love of
individual material beauty to love of the Beautiful itself. This, too, is a kind of
purification of the rational soul, but with respect to the motion proper to the soul—Eros.
Cornford compares this ascent to the Beautiful to the ascent described in the Republic:
Now in Diotima’s discourse the Greater Mysteries of Eros take this for
their point of departure. They describe the conversion of Eros from the
love of a single beautiful person to the love of Beauty itself. The upward
journey of emotion runs parallel to the upward journey of the intellect in
480
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the mathematical and dialectical studies of the Republic. The intellect
soars from the world of sense to the source of truth and goodness; but the
wings on which it rises are the wings of desire for the source of beauty.
The true self, the divine soul, is not a mere faculty of thought and
dispassionate contemplation of truth; it has its own principle of energy in
the desire kindled by goodness in the guise of the beautiful. The
intimations of immortality already discernible in the lower forms of Eros
are now confirmed when its true nature is disclosed as a passion for
immortality in an eternal world.481
Cornford’s remarks indicate, as does my own analysis in the last chapter,that the ascent
of the Symposium properly applies to the rational element of the soul. The lesser
mysteries of Eros that precede the ascent passage but are contained within the
explanation of the effects of Eros describe the pleasures and activities proper to the
irrational appetites and θυµς. The ascent passage itself, however, describes the ascent of
the affectivity of the rational element itself.
Just as the soul can be misdirected in its thinking and knowing if it focuses on the
transitory objects of the material world, so also can it be misdirected in its loving. The
κθαρσις described in the Phaedo advises the philosopher to beware of the ways in which
sensation and sensible pleasure can mislead his thought. In similar fashion, Diotima’s
description of the ascent to the vision of the Beautiful advises the philosopher to move
beyond the merely material and particular instantiations of beauty found in the sensible
realm. The movement of ascent she describes moves from individual material
instantiations of beauty, through beauties of soul and actions and upward toward their
ground in Beauty itself.
Golden writes that the κθαρσις of the Phaedo “is clearly a purification process by
which the soul is freed of the admixture of the body and thus becomes able to
481
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contemplate clearly.”482 In similar fashion, as we saw in chapter six, the ascent to the
vision of Beauty in the Symposium is a purification process; it, too, separates the soul
from the confusions of the body, but with regard to its movement toward beautiful things,
i.e., its rational affectivity. The consequence of this purification is the state of existential
readiness described as φιλοσοφα φθονος. This is the state Josef Pieper describes in his
discussion of erotic madness in the Phaedrus:
However, Socrates’ speech does maintain that erotic emotion may also be
one way in which man can partake of “the greatest blessings”—provided
man does not corrupt the erotic emotion by, for example, refusing to pay
the price of receptivity to the divine madness. The price is a surrender of
his autonomy; he must throw himself open to the god, rather than lock the
doors of his soul by choosing sensual pleasures alone.483
The lover must engage in the rituals and initiations of Eros, must learn the proper order of
loving, and the proper order of beloved objects, and must learn to love them to the
appropriate degree. Much of the practice involved in this learning is the practice of
σωφροσ"νη. But human σωφροσ"νη yields only human immortality; divine immortality
depends on the lover’s ability to wait in stillness and expectation for the vision of Beauty
itself.
In his article “The Dialectic of Eros in Plato’s Symposium”, R. A. Markus writes
that Plato “shows us love both as passivity subject to ethical evaluation and as the activity
which performs this evaluation; as natural impulse and inclination as well as free, selfimposed inclination or duty.”484 This “duality of love”, Markus writes, is not unlike St.
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Augustine’s ordo amoris, insofar as it captures “the right order freely imposed on human
love by human love itself.”485 These last words suggest an understanding of the ascent
passage of the Symposium that encompasses more than a depiction of the steps one must
take in order to study erotics properly and attain its ultimate end, the vision of beauty;
they suggest that the attaining of this end results in a transformation of the lover such that
his love is manifested differently according to the goodness of the object loved. The
ascent passage, then, accomplishes two things: the articulation of a method or practice by
which one ascends to the ultimate vision and a description of the disposition or attitude of
the true lover toward beautiful objects located at the various stages of the ascent.486
This ordo amoris of which Markus speaks is the consequence of the purification
of Eros. If we return now to the Symposium, bearing in mind that the soul is a thing with
motion, and that this motion is Eros, we can see the sense in which we might speak of a
κθαρσις of Eros. Speaking of an affective κθαρσις of the soul involves the purification of
the soul with respect to (1) the objects loved, (2) the order or priority of the objects loved,
(3) the degree to which these objects are loved given their place in the cosmos, and (4)
the motion or Eros itself of the soul insofar as it is teleologically ordered toward
ε$δαιµονα and participation in divine immortality. All of these aspects are contained
within the ascent passage, both as a description of the method of κθαρσις, and as the state
achieved by the lover who makes the ascent. In the penultimate stage of the ascent, the
lover is depicted as procreating in ‘φιλοσοφα φθονος’, or “a love of wisdom that grudges
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nothing.”487 This love of wisdom that grudges nothing is the sought after state of the true
lover and necessary predisposition for his seeing pure (καθαρς) beauty. In ‘φιλοσοφα
φθονος’ is an Eros that entails a kind of poverty, but one that is chosen, and in the course
of the ascent cultivated, by the lover. The lover is thus himself transformed in the course
of the ascent, as is the nature of his love for things around him. The lover’s soul itself
becomes more like that which it loves most; in this sense too, the lover is transformed, for
his soul becomes more like the καθαρς beauty that is the object of his love. The erotic
ascent in the Symposium is a kind of κθαρσις, and one that yields “a love of wisdom that
grudges nothing.”
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